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Summary  
The dissertation describes a practically proven, particularly efficient approach for the verifica-
tion of digital circuit designs. The approach outperforms simulation based verification wrt. 
final circuit quality as well as wrt. required verification effort. In the dissertation, the para-
digm of transaction based verification is ported from simulation to formal verification. One 
consequence is a particular format of formal properties, called operation properties. Circuit 
descriptions are verified by proof of operation properties with Interval Property Checking 
(IPC), a particularly strong SAT based formal verification algorithm. Furtheron, a complete-
ness checker is presented that identifies all verification gaps in sets of operation properties. 
This completeness checker can handle the large operation properties that arise, if this ap-
proach is applied to realistic circuits. The methodology of operation properties, Interval Prop-
erty Checking, and the completeness checker form a symbiosis that is of particular benefit to 
the verification of digital circuit designs. On top of this symbiosis an approach to completely 
verify the interaction of completely verified modules has been developed by adaptation of the 
modelling theories of digital systems.  
 
The approach presented in the dissertation has proven in multiple commercial application 
projects that it indeed completely verifies modules. After reaching a termination criterion that 
is well defined by completeness checking, no further bugs were found in the verified modules. 
The approach is marketed by OneSpin Solutions GmbH, Munich, under the names "Operation 
Based Verification" and "Gap Free Verification". 
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1 Preliminaries 
1.1 Note about the translation 
This document is a translation of my thesis “Vollständige funktionale Verifikation” to obtain 
the level of Dr.-Ing. at the University of Kaiserslautern from April 2009. The translation was 
prepared in May 2017. I took the freedom to correct errors and to update one or the other re-
mark. 
 
To save some effort, the translation started from the output of a public domain version of 
Google Translate. Since I could only spend a limited amount of effort on the translation, I 
skipped the appendix with the proofs. Please contact me in case of need.  
  
The original German text can be obtained from kluedo.ub.uni-kl.de/volltexte/2009/2356. 
1.2 Foreword  
This work has been developed in an industrial environment, initially at the Central Research 
and Development department of Siemens AG, then at Infineon, and finally at the startup 
OneSpin Solutions GmbH, which further develops and markets these ideas under the names 
"Operation Based Verification" and "Gap Free Verification".  
This has resulted in many ideas of this work being intensively examined. Without the con-
vincing outcome from pilot projects for commercial deployment, I would never have had the 
chance to work out the complete verification. In these projects, our customers, both internal in 
our Siemens and Infineon times, as well as the real customers, had a large share. I am grateful 
to them for their challenges, for the insights they have given me into their processes, and 
sometimes also for the enthusiasm with which they have taken our results, although in most 
cases these results revealed errors in their circuit designs and led to additional work.  
The work presented here has been created in a high-profile environment. So I could build on a 
high-class technology, which has many mothers and fathers. To name them individually 
would be beyond the scope of this preface.  
Our front-end people developed and supervised the precise and powerful programs that read 
the circuits descriptions, which cope with all the finesse and all the sizes of the RTL descrip-
tions presented to them. The tools developed in our prover group are among the most power-
ful in the world. They spoiled us in such a way that today we become impatient even with 
large circuits, if a proof takes longer than 5 minutes. A very important development task for a 
formal verification tool is the preparation of user input and the intuitive feedback about the 
results of the proof. The colleagues concerned have created a product that is pleasant and effi-
cient to use and which is able to deal with highest complexity requirements. As a crown, a 
professional graphical user interface was created, which presents the functionality in an easily 
understandable way. All of this technology, combined in the OneSpin 360 MV product, was 
at my disposal to develop the ideas presented here, which in turn influenced the product. For 
this I am grateful to the developers.  
In addition to the developers, I would like to thank Sven Beyer, Martin Freibothe, Steven 
Obua, Jens Schönherr and Sebastian Skalberg, who have been with me in the group for meth-
odology, technology and advanced applications of OneSpin Solutions GmbH for their ideas, 
feedbacks, and further developments. I had further fruitful discussions with our academic co-
operation partners. I would particularly like to thank Professor Wolfgang Kunz for the tech-
nical and scientific discussions, for the support of this thesis and for the feedback I received as 
a doctoral student. I also thank Dominik Stoffel for his many improving hints.  
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The work was supported by the German Federal Ministry for Research and Development 
within the framework of the research projects VALSE, Herkules and Verisoft, which also 
supported our contacts in the academic world.  
This fertile high-caliber environment goes back to Professor Wolfram Büttner. His strategic 
skill and deep technical insight have attracted many of us to work in this field. He kept this 
working group together for over 10 years under very changing conditions. He frequently initi-
ated the important considerations that led to technical progress. This culminated in the startup 
OneSpin Solutions GmbH, which he founded. However, his share in this work goes far be-
yond business. Rather, he has helped me in countless conversations and many common lunch-
es to develop the ideas and to pinpoint them, as well as to evaluate the technology in its prac-
tical relevance. For this I thank him, as well as for his suggestion on this thesis, the many 
feedbacks, also on previous versions, as well as for the overall support.  
I would like to thank today's management of OneSpin Solutions for their support and discus-
sions during the preparation of this work, especially Michael Siegel for his helpful comments.  
A consequence of the industrial environment of this work is the patent protection, which was 
obtained or applied for for some of the concepts and inventions related to this work, e.g. for 
the completeness checker [Busch / Bormann 2005] and the generation of complete property 
sets for the verification of processor architectures against processor pipelines [Bormann / 
Beyer / Skalberg 2006]. I must point out that the unauthorized use of the patented parts of this 
work for research purposes or in industrial applications constitutes a breach of patent rights 
which would have legal consequences.  
A company like OneSpin Solutions GmbH is driven by explicitly stated or anticipated cus-
tomer requirements. I would therefore like to emphasize that I wrote this thesis independently 
of the company's opinion and strategy. The opinions and conclusions published here are my 
own and have been published independently of the official strategy of OneSpin Solutions 
GmbH. Accordingly, this work does not make any statements about development plans or 
goals of OneSpin Solutions GmbH.  
In the course of this work, my family had to do without husband and father even more than 
before. Now and then my wife and children hat to listen to reports of particularly good or par-
ticularly bad progress. I thank Beate, Ines and Joachim, for patience, forbearance and support.  
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2 Functional verification  
2.1 Formal Verification and the Verification Gap  
The complaint about the "verification gap" has accompanied the semiconductor industry for at 
least 15 years. Specifically, this complaint means that nowadays approximately 70% of the  
R & D cost for an ASIC are not spent on the actual circuit design, but on the verification, i.e. 
the quality assurance of the design. Despite the enormous cost, the success of the verification 
is rather modest: On average, an ASIC project needs 1.7 respins where the lithography masks 
for the production are replaced by improved ones. The cost of respins in the current technolo-
gy with structure sizes of 45 to 65 nm are in the range of 1 million euros. This high rate of 
failures is no surprise if one considers that the main workhorse of the verification is still simu-
lation, although the simulation models are about 1 million times slower than the finished 
chips. Even if many computers are involved in simulations for months, only a few minutes of 
the lifetime of a device are examined during the entire verification phase. This does not allow 
testing all critical situations such that functional flaws remain in the design and lead to 
respins.  
The problems culminate particularly in functional verification which shall ensure that the 
function provided to an end user is correct. Functional verification does not consider any 
physical interference effects or errors from the introduction of production-specific functionali-
ty such as test logic, clock tree balancing, etc.  
Almost as old as the complaint about the verification gap is the dream that formal verification 
could close the gap, or at least help to reduce it. In fact, formal verification is very successful 
in the form of combinatorial equivalence verification [Filkorn 1992, Brand 1993, Kunz 1993, 
Kuehlmann / Krohm 1997, Lohse / Warkentin 1998, Bormann / Warkentin 1999, Hoereth / 
Müller-Brahms / Rudlof 2002] and has almost pushed out the netlist simulation that was used 
before.  
But with combinatorial equivalence verification, it is only demonstrated that the circuit func-
tion is retained. It is not shown whether this function is correct in the sense of a specification. 
Therefore, combinatorial equivalence verification can only be used for process steps that are 
executed after the definition of the circuit function. Thus, combinatorial equivalence verifica-
tion is not a functional verification.  
2.2 Assertion-Based Formal Verification (ABFV)  
Formal verification has repeatedly demonstrated how useful it can be for functional verifica-
tion by making significant contributions to the design or verification of particularly complex 
building blocks such as processors [Beyer 2005, Buckow / Bormann 1993] or filters [Busch 
1991]. But then it was used by highly specialized experts, who applied theorem provers, i.e. 
highly complex proof tools. Approaches to make theorem proving available to a larger user 
community have so far failed commercially [Bombana et al. 1995].  
After 20 years of intense research in this field [Bryant 1986, Clarke / Emerson / Sistla 1986, 
Mayger / Harris 1991, Filkorn 1992] only the assertion-based formal verification (ABFV) is 
regarded acceptable. There are now commercial ABFV tools [Solidify undated, IFV 2005, 
Jasper 2007, 0-in 2005, Magellan undated, Conquest undated], which are based on the re-
search tools of the 1990s [McMillan 1992, Bormann et al. 1995].  
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The experience with the commercial ABFV tools is however sobering. Until recently, ambi-
tious design projects have still largely been carried out without the use of formal functional 
verification [Shimizu et al. 2006]. Raj Mitra, who heads the formal methods at Texas Instru-
ments [Mitra 2008], recognizes the benefits of formal verification, but criticizes among other 
issues the low circuit complexity that the tools can handle which requires the verification en-
gineers to develop a deep understanding of the circuit. Mitra also mentions the unreliability 
with which formal results can be achieved in a given period of time. This uncertainty arises 
because user-defined abstractions [Kroening / Seshia 2007] have to be tried and tested in or-
der to obtain verification results. Mitra considers it self-evident that formal verification can 
not fully investigate all functionality of a circuit.  
Whether ABFV will ever meet the hopes set for formal verification seems questionable 
against the background of statements by the architects of ABFV tools that today, after many 
years of intensive research, the tools still have complexity limits of around 1000 state varia-
bles [Jain et al. 2007]. This is not a particularly high improvement compared to the complexi-
ties of the late 1990s, when 300 state variables were reached on the computers at that time. It 
is questionable how much of the improvement since then are related to the  research efforts in 
the field of formal methods and how much comes from the pure improvement of the computer 
performance and the use of larger memories. With Moores Law about the growth of the com-
plexities of integrated circuits [Moore 1965] the development of ABFV did not keep pace at 
all.  
Other authors complain about the disconnect between ABFV and simulation-based verifica-
tion [Bailey 2007]. One indication of this is the uncertainty how much simulation can be re-
placed by the formal verification of a given set of assertions. Another problem is that the 
transaction-based view of today's simulation test benches does not find any resonance in the 
ABFV: Assertions usually investigate local aspects of the behavior of individual signals and 
ignore the overall picture that this signal behavior should be part of. This may be owed to the 
complexity limitations of the ABFV tools, but the disconnect extends even to the fact that the 
standard languages PSL [PSL 2004] or SVA [System Verilog 2005] of ABFV are opposed to 
a transaction-based approach by formal tools (see section 4.3.12). Furthermore, the user is 
only given case-by-case ideas about how assertions are actually to be set up [Foster et al. 
2003, Foster / Krolnik 2008].  
In addition, ABFV requires the development of deep circuit knowledge, although many veri-
fication engineers can not or do not want to be able to look into the modules to be verified. 
This is the result of a long-practiced division of tasks between verification engineers and cir-
cuit engineers.  
2.3 Today's Work Split Between Design and Verification  
Today's verification practice follows the methods already used 20 years ago in the design of 
the Alpha chip: Use of simulation, while the modules of the circuit are treated as black boxes. 
In order to detect a fault, it must be observable on the output signals of the module during the 
simulation.  
This observation  based quality assurance is also common in other fields of technology. How-
ever, it is often supplemented by a quality assurance that is based on the understanding of the 
implementation of the product and reasoning about the sensibility of the implementation. In 
the circuit design, this second procedure of quality assurance would correspond to a code re-
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view or the complete verification to be presented in this thesis. Codereviews are known as 
methods for achieving high quality standards [EN61508 2001], but are used very rarely.  
The main weakness of an observation based quality assurance is that errors are only identified 
with certain probabilities. However, the circuit design has so far arranged itself with this. Cir-
cuit verification has been improved by methods with which the occurrence probability of the 
errors has been gradually increased. Random pattern simulation, hardware acceleration, or 
simply faster simulation algorithms have made it possible to simulate more in the same time 
span.  By coverage criteria, input stimuli can be selected more carefully and simulate a larger 
set of situations.  
However, every single chip is orders of magnitude faster than the simulation during its design 
phase, and millions of such chips may be put into operation. Hence, even errors with the 
smallest observation probabilities are revealed. As long as one is satisfied with gradual im-
provements in the observation probability of errors, errors will continue to occur in the field, 
at least those with a too low observation probability to discover them during the verification 
phase.  
The striking advantage of the simulation-based black box verification is, however, that it al-
lows a task split between design and verification: Ideally, the verification code (i.e. the test 
bench) is developed independently of the implementation and is therefore usable even if the 
implementation is completely changed. The verification engineer is not compromised by the 
knowledge of the implementation, and thus runs less risk of taking over wrong views from the 
designer and thereby accepting errors. Since the verification code is created independently of 
the implementation it is therefore available early in the design process. Ideally, it is already 
used during the circuit design for fast quality assurance of newly developed circuit parts.  
This task split between design and verification is now deeply rooted: The verification tools 
and methods are entirely focused on the phenomena at the module boundaries. They deal with 
interfaces and the transactions there. Accordingly, the tools and methods are concerned with 
transactions, their generation and their identification. There are, for example, transaction-
based reference models and scoreboards to compare transaction sequences.  
Verification engineers look at circuits as objects that are described by the sequences of the 
transactions on their interfaces. The actual circuit description plays a subordinate role. This 
goes to the point that verification engineers do not understand circuit descriptions because 
they neither know circuit description languages (such as VHDL or Verilog) nor do they have 
an overview of common circuit structures. An understanding based quality assurance is not 
possible for such verification engineers.  
Designers, of course, know the internals of circuit designs. However, they are supposed to 
provide their circuit designs quickly, so that the verification teams can begin their work. Qual-
ity issues are less important than the design speed. The designers pass the code early to the 
verification engineers, and then continue with the next modules. Errors are discovered later 
than if the designers themselves had carried out some quality assurance. The late discovery 
requires the designers to re-familiarize themselves with half-forgotten code. The error correc-
tions become more protracted and uncertain.  
This strong task split between designers and verification engineers and the associated lack of 
information is regarded by opinion-makers in industry as a serious structural problem [Kranen 
2008].  
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All in all, RTL code is often difficult to understand. If the code was software, it would often 
fail to meet the principles of sustainable, maintenance-oriented development. This becomes 
obvious at company-internal IP blocks, which are developed for use in various ASICs. Such 
modules are maintained, i.e. they undergo several revisions, usually also by various responsi-
ble persons. During this maintenance, badly understandable code is problematic, because the 
revisions are then carried out on the basis of an imperfect understanding. This reduces the 
quality of the module with every revision.  
If errors in the IP blocks then accumulate, this loss of quality is often attributed to the age of 
the testbench and its outdated technology, although the testbench was originally sufficient to 
ensure the quality of the first RTL version and the reuse was originally advertised as a meas-
ure to increase the quality.  
2.4 Today's verification methodology and ABFV  
The work split between the circuit design and the verification and the deep internalized prac-
tice of looking at modules as a black box in the verification process, leads to acceptance prob-
lems of ABFV. It starts with the fact that it is not clear who is to write and prove the asser-
tions.  
One class of assertions is characterized as designer assertions. These are assertions which do 
not actually state anything about the specified function of the module, but about individual 
implementation details, often simply about the local interplay of some code lines. Such asser-
tions are written by designers. They are easy to prove: It is clear to the designer which local 
aspect of the function is to be checked, the formalization by an assertion is simple, and the 
relevant circuit part is small so that there are no complexity problems when using the formal 
tools. But such assertions also do not verify much, even if they occur in hundreds or thou-
sands.  
A more interesting class of assertions are high level ssertions, which are used to prove speci-
fied aspects of the function of a module. In the specification, these aspects always look very 
succinct, but the devil is in the details. In the implementation, the developer may have insert-
ed intended exceptions to the concise formulation of the specification. These exceptions must 
either be incorporated into the assertion, or they must be related to environmental constraints, 
which in turn must be formalized. The intended exceptions, however, have to be distinguished 
from the unintended exceptions, because the latter point to the errors that the verification 
should reveal. Both the identification of the intended exceptions as well as the differentiation 
of unintended exceptions requires knowledge of the circuit.  
Where circuit knowledge is not to be acquired, the verification of high-level assertions is lim-
ited to those that can be purchased as a prefabricated verification IP. Such assertions are often 
related to protocol compliance. This verification task is also well addressed by simulation, 
because many approaches are based on the extraction of transactions.   
But even if a verification engineer has set up a first trustworthy formalization of a high-level 
assertion, complexity problems can still occur, and they are the worse the more a high-level 
assertion indicates the correctness of the circuit. In order to master such complexity problems, 
the verification task is split or a more abstract version of the task is prove. Both can not be 
carried out successfully without the knowledge of the circuit and this probably leads to Raj 
Mitra's complaint [Mitra 2008] about the unpredictability of the effort for a formal verifica-
tion.  
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All in all, it is not possible to formally investigate high-level assertions without knowing the 
circuit to be examined. This is why ABFV of high-level assertions is somehow sitting be-
tween the chairs: developers do not want to invest effort to formalize the high-level assertions 
properly, and the verification engineers lack the time, experience and knowledge to get into 
the circuit functionality. Moreover, as long as the simulation is the main source of insight dur-
ing the verification, effort and benefits of high-level assertions are even in an unfavorable 
ratio. Accordingly, the concept of verification of high-level assertions is not widely used to 
date.  
2.5 Complete Verification  
The work to be presented in this dissertation takes a different approach than the ABFV. First-
ly section 3.2 presents a generally applicable idea of what is to be verified: Operations of the 
circuit are introduced as the central means to structure the verification. Operations are parts of 
the execution of the circuit over a shorter period of time. They form useful building blocks of 
the functionality. The abstraction of circuit behavior by operations is so similar to the abstrac-
tion of interface behavior by transactions [Cai / Gajski 2003] that some authors write of trans-
actions of a module instead of operations. For example, an operation of a bus interface de-
scribes the generation of a transaction on the bus, operations of processors describe the fetch-
ing and execution of an instruction in the processor pipeline, and the operations of an arbiter 
describe the arbitration cycles.  
Many operations can be represented by generalized timing diagrams (see section 4.3.11) 
[Bormann / Spalinger 2001]. An example of generalized timing diagrams is shown in Figure 
7. These timing diagrams are easily described in the language ITL [Siegel et al. 1999] (see 
section 4.3) or expressed on the base of the SVA library Tidal [Bormann 2007] as temporal 
properties. These temporal properties are called operation properties.  
A property checker proves that the circuit performs the operation as described in the operation 
property. For this proof, powerful tools [OneSpin undated] are available, which prove proper-
ties over modules of medium size in the range of minutes. The largest module tested with this 
approach consisted of significantly more than 100,000 lines of RTL code.  
The property verifier verifies operations by examining them from every state. However, some 
of its performance is bought by the fact that the property is also verified from states which can 
not occur during the operation of the circuit. If such unreachable states lead to counter-
examples, they must be excluded by means of reachability conditions. Such reachability con-
ditions can sometimes be determined automatically. Where automatic procedures fail, hints 
from the verification engineer are required. These hints can be developed from the circuit 
knowledge or they are based on indications from the designer of the circuit. Such hints will be 
justified later within the framework of the methodology, such that erroneous hints will not 
corrupt the verification. This approach makes it possible to transform the verification problem 
into a SAT problem and then to benefit from the high performance of SAT proofs. This proof 
approach is called Interval Property Checking (IPC).  
The generalized timing diagrams suggest a kind of jig saw puzzle game [Bormann / Spalinger 
2001]: If an input trace to the circuit is given, one can try to predict the circuit behavior by 
only using operation properties. If this allows unique determination of an output trace for each 
input trace, the set of operation properties is called complete. It then examines every aspect of 
the circuit function. The description of an automated completeness checker is part of this the-
sis. A complete set of proven operation properties provides an equivalent, more abstract cir-
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cuit description and can be the basis for further abstractions up to a variant of a transaction 
model that is suitable for further formal verification. Thus, the abstraction level of the circuit 
description for formal verification comes close to that of the circuit description for simulation-
based verification.The goal of the verification is a complete circuit description. It is therefore 
referred to as complete verification. Complete verification thus represents an understanding 
based quality assurance in accordance with the characterization in section 2.3. Occurrence 
probabilities for errors as they impede the simulation, are not an issue here. If an error is ob-
servable, it will be found. 
To automatically prove the completeness of a set of operation properties a completeness 
checker was developed. At the submission date of the corresponding patent [Bormann / Busch 
2005] it was the the first of its kind [Claessen 2006]. It solved a core problem of the formal 
functional verification ([Katz et al. 1999, Hojati 2003, Hoskote 1999]): When do you have a 
sufficient number of assertions formulated to fully cover the circuit functionality? Chapter 5 
describes this completeness checker, proves the approach and illustrates it with an example. 
The completeness checker examines operation properties over a circuit part in which the cor-
responding operations are carried out successively. Therefore, there are no concurrent opera-
tions. Such a circuit part is called cluster. Of course, larger circuits include concurrent opera-
tions. For complete verification, such circuits are broken down into multiple clusters. The 
composition of complete verification of the clusters to a complete verification of the overall 
circuit is only possible under certain requirements to modeling and so-called. integration as-
sumptions, which contain conditions and assurances about behavior at the interface of a clus-
ter. Chapter 6cdescribes and proves the conditions, and illustrates them by examples. 
2.6 Application of Complete Verification   
Since 1999, verification projects with complete verification and similar, less mature predeces-
sors approaches have been in regular productive use at Siemens, Infineon and other semicon-
ductor manufacturers and system houses. A selection of projects is listed in Tabelle 1. Almost 
all circuits that were verified in these projects functioned properly after the fabrication of the 
respective ASICs or the burning of the corresponding FPGAs. 
 
In the few projects where circuit faults were overlooked, the escape was traced back to human 
failure in the application of the underlying methodology: For example, wrong constraints re-
stricted the input traces too much and thus masked errors, or circuit errors were wrongly ac-
cepted by inaccurate descriptions of the expected output behavior.  
 
One of the reasons for the high resultant quality of the approach is that – whereever possible – 
user input is treated as a hint to simplify proofs, but needs to be cross checked in turn. This 
minimizes the probability that human error impacts the final circuit quality.  
The procedure described here is capable to take the full verification task for a module. Contra-
ry to ABFV, complete verification is therefore no complement to simulation-based verifica-
tion on module level, but an alternative. In extreme cases, complete verification reduces the 
application of simulation to the exploration of the hardware design to provide a designer with 
a feeling for the newly designed circuit. However, it is up to a verification responsible, how 
she or he defines the mix between simulation and complete verification. But now, similar to 
the quality assurance in other engineering disciplines, a proper mix of observation and under-
standing based quality assurance (in the sense of paragraph 2.3) can be configured. 
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This opens up considerably higher effort budgets for complete verification than for  ABFV. 
As part of these effort budgets a deep familiarization with the circuit design is possible with a 
favorable ratio of costs and benefits. This familiarization with the circuit design is simplified 
by the structuring of the approach. Since the verification engineer is focused on one operation 
after another, he / she will not simultaneously be confronted with all the problems, as is the 
case with a verification by High Level Assertions. 
2.7 Simulation-Based and Complete Verification  
As stated above, complete verification is an independent approach for circuit verification. It is 
therefore in competition with simulation-based verification approaches for module verifica-
tion, such as Coverage Driven Random Pattern Simulation [Bergeron et al. 2005]. In compari-
son, complete verification has a number of attractive characteristics, which should be be 
sketched briefly in the sequel. After a detailed presentation of complete verification these 
benefits will be described in section 3.6 in more detail. 
Complete verification reaches the highest quality for the modules that were verified with this 
methodology, while other verification procedures leave errors in design, because the errors 
were either not stimulated, or because they were overlooked by the checking mechanisms.  
The quality gain is not only realized in the implementation but also in the specification, be-
cause the completeness checker points to specification gaps. The competition processes have 
no way to structured identification of specification gaps. 
To prepare and execute complete verification, a process has been defined, which starts with 
the planning of a verification project and provides recommendation about how to develop the 
operation properties. Good project planning leads to reliable execution times. The quality of 
project planning only affects the punctuality of the project, but not the quality of the circuit 
after complete verification. For simulation-based methods, there are also thoroughly defined 
processes. Here, verification requires the collection of all the verification objectives. The 
quality of the verification plan affects both the schedule and the final circuit quality. 
The end of a complete verification project is reached when a logical, i.e. uncompromisable 
termination criterion is met, which is automatically checked by the completeness checker. 
Simulation-based verifications are terminated on the base of heuristic criteria such as cover-
age figures and fault finding curves. 
Productivity and termination criteria are interrelated. Unskilled execution of complete verifi-
cation or application on poor RTL code leads to extended verification times but does not im-
pact the final circuit quality. Different to that, the termination of a verification by simulation 
is always a matter of interpretation. But experienced users verify well written RTL code with 
complete verification faster than through simulation, despite the additional quality gain. A 
rough estimate is a productivity of 2000 to 4000 lines of RTL code that can be examined with 
complete verification in a person month. In single cases, 8,000 lines per person month were 
reached. 
Besides the unusual approach the biggest acceptance hurdle of complete verification is its 
close relationship with the concrete implementation, which makes verification experts suspect 
that errors might escape because misinterpretatios are consistently inserted into RTL and veri-
fication code. But experience shows that, despite this close relationship, such escapes are very 
rare.  But implementation changes often require changes also in the verification code. This is 
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not a problem with incremental changes as part of a design and verification project. But 
strong changes may result in substantial effort, whereas in simulation-based verification effort 
can be saved by reusing the testbenches. But such effort comparisons need to observe, that re-
use of a testbench would need to be complemented by the adjustment of the coverage criteria 
and the stimuli, if the new circuit shall have the same quality as the old one. This adaptation 
effort is however often saved. 
2.8 Complete Verification and ABFV  
The fundamental difference between ABFV and complete verification arises from their differ-
ent roles in a verification project: ABFV supports a verification which is carried out mainly 
by simulation while complete verification can handle the full verification task.  
But both approaches have in common the central usage principle: Assertions and properties 
are formalized, they are verified with an automatic proof tool against the circuit, the proof tool 
constructs a counter-example, this is analyzed by the user and the analysis leads to the identi-
fication of a circuit failure or to adaptation of the assertion or property.  
ABFV makes no requirements about the form of assertions, while complete verification re-
quires a certain structure of the properties and how they should be formalized. The circuit 
quality that can be achieved with ABFV thus depends to a greater degree on skills and inge-
nuity of the formal verification engineer. But it requires little training to write and prove as-
sertions. For each type of circuit and usually also for each implementation strategy an own set 
of assertions will be developed, without there being a guiding idea of the general structure of 
an assertion. Accordingly, there is a lot of literature about assigning useful assertions to cir-
cuit classes on a case by case base. For the complete verification the methodical base is wider, 
and then the verification tasks arise in a natural way. 
Because of the diversity of assertions, universal verification tools are available for it. Asser-
tions can be of widely varying complexity. The circuit itself plays a big role, so that even syn-
tactically similar assertions can lead to very different resource requirements of the provers. 
Users either get accustomed to prover failures without apparent reason, or they develop a feel-
ing for the resource requirements of a prover and start it only on appropriate assertions. Un-
suitable assertions can be further investigated by simulation. 
The operation properties of the complete verification can be proven with IPC which leads to 
moderate resource demands, at least in comparison to the circuit size. The prover rarely fails 
to produce  proof or a counter example. If it does, the operation in question needs to be subdi-
vided into smaller operations. 
Assertions play an important role also in complete verification, for example as part of a speci-
fication. But they also come into play to summarize interim results. Some assertions are easily 
verified by means of ABFV. However, where this fails, assertions can be proven by showing 
that they are met by all operations of a complete set of operation properties. 
 
Tabelle 1: Project with complete verification 
Funktion  Projekt 
Prozessoren  
TriCore2 (super scalar, 32 Bit, automotive) [Bormann et al. 2007] 
Multithreaded network processor [PPv2 2008] 
IEEE floating point processor  
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Weakly programmable IP [Loitz et al. 2008] 
Peripherals  
Infrared interface 
One-Wire Interface 
Touch Screen Measurement Interface 
USB Master Interface,  
Counter 
UART 
Interrupt Controller 
A/D Converter Controller 
Flash Card Data Port 
Camera Interface 
Multimedia Card Interface 
Configurable Arbiter  
DMA Controller 
Bus Interfaces  
Bus Arbiter 
AHB (Master-, slave interfaces, bridges, multilayer bus  
                                                        [Bormann/Blank/Winkelmann 2005]) 
Interfaces with proprietary protocols 
Protocol adaptation of a legacy processor [Bormann/Spalinger 2001] 
CAN, LIN,  Flex Ray, AXI 
SRC Audiobus Interface 
Communication infrastrcuture of a massively  
       parallel multi processor system  
HDLC Controller [Bormann/Blank/Winkelmann 2005] 
Memory Control-
lers  
SDRAM Controller  
Advanced Memory Bus 
SATA 
Caches 
Flash Memory Interface 
Error Correction  
ECC 
Robustness against distortions of board to board communication  
Telecom  
AAL2 Termination Element 
Address management of an ATM Switch 
Sonet / SDH Frame Alignment [Thomas et al. 2004] 
Path Overhead processing of a Multi-Gigabit-Switch 
DSP Coprocessor-ASIC for correlation computation  
                                                                           [Winkelmann et al. 2004] 
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3 Overview over Complete Verification  
A special feature of the approach of complete verification outlined in section 2.5 is its similar-
ity to transaction-based verification, i.e. the currently used simulation-based verification ap-
proach [Bergeron et al. 2005]. With respect to this similarity this approach is presented in the 
sequel from an application perspective. 
A brief outline of transaction-based verification by simulation is given in section 3.1. The 
complete verification is a symbiosis of the operation based circuit description presented in 
section 3.2, the proof method “Interval Property Checking” (IPC) described in section 3.3 and 
the completeness checker of section 3.4, which is complemented by the compositional ap-
proach of section 3.5 to a process which has in principle no size restrictions. The pros and 
cons of the practical application of complete verification are discussed in section 3.6. 
3.1 Transaction-Based Verification by Simulation  
3.1.1 Transactions  
RTL describes calculation steps and the interaction of these calculation steps. Each operator 
in an RTL description is a calculation step, and control statements enforce proper interaction 
of these calculation steps. 
Functional verification checks whether the individual calculation steps in RTL interact as re-
quested by a specification. In this respect functional verification corresponds to numerous 
other verification tasks: In the design of cells from transistors it is verified whether the inter-
action of the transistors implements the desired function of the cell. During verification of 
netlists against RTL it is examined whether many such cells interact properly to implement 
coarser calculation steps of the RTL (such as multiplication). 
If simulation is used for functional verification of a module, main attention is put on the be-
havior of the interface signals of the module, that are those signals which connect the modules 
and transmit e.g. read or write requests or acknowledgments. This behavior appears at first 
glance confusing. But on closer inspection, it turns out that this behavior follows a few basic 
patterns. These basic patterns are obtained when the interface signals are grouped in busses, 
and when each bus is considered separately. The basic patterns are then called transactions of 
these buses. The transactions describe the request of module activities or services provided by 
other modules. 
The available transactions, the allowed sequences, and their implementation by sequences of 
values of signals of a bus is given by a protocol specification. The concept of transactions is 
fundamental for today's simulation-based functional verification. 
Transactions have parameters. Essential parameters are data, addresses or communication 
direction. Other parameters can give information about the simulation time at which the trans-
action begins and ends and the time between synchronization events defined by the protocol. 
Moreover, there may be protocol-specific parameters such as the type of a base transaction of 
the AHB protocol [AHB 1999]. 
The usage of the word “transaction” is not unique [Cai / Gajski 2003]. Instead there is a hier-
archy of transactions. E.g., a basic transaction of the AHB protocol can be subdivided into 
address and data phase, preceded - depending on viewpoint – even by an arbitration phase. 
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These phases are transactions at a lower level of abstraction. On a higher level of abstraction, 
several basic AHB transactions connect to a burst transaction. 
3.1.2 Testbenches  
The testbench of a simulation-based functional verification includes all code which has been 
developed to verify the given circuit. Figure 1 shows a typical transaction-based verification 
testbench, which is described below. 
Directed or random tests generate sequences of signal values, called  waveforms, on the buses 
of the circuit. The circuit code might contain assertions. These assertions can examine any 
signal in the code. However, the bulk of the verification task is done by examination of the 
interface signals of the module. To that end, the testbench converts the waveforms of the in-
terface signals into series of transactions by so-called transaction extractors. Each transaction 
is described by its parameter set. During the extraction the extractors also check the compli-
ance of the waveforms with the protocol specification, e.g., whether write data is indeed kept 
stable until the write was confirmed. The examination of the module functionality is then re-
duced to the investigation of the transactions. E.g. the test bench checks the parameters of the 
transactions, or whether the sequence of transactions is correct. 
A distinction is made between incoming and outgoing transactions of the module. Incoming 
transactions are those in which a neighbor module has taken the initiative to a data transfer. 
circuit under
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Figure 1: Transaction based testbench for simulation 
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Outgoing transactions are those in which the module under verification has taken the initiative 
to a data transfer. If a bus interface of a module receives incoming transactions, it is called 
slave or target interface, when it produces outgoing transactions, it is called master or initiator 
interface. 
The terms "incoming" and "outgoing transaction" do not describe the direction of the data 
transfer. For write transactions, data flows from the master to slave interface, and for read 
transactions from the slave to the master interface. Some modules have only slave interfaces, 
such as memory modules, others may only have master interfaces, such as processors, or they 
have both types of interfaces, such as bus bridges. 
In a typical transaction-based simulation verification, the incoming transactions of the circuit 
under verification are also processed by a transaction-based reference model that provides 
reference data to incoming read transactions and generates sequences of outgoing reference 
transactions. Such a model that operates on transactions is called circuit Transaction Level 
Model (TLM) of the circuit. 
A sequence of outgoing transactions generated by the TLM need not exactly match the se-
quence of outgoing transactions that the transaction extractors generate from the waveforms at 
the interface of the examined module. Instead, the testbench will check for a suitably defined 
similarity. Testbench components that implement this similarity are called scoreboards. These 
compare the sequence of transactions that is generated by the implementation with the se-
quence of transactions from the TLM model and thus verify the module. A scoreboard can 
e.g. be tolerant wrt. local rearrangements of the series of transactions, but reports an error 
when the module fails to produce a transaction or produces incorrect or additional transac-
tions. 
The testbench sketched in Figure 1 is particularly suitable for the test of a module within a 
system simulation, in which the module is stimulated by neighboring modules. In this case, 
the transaction extractors actually extract the transactions from the signal behavior between 
modules. 
Contrary to that, the verification of an isolated module requires that the testbench generates 
incoming transactions. To that end the generators on the master side of the circuit to be tested 
are described abstractly. They consist either of routines that e.g. read a text file with the pa-
rameters of transactions to be executed and pass them to the TLM and a convertor into the 
signal level description. The generators can also determine the parameters of the transactions 
at random.  
Coverage measurements will determine how intensively the circuit is examined by the verifi-
cation, i.e. how many operating situations were simulated. Coverage may be determined on 
the base of the RTL code of the circuit under test. On the other hand, straight functional cov-
erage, i.e. the simulation of certain functional processes are often derived from the parameters 
of the transaction, so that the coverage measurement uses the one level of abstraction, which 
is particularly suitable for the given coverage condition. 
3.2 Levels of Abstraction of Complete Verification  
In this section the approach of complete verification is presented from an application perspec-
tive. Figure 2 shows the associated levels of abstraction and the refinement relations between 
them. 
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The role of the transaction-based reference model in the simulation is taken by a transaction 
automaton, which will be introduced in section 3.2.2. The transitions of the transaction au-
tomaton are triggered by incoming transactions and they describe which outgoing transactions 
are produced. The transaction automaton does not model how the incoming and outgoing 
transactions are implemented by signals and clocks. 
A refinement of the transaction automaton represents the transactions through their signal 
behavior. The so refined automaton is called operation automaton and corresponds to the in-
teraction of transaction extractors, a special scoreboard and the TLM reference model. The 
operation automaton is described in section 3.2.3. 
A circuit is verified by demonstrating that its operation automaton meets the specification and 
has the same input / output behavior like the module under test. For this purpose a mapping of 
the states of the circuit to the states of the operation automaton is required, similar to the state 
mapping of combinatorial equivalence verification. This state mapping leads to operation 
properties, which are discussed in section 3.2.4. In section 3.2.6 the abstraction levels of com-
plete verification will be compared with other abstraction techniques commonly used in cir-
cuit design and formal verification. 
The proof of the operation properties with IPC is covered by section 3.3 together with the 
related reachability issues from a user perspective. 
In carrying out complete verification in practice, the verification engineer always focuses on 
the verification of one operation at a time. Technology and theory to answer the question 
whether the entire circuit function has been verified, is presented in section 3.4. Initially this 
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Figure 2: Abstraction levels and their relationship 
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concerns only circuit components that perform operations in sequence, which are called clus-
ters. The completeness checker in section 3.4.3 detects verification gaps in sets of operation 
properties about clusters, or it proves the absence of such gaps. Section 3.5 extends the notion 
of completeness of clusters to arbitrary concurrent functionality because it can be composed 
of multiple clusters. 
3.2.1 Example  
The concept introduced in the sequel will be illustrated by an example that relates to a 
memory interface. As Figure 3 shows, the interface provides the data transport between a pro-
cessor and SDRAM. SDRAMs are memory blocks the memory locations of which are ar-
ranged in a matrix. Hence they have a row and a column address. The column address is usu-
ally represented by the upper half of the signal of the address bus, the row address by the low-
er half. 
The control inputs of an SDRAM are usually called cs_n, we_n, ras_n and cas_n and remind 
of names such as chip select or write enable. But their mode of operation is better understood 
when the four signals are regarded as a command bus to the SDRAM. It conveys commands 
such as, e.g., "row activate", with which an address row is activated, as indicated by the con-
dition 
cs_n = 0 and ras_n = 0 and cas_n = 1 and we_n = 1 
Accordingly, there are read and write commands that cause the transmission of data bursts, a 
stop command that terminates the transmission of a burst, a precharge command to end the 
activation of a line, i.e. the line is closed and a NOP command, in which nothing happens. 
Reading or storing a piece of data is requested by the processor through the activation of the 
request signal req and an appropriate value on the rw signal. The address is then found on the 
signal address and the write and read data on the signal rdata or wdata. The processor must 
keep its output signals stable until they are acknowledged by the memory interface by activat-
ing the ready signal. This activation also validates the read data. 
Reading or storing usually requires multiple such commands to the SDRAM, which succes-
sively activate a row of the memory array, then access it with a burst read or write to the col-
SDRAM
SDRAM Interface
sd_addr sd_ctrlsd_wdata sd_rdata
Processor
request rw address wdata rdata ready
 
Figure 3: SDRAM interface and its system integration 
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umn address of the memory location, and finally close the memory row. The corresponding 
commands of the command bus are called "row activate", "read" or "write", and "precharge". 
The commands are are accompanied by values on the sdram_addr address bus and the write 
data bus sdram_wdata, or they make the SDRAM provide valid values on the read data bus 
sdram_rdata after a number of clock cycles. The individual SDRAM commands must have 
certain, memory-type-dependent time distances from one another. After activation of a row 
several read and write operations can be performed on the elements of this row without clos-
ing and re-enabling this row. 
3.2.2 Transaction Automaton  
Starting point of complete verification is a transaction-based automaton representation of the 
specification, which is called transaction automaton. This is quite similar to the TLM refer-
ence model of the simulation-based verification. The automaton processes incoming transac-
tions and generates related sequences of outgoing transactions. Differences in the levels of 
abstraction of TLM-reference models and transaction automata are discussed in this section. 
The states of the transaction automaton are called "abstract conceptual states". Similar to the 
division of circuits into control and data paths the abstract conceptual states of transaction 
machines consist of a control portion and a data portion. The control part of the state is called 
important abstract state of the transaction automaton. The data portion is called visible state 
because this is how the circuit stores the data that is visible in the specification. The variables 
in which the visible states are stored, are called visible registers. 
Figure 4 shows the transaction automaton of the SDRAM interface. There are two important 
states, namely IDLE and ROW_ACT. The latter reflects the fact that a memory row is acti-
vated, and subsequent access operations to the same memory row can therefore be carried out 
more quickly. In state ROW_ACT there is also a visible state actrow which gives information 
about the currently open memory row. In idle state this variable is meaningless. 
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and R = actrow /
mwrite(C,D)
pwrite(R,C,D) 
and R ≠ actrow /
precharge,
activate(R),
mwrite(C,D),
actrow <= R
pread(R,C) 
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Figure 4: Transaction automaton of the SDRAM interface 
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 In general, a transaction automaton executes a state transition depending on the abstract con-
ceptual state and - if the module has slave interfaces - from incoming transactions. During this 
state change the automaton determines the read data for incoming read transactions. Further, 
the automaton generates outgoing transactions if the module features a master interface. The 
concept of time of a transaction automatorn is therefore event driven. 
When a transaction automaton is to be displayed by the transition graph of an automaton, the 
common representation of circuits with control and data content is used: Node of the transac-
tion graphs are only the important states and the behavior of the data path is represented by 
appropriate expressions that are either part of the conditions under which a transition is car-
ried out or determine the data or addresses that are issued by the circuit during the transition. 
The remainder of this presentation will work with this coarsened view in which the transac-
tion machine often contains relatively few important states and few transitions.  
The graph of the transaction automaton of the SDRAM interface is shown in Figure 4. In the 
illustration of the transaction automaton it has been assumed that the processor bus can exe-
cute the transactions pread (R, C), pwrite (R, C, D) and pnop which may occur in any order. R 
is the row, C the column address of the memory and D stands for the write data. For the sake 
of simplicity the read data remains unmentioned. The memory bus between the interface and 
the SDRAM can execute the transactions mnop, activate (R), mwrite (C, D), mread (C), 
precharge, which should contain the respective SDRAM commands while adhering to the 
associated timing conditions. The single transaction is characterized by an expression of the 
form <condition> "/" <action>. The <condition> must be met before the transition is execut-
ed, and the execution of the transaction leads to the activities <action>. The transactions spec-
ified are sent sequentially, and the visible registers get assigned the new visible state. 
In Figure 4 there is e.g. a transition that is performed when the SDRAM interface is in the 
abstract conceptual state ROW_ACT when a pwrite (R, C, D) transaction is on the processor 
bus, and if the row address R is equal to the address actrow that is part of the visible state and 
determines the address of the activated memory row. In this case, the SDRAM interface pro-
duces a transaction mwrite (R, D) to the SDRAM and further remains in the abstract concep-
tual state ROW_ACT without changing the visible state actrow. 
Each transition of the transaction automaton is related to a verification task about the module 
under test: It has to be shown that if the actual module is in a state that implements the im-
portant start state, and if it receives the incoming transaction of the transition, and if the con-
dition between visible start state and incoming transition is satisfied, it generates the appropri-
ate outgoing transaction with the appropriate data and finally enters the appropriate new im-
portant state and adapts the visible state appropriately.   
3.2.3 Refinement to Operation Automaton  
To investigate these verification tasks, the relationship between the transaction automaton and 
the input / output behavior of the circuit under test must be clarified. To that end the transac-
tions that were previously considered as atomic must be expressed by the behavior of the in-
put and output signals of the module to be tested. The essential information for this refine-
ment comes from the specifications of the protocols of the slave and master interfaces. These 
specifications define what behavior of input signals the module may expect from its environ-
ment and how the output signals of the module should behave in releation therewith. This 
refinement step corresponds in simulation based verification to the extension of the the TLM 
reference model by the transaction extractors. 
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After the protocol specification has been introduced, the description is initially independent of 
a concrete implementation and does not specify when the module under verification produces 
the synchronization events that it should produce according to the protocol specification, and 
it does not specify the temporal relationship between incoming and outgoing transactions. 
Such degrees of freedom are expressed in the simulation-based verification by the scoreboard 
that accepts the temporal relationships allowed by the specification and rejects the others. For 
formal verification, these degrees of freedom are difficult to express. The approach presented 
is therefore slightly different: It requires the timing relationship implemented by the RTL. 
By introduction of this information into the transaction automaton, a refined automaton is 
generated, which is called Operation Automaton. Its states are still the abstract conceptual 
states of the transaction automaton. But the operation automaton describes the input / output 
behavior of the circuit precisely for signals and clock cycles. A transition of the refined au-
tomaton is triggered when a condition is met about the input signals of the circuit, and they 
generate the appropriate behavior on the output signals, which is again described by a condi-
tion. In general, both conditions are sequential and overlap in time. 
A transition of the operational automaton is thus characterized by an abstract conceptual start 
and end state and conditions about the concrete input and output signals. Such a transition will 
be referred to as an operation. 
On top of all this, the refinement defines the temporal relationship between successive opera-
tions. To that end every operation is assigned a symbolic start time point   and a symbolic 
reference point      at which all subsequent operations begin. The reference time point of an 
operation is determined by a time offset relative to the start time  . This time offset may de-
pend on the visible state at the beginning of the operation, as well as on the behavior of the 
input signals. 
In the context of a verification according to Figure 1 the concept of an operation automaton 
combines the roles of the Transaction Level Model, the scoreboard and the transaction extrac-
tors. The operation automaton could for example be executed by simulation in parallel with 
the module to be verified. Then, the verification would be to check whether the outputs of the 
module to be verified meet the conditions of the output signals generated by the operation 
automaton. 
The refinement of the transaction automaton can be chosen to be so accurate that the opera-
tion automaton assigns each input trace exactly one output trace. In this case, the verification 
checks the equivalence between the operation automaton and the circuit to be verified. 
Figure 5 presents the operation that results from the transition of the transaction automaton at 
the bottom left in Figure 4. The protocol of the processor bus is the simple request-ready pro-
tocol that was already introduced above. After the activation of the request signal all the oth-
er signals must be kept stable until the SDRAM acknowledges the access with a       
pulse and simultaneously validates the values on the       signal. On the SDRAM bus a 
precharge, activate, read and stop command are issued under the required time conditions. 
The stop command is required because the read command would otherwise create a burst of 
read data. 
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In the representation of the operation by Figure 5, the input condition of the operation is 
shown in blue. It contains the comparison between the row address of the transaction and the 
visible state. The description of the output signals is shown in red. The black lozenges mark 
signal values that are referenced elsewhere in expressions and describes itself neither an as-
sumption nor a commitment. 
This representation also describes the output of read data to the processor via the signal rdata. 
From the values of the signal that are marked black it is clear that the operation takes ad-
vantage of the stability of the processor bus signals until the ready pulse. Further, the descrip-
tion contains the determination of the reference time point      ,  which is    . In addition 
to the conditions on the input and output signals corresponding to Figure 5, the operation is 
characterized by its important start and end state row_act, and by the visible state actrow, 
which is set to the new row address in the course of the operation. The information about 
the conceptual state is not represented in Figure 5. 
3.2.4 Refinement to Operation Properties  
If the just described equivalence verification between operation automaton and actural RTL 
circuit is to be carried out with the quality of formal verification, additional measures are 
needed in order to examine practically relevant circuit sizes. For the approach described here, 
the abstract conceptual states are related explicitly to the states of the circuit and thereby the 
equivalence comparison is partitioned. 
This corresponds to the procedure for combinatorial equivalence verification [Filkorn 1992, 
Kuehlmann / Krohm 1997, Lohse / Warkentin 1998, Bormann / Warkentin 1999, Hoereth / 
Müller-Brahms / Rudlof 2002]: There the original verification task is also to provide a proof 
that the circuits have equal input / output behavior. This is initially a sequential verification 
task, which needs to consider input and output traces of any length. This sequential verifica-
tion task, however, can only be solved with algorithms that already fail on fairly small cir-
cuits. Therefore, a preprocessing step relates the two circuit descriptions by mapping the state 
signals of one circuit description to the state signals of the other. Through this mapping the 
original verification task is divided in time: The verification assumes same states at any initial 
time t and tries to prove the equality of the state signals at time t+1 (and of course also of 
the output signals). This decomposed verification task can be treated with SAT algorithms 
which are quite powerful and thus allow the examination of large circuits. The reduction to a 
combinatorial problem is admissible because design steps like synthesis, netlist optimizations, 
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Figure 5: Operation "Read with change of memory row" 
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insertion of test logic or last minute changes should not change the state encoding of the cir-
cuit. 
The power of this approach is in its pessimism. Every now and then it returns negative com-
parison results, although the circuit descriptions are equivalent. But if the method proves two 
circuits equivalent, then they reliably have the same input and output behavior. Wrong map-
ping of state signals can not cause false positive results, which might mask an error. However, 
false negative results are possible by which circuits with actually the same input / output be-
havior are blamed to be different. Then counterexamples are generated that contain hints to 
the wrong state mapping. 
The approach of complete verification is similar: The conceptual states of the operation au-
tomata are mapped to states of the circuit to be tested. By this the operation automaton is re-
fined to a machine whose states are given by conditions about the concrete signals of the im-
plementation. These state conditions are called concrete conceptual states. The advantage of 
this refined automaton is that each transition and thus every operation can be compared with 
the RTL in a separate verification task. This verification task assumes that the circuit is in a 
concrete start state of an operation, and proves that the circuit behaves according to the opera-
tion and enters a concrete conceptual state at the reference time point. This verification task 
idle
(req = '1' and rw = '0' and
row(address) = last_row) /
sd_ctrl <= write;
sd_addr <= col(address);
ready <= '1';
sd_wdata <= wdata;
sd_ctrl <= stop;
ready <= '0';
req = '1' and rw = '1' and
row(address) = last_row /
sd_ctrl <= read;
sd_addr <= col(address)
ready <= '0';
sd_ctrl <= stop;
ready <= '0';
sd_ctrl <= nop;
ready <= '0';
rdata <= sd_rdata;
ready <= '1';
ctrl <= nop;
(req = '0' or
row(address /= last_row) /
sd_ctrl <= precharge;
ready <= '0';
req = '0' /
sd_ctrl <= nop;
ready <= '0'; 
req = '1' /
sd_ctrl <= row_act;
sd_addr <= row(address); 
last_row <= row(address);
ready <= '0'; 
sd_ctrl <= nop; 
ready <= '0';
sd_ctrl <= nop; 
ready <= '0'
reset
sd_ctrl <= nop;
ready <= '0'; 
row_act
sd_ctrl <= nop;
ready <= '0';
 
Figure 6: Implementation of SDRAM interface 
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can be expressed by a property. This property is called operation property. The automaton 
formed by the set of all operation properties differs from the operation automaton only with 
respect to the states. The transitions and reference time points are the same. The operation 
automaton is therefore sometimes identified with the set of all operation properties. 
The state mapping is a function that maps implementation states to the conceptual states and a 
special value  . This special value is for those implementation states that represent no 
conceptual state. In practice, there is for every important state a predicate to determine if the 
circuit entered the important state, and a separate function that maps the behavior of the cir-
cuit to the corresponding visible state. 
The state mapping has to be defined. While this can be automated for combinatorial equiva-
lence checking, it is usually provided manually by the user of complete verification. However, 
the user is working with a safety net, corresponding to the pessimistic attitude of equivalence 
verification: Incorrect user input can only lead to a negative result of the equivalence verifica-
tion between operation properties and implementation, although a correct user input may ac-
tually show equivalence. It is not possible to falsely obtain a positive result by wrong user 
input.  
To determine the state mapping for the SDRAM interface, the implementation must be exam-
ined. Figure 6 describes the state transition graph of the implementation. A transition of this 
graph corresponds to one clock cycle. The transition is characterized by assignments to regis-
ters that often drive the output signals, and where applicable by the conditions under which 
the transition is executed. The state mapping obviously maps              to the important 
state IDLE and                 to the important state ROW_ACT, as well as the con-
tents of the register          to the visible state actrow. 
3.2.5 Representation of Operation Properties  
Based on this state mapping the operation property belonging to Figure 5 can be formalized. It 
is expressed in the language ITL which is so closely related to timing diagrams, that proper-
ties described in this language can frequently be visualized very intuitively.  
ITL distinguishes between an assume and a proof part. The assume part corresponds to the 
left side of an implication and the proof part to the right side. The implication will be checked 
for all time points    . Assume and proof part consist of temporal conditions, which are 
formed from a state predicate and a temporal specification. The temporal specification refer-
ences time explicitly, relative to an arbitrary but fixed point in time  .  
This explicit specification of time points allows that assume and proof part overlap in time. 
This is important for operation properties, because it may happen that different operations are 
selected by values of input signals at relatively late times, such as e.g., read accesses of a pro-
cessor under normal operation or once they are terminated by an error message. 
In this regard, ITL has advantages over the conventional use of SVA or PSL, wherein the an-
tecedent (that corresponds to the assume part of ITL) and the succedent (which corresponds to 
the proof part) describe successive time intervals which overlap by at most one clock cycle in 
the middle. Another advantage of ITL is the absence of operators that allow different matches 
for a given initial time point of the property. This is a source of errors even in user literature 
about SVA. 
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The graphical representation expresses the assume part by blue lines and the proof part by red 
lines. If the property is proven, its graphical representation can be printed on a slide and 
pulled over any simulation run of the SDRAM interface. Wherever the blue lines match, the 
red lines will match either. 
The textual representation of the operation property of Figure 5 is  
property read_new_row is  
   
assume:  
at t:  state = row_act;  
at t:  request = '1';  
at t:  rw = '1';  
at t:  address /= last_row;  
   
prove:  
at t+9:  state = row_act;  
at t+9:  last_row = prev(row(address));  
   
during [t+1, t+7]:  ready = '0';  
at t+8:  ready = '1';  
at t+9:  ready = '0';  
at t+8:  rdata = prev(sd_rdata);  
   
at t+1:  sd_ctrl = precharge;  
at t+2:  sd_ctrl = nop;  
at t+3:  sd_ctrl = activate;  
at t+3:  sd_addr = row(address);  
at t+4:  sd_ctrl = nop;  
at t+5:  sd_ctrl = read;  
at t+5:  sd_addr = col(address);  
at t+6:  sd_ctrl = stop;  
during [t+7, t+9]:  sd_ctrl = nop;  
   
end property;  
The functions row and col extract the row and column address from the full address. Figure 7 
presents the related graphical representation. The property can only be proven if it is assumed 
that the circuit environment behaves according to the protocol. This is formalized in the fol-
lowing two constraints: 
sd_wdata
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rdata
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Figure 7: Graphical representation of the property 
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constraint no_reset :=  
reset = '0';  
end constraint; 
 
constraint processor_protocol := 
 if request = '1' and ready = '0' then  
next(request) = '1' and 
  next(address) = address and 
  next(rw) = rw and 
  if rw = '0' then next(wdata) = wdata; 
 end if; 
end constraint;  
3.2.6 Discussion  
Operation properties, operation automata and transaction automata are circuit descriptions 
with increasing level of abstraction. The operation properties provide only reduced infor-
mation about the behavior of a few internal signals of the circuit. Operation automata do not 
mention internal signals at all, but describe only the effect of internal signals to the sequence 
of operations and to the flow of information between successive operations. But operation 
properties and operation automata represent the input / output behavior precisely in terms sig-
nals and clock cycles. Only the transition to transaction automata also abstracts from input / 
output behavior of the circuit to atomic transactions. 
Operation properties and operation automata therefore provide the input / output behavior of 
the circuit as precisely as the original RTL description. But in comparison with the RTL, the 
operations are more structured in the sense that they represent related activities on the output 
signals in their relationship with each other and with the input signals. This is less an abstrac-
tion than a structuring of the input / output behavior. This structuring turns the usually ex-
tremely complex variety of possible output actions of RTL's into a manageable number of 
operations. This allows understanding the circuit function more easily and it is easier to de-
termine whether the operation of a circuit is correct. 
The understandability gain by the transition from RTL to operations corresponds roughly to 
the improved understandability of RTL compared to a netlist description. Compared to 
netlists, RTL can be more easily understood because individual signals are grouped into bit 
vectors and complex logics with many gates and connecting internal signals are condensed to 
powerful or at least more intuitive operators. In the relationship between netlists and RTL, 
values of bit vectors and the powerful operators about the bit vectors play the role of transac-
tions and operations in the relationship between RTL and an operation automaton. 
But the improved structuring of the input / output behavior in terms of operations or operation 
properties and the associated abstraction of internal behavior does not only lead to a better 
understanding of the circuit. On top of this it will be shown in the following sections that op-
erations also lead to proof tasks, which can be solved with a particularly suitable proof tech-
nique. As a consequence, given circuits can be verified with lesser technical effort, or larger 
circuits can be analyzed with the existing resources. 
This effect shall also be achieved with other abstractions that are discussed in the literature, 
such as predicate abstraction and abstraction refinement [Kroening / Seshia 2007, Clarke et al. 
2000, Wang et al. 2006, Chauhan et al. 2002, McMillan / Amla 2003, Gupta et al. 2003, Jain 
et al. 2008]. However, the goal of these methods is always to suitably reduce the model of a 
circuit. Complete verification avoids such reductions of the model. All properties are proven 
on an internal representation of the entire RTL. The only measure to reduce the size of a mod-
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el is compositional complete verification, by which a circuit is broken into sub-circuits, which 
are then verified separately. 
3.3 Proof Technology 
In complete verification the proof algorithms and the methodology are particularly well 
matched. The proof technique of choice is Interval Property Checking (IPC), a proof algo-
rithm that can often prove operation properties within minutes. IPC is applicable, because 
complete verification mitigates the disadvantage of IPC that reachability conditions must be 
given explicity, to characterize the states that can occur during normal operation of the circuit. 
Complete verification usually needs comparatively few and simple reachability conditions. In 
addition, user-specified reachability conditions are cross checked, so that the verification can-
not be corrupted by accidentally incorrect user input. 
Hence the good match between proof technique and the methodology of complete verification 
allows that even large circuits can be examined with operation properties, while the overhead 
of determining the reachability conditions remains acceptable. The effort is usually so low 
that the complete verification is more productive than the simulation-based verification, even 
if the quality improvements are not accounted for. 
For general assertion based formal verification, IPC usually needs more elaborate reachability 
conditions. In ABFV tools the reachability analysis is therefore largely automated. Therefore, 
only smaller circuits can be examined with sometimes very high proof times and / or it is ac-
cepted that the examination is less rigid than a full proof. 
IPC is treated in section 3.3.1. Reachability conditions are exemplified in section 3.3.2, and 
their determination and justification is discussed in sections 3.3.3 to 3.3.5. 
3.3.1 Interval Property Checking (IPC) and Bounded Model Checking 
(BMC)  
In order to verify a circuit, it must be ensured that each operation property derived from the 
operation graph is satisfied for every time point    .  
The corresponding proof can in principle be created by every formal proof method. Interval 
Property Checking (IPC) is however particularly useful because it can analyze large circuits 
quickly and quickly comes to a conclusion. Interval Property Checking is a SAT-based meth-
od [Ganai / Gupta 2007] to verify digital circuits [Lohse / Warkentin 2001]. The circuits are 
represented by Mealy automata with bit valued input, output and state variables. The mapping 
of RTL code to such automata is prior art [Bormann 1995].  
Interval Property Checking is suitable for a property  , that relates input, output, and state 
variables of the circuit for time points within a finite time interval        .  The proper-
ties are examined for all time points     and for all traces. For this, the state transition 
and output function of the Mealy automata are unrolled     times (see Figure 8). This cre-
ates instances of the functions for the time points      , etc., up to     which substitute 
the variables of the property. This results in a Boolean function    whose arguments are 
the instances of the input variables of the Mealy automaton for each of the time points   to 
    and the instance of the state variables at the time  . The circuit meets the original 
property   if the Boolean function    is 1 for all arguments.  
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Zeros of    point to traces that violate  . These so-called counter-examples are character-
ized by a state at the time   and by the sequence of input values at the time points   to 
   . No check is made if the state at time   is reachable. If it is not reachable, the counter-
example is unrealistic, i.e., it cannot occur during operation of the circuit. Then the proof must 
be repeated under additional reachability conditions. This characteristic limits the application 
of IPC to processes in which reachability conditions are determined and validated separately. 
The zeros of    are determined with a special class of proof algorithms, called SAT solv-
ers. These algorithms robustly handle problems with millions or more variables. For this dis-
sertation, the exact function of SAT solvers is irrelevant, they are presented e.g., in [Ganai / 
Gupta 2007]. Known SAT solvers are GRASP [Marques-Silva / Sakallah 1996], Chaff [Malik 
et al. 2001], and MINISAT [Een / Sörensson 2003]. SAT solvers are continuously being im-
proved [Brinkmann 2003 Wedler et al. 2007, Wedler et al. 2005, Novikov / Goldberg 2001, 
Novikov 2003, Novikov / Brinkmann 2005, Goldberg / Novikov 2002], and alternative proof 
algorithms are developed [Achterberg / Wedler / Brinkmann 2008]. 
IPC is related to Bounded Model Checking (BMC) as described by [Biere 1999]. Unlike IPC, 
BMC does not use an arbitrary state at the beginning of the instances of the state transition 
and output functions, but the reset state of the circuit. Therefore, the instances describe the 
clock cycle 0, 1, 2, etc. after reset of the circuit. BMC does not examine property   for every 
time point  . Instead, a BMC algorithm determines a limit   depending on the available 
resources and examines the property for all    . A counterexample of this examination is 
particularly useful, because it starts in the reset state and thus cannot be unrealistic, which was 
the problem with IPC due to an unreachable initial state. But if BMC does not find a counter 
example, the result is not a full proof because of the limitation to the time points    .  
As long as ABFV is only used to support simulation-based verification, BMC is a good 
choice, because the users are mainly interested in counter examples. Since simulation cannot 
prove correctness of a circuit anyhow, a full proof for single assertions is not particularly 
helpful. Verification methods that use formal proof algorithms without aiming at full proof 
are frequently called semiformal.  
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Figure 8: Generation of an IPC proof task 
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However, if more complex assertions must really be proven, e.g., to show compliance with a 
specification, the verification engineer is in a dilemma, because BMC is unsuitable, other ver-
ification approaches have lesser complexity boundaries, and the explicit determination of 
general reachability constraints is quite hard. A solution to this dilemma is described in sec-
tion 3.4.4. 
The proof of the property   with IPC requires only     instances of the state transition and 
output function and only one instance of the logic that represents  , while BMC requires  
      instances of the next state and output function, and   instances of the property 
logic. This shows that a BMC verification is more resource demanding than IPC, even though 
the proof is limited.  
3.3.2 Examples of a Reachability Condition  
The example of the SDRAM interface is actually too small to provide the user view onto IPC, 
unrealistic counterexamples and reachability conditions. Neither the  run time benefits of an 
IPC proof can be demonstrated, nor the facettes of the reachability conditions required.  
In order to present something it shall be assumed that the SDRAM interface of Figure 6 is 
modified according to Figure 9, i.e., by removing the assignments to the output register when 
the circuit in the state. This change is irrelevant since this register gets a ‘ ’ assigned on 
all paths to the state idle. The assignments in state idle are therefore redundant.  
Nevertheless, on the correspondingly modified circuit the property read_new_row of section 
cannot be proven directly by IPC. The counter-example examples shows that ready is '1' at  
   . This counter example is irrelevant, because there are no input stimuli to the circuit such 
that         in state idle. To acknowledge this, the start state condition of read_new_row 
must become                             , and analogously all end states idle need to be 
adapted.  
 
idle
(req = '0' or
row(address /= last_row) /
ctrl <= precharge;
ready <= '0';
req = '0' /
ctrl <= nop; 
req = '1' /
ctrl <= row_act;
sd_addr <= row(address); 
last_row <= row(address);
ctrl <= nop; 
ready <= '0';
ctrl <= nop; 
reset
row_act
ready<= '0'; 
ctrl <= nop;
 
Figure 9: SDRAM interface with alternate implementation 
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3.3.3 Reachability Analysis  
Reachability conditions can be determined automatically, or the user creates them manually.  
The automatic determination of reachability conditions is called reachability analysis and is 
closely related to many formal proof algorithms. Reachability analysis is a very difficult re-
search topic and a major reason for the slow development of formal verification over the past 
15 years. 
Some reachability analyzes strive to determine the set of reachable states exactly. These 
methods can only work on small circuits and have even then sometimes enormous run times. 
Other methods determine the supersets and subsets of the set of reachable states. BMC’s pro-
logue of up to   instances of the state transition function of the Mealy automaton (see sec-
tion 3.3.1) can be understood as a reachability analysis that determines a subset of the reacha-
ble states at the time   of the property  . Such underestimating methods are unsuitable for 
complete verification, because they mask counter examples that start in those states that were 
not discovered. 
By contrast, methods for the determination of supersets of reachable states can be well inte-
grated into the complete verification. Particularly well was this done with the method de-
scribed in [Nguyen et al. 2008, Nguyen et al. 2005a, Nguyen et al 2005b]. Other options arise 
from the work of [Case / Mishchenko / Brayton 2006, Stoffel et al. 2004, Wedler et al. 2003, 
McMillan 2003]. 
3.3.4 Justification of User Defined Reachability Conditions  
The automatic reachability analysis usually fails in such verification projects where the reach-
ability conditions relate to creative design efforts on the basis of a global circuit understand-
ing. Such reachability conditions are more easily determined by the human user, who reads 
them from suitable circuit documentation, obtains them from designer interviews, rebuilds the 
respective circuit understanding. For a complete verification, it is therefore essential that 
reachability conditions can be explicitly specified by the user. 
Such a user input may contain errors. By the completeness checker that will be presented in 
section 3.4 will discover such errors. This prevents that the verification is corrupted by faulty 
user provided reachability conditions. Due to the low run times of the IPC proof algorithms, 
the user need not even be particularly careful when making guesses about the reachability 
conditions. If the complete verification can be carried out until the end, all user provided 
reachability conditions are also justified and otherwise, counter examples are created that help 
to debug the reachability conditions. 
ABFV usually relies on automatically determined reachability conditions. If they are occa-
sionally still entered by hand, it remains the responsibility of the user to justify the reachabil-
ity conditions. Sometimes this justification is only provided informally. Other users check 
reachability conditions by simulation. In both cases, the reliability of verification is consider-
ably impacted: The value of a formal verification of an assertion becomes questionable, if it is 
verified under the assumption of a reachability condition, that is only justified by a procedures 
that is considered so unreliable that formal verification was tried. 
But reachability conditions may be justified separately. Typical approaches are induction 
proofs. These often require the identification of additional reachability conditions until an 
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induction hypothesis is found that can be proven. In the ABFV this complex process leads to a 
dedicated reachability analysis for the corresponding assertion. It is likely that this process 
needs to be repeated if further similarly complex assertions are to be proven.  
3.3.5 Reachability Conditions and Operation Properties  
In connection with complete verification reachability conditions are only needed for the im-
portant states, because all operation properties start there. An operation automaton usually has 
only few important states, and therefore complete verification needs only few of such specific 
reachability conditions. This already simplifies the task of determining the reachability condi-
tions.  
 
A further simplification arises because usually a superset of the reachability conditions is suf-
ficient. For example: If a register is initialized in all operations that start in some important 
state, then this register need not occur in the reachability condition. This is because even if the 
proof tool assumes an unreachable value at the beginning of the operation, this value will be 
overwritten by the initialization value, such that the unreachable value has no impact for the 
execution of the operation.  
But in some implementation styles the registers are always reinitialized immediately after use, 
i.e. at the end of an operation. The example from section 3.3.2 reflects this situation. Such 
implementation styles lead to the reachability condition that the register has the initialization 
value in certain important states. In this situation, this reachability condition is really needed, 
but this is quite simple and easy to recognize. 
If yet more complicated reachability conditions should occur in the important state, there is a 
good chance that they are known to the developer of the circuit, because usually the develop-
ers consider operations as self-contained functional units that start in the important states and 
implement them accordingly. This designer knowledge can be used in the development of the 
properties. For the reasons given in section 3.3.4 there is no risk of duplication of errors. 
All in all, reachability conditions for the proof of operation properties can therefore usually be 
obtained quite easily. This statement should not rule out that inadequately implemented cir-
cuits include complicated reachability conditions that can be detected only with difficulty. 
For reachability conditions for assertions, however, the situation is different: In the course of 
an operation intermediate results are calculated, stored and used. This can lead to complicated 
reachability conditions in the middle of an operation. Moreover, the designers are not aware 
of them because s/he has the flow of the operation in mind and does not think about the ques-
tion, which signal values can occur simultaneously. Fortunately, such complicated reachabil-
ity conditions from the middle of an operation are not necessary to prove the operation prop-
erties. But they may well be necessary for the proof of assertions that make e.g., statements 
about signal behavior in the middle of an operation. Such reachability statements are not even 
trivial in relation to individual operations. It becomes particularly difficult, however, if an 
assertion makes a statement over several operations. In this case the process of developing the 
reachability condition is no longer properly structured and unrealistic counterexamples during 
the development of the same reachability condition may show behavior from different opera-
tions. This can make the development of a general reachability condition a cumbersome task. 
In this case it may be advantageous to first carry out a complete verification before the the 
assertion is proven with the methods described in section 3.4.4. 
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3.4 Completeness Check  
For complete verification a circuit is examined with the operation properties from section 3.2, 
fed into the proof algorithms of Interval Property Checking from section 3.3. The operation 
based examination of the circuit does not only help with the reachability problem and the 
complexity of the proof that was discussed in section 3.2. It also helps a user to structure her / 
his efforts for a formal verification and to focus on one operation and all its facettes at a time.  
However, the concentration on individual operations gives rise to the risk that the interaction 
of the operations escapes from the view of the verification engineer. This might give rise to 
verification gaps. Examples are described in section 3.4.1. A measure to exclude verification 
gaps is to examine if the set of operation properties is complete. For this purpose it is investi-
gated whether the verification code rigorously checks the values of the output signals at every 
time point. The rigor of the check is formalized in the concept of determinedness of section 
3.4.2. The completeness checker from section 3.4.3 makes determination assumptions about 
the input signals and proves that the operation properties check the output signals with the 
rigor requested by the determination commitments. 
The completeness checker allows complete verification of circuit parts, which process opera-
tions sequentially. For such circuit components section 3.5.6 introduces the the term cluster. 
Section 3.5.7 illustrates the conditions under which a complete verification of a set of clusters 
is also a complete verification of the circuit that consists of these clusters. 
3.4.1 Verification Gaps  
The development of operation properties follows the abstraction level from Figure 2 either top 
down or bottom up.  
If a good specification is available a verification engineer will start with the highest level of 
abstraction, i.e. the transaction automaton. This will provide an overview of the transitions 
and conceptual states of this automaton. The transaction automaton will further be refined to 
an operation automaton and the operation properties. These steps are influenced by implemen-
tation specific information that captures design decisions as presented in sections 3.2.3 and 
3.2.4. 
The abstraction levels from Figure 2 are traversed bottom to top, when only inadequate speci-
fications are available or if the implementation interpretes the specification in an idiosyncratic 
manner, so that the operations from the specification are not really found in the implementa-
tion. First, the operation properties are developed. During this development, the operation and 
transaction automaton are created piece by piece. The correspondence between the operation 
properties and the specification contents is continuously checked. 
Regardless of the method, the verification engineer focuses on one operation at a time. This is 
not only beneficial for the proof technique of section 3.3. Rather, it helps the verification en-
gineer to concentrate on a relatively small number of phenomena and to investigate them 
thoroughly before the next operation is processed. Thus, the single operation receives particu-
larly high quality. 
But during the verification it needs to be ensured that the operation properties together form 
an operation automaton. This can be impacted by a number of flaws during the development 
of the operation properties.  All these flaws have the consequence that the operation properties 
37 
 
accept unintended behavior. In this case, the verification has gaps. Some examples of such 
gaps will be presented in the sequel. 
The most prominent verification gap is that some operations have not been verified at all. If a 
circuit has an error in such a forgotten operation, the error would not be detected.  
Another type of verification gap is that the conditions about the input signals of the operations 
are formulated too restrictively. Then, the operation property checks less runs of the circuit 
than intended and lets other runs unexamined. The unexamined runs may hide implementation 
errors. 
Further possible verification gaps are inadequate conditions about the output signals that al-
low multiple signal values, although only one is correct. For example, if the condition about 
sd_ctrl would be missing in the proof part of the property in section 3.2.5, the circuit would 
not be recognized as erroneous, if wrong commands would be passed to the SDRAM. 
Furthermore, the predicates for important states can be formulated incorrectly, or there are 
different predicates being used for the same important state.  
Finally, the calculation of the updated visible state may be described incompletely or it does 
not fit with the functions that extract the visible states from the traces of the circuit. For ex-
ample, if the condition "at t + 9: last_row = prev (row (address))" were missing in the proper-
ty in section 3.2.5, a subsequent read access could be verified with a property about a read to 
the same row address as before, or with a property about a read to a different row address. But 
the two properties provide different behavior e.g., of sd_ctrl and hence to not verify the read 
properly. An error in the logic that identifies row address changes might thus escape. When an 
error makes the circuit accidentally modify last_row during the first read operation, and if the 
2
nd
 read operation accidentally uses this modified value, the row address change would not 
happen and the SDRAM IF would write into the wrong memory location. Such errors can 
hardly be identified by simulation because in most cases the error only leads to some addi-
tional row address changes, but nevertheless the correct date is read. To read a wrong date 
during the simulation, the SDRAM must be accessed with a row address which coincidentally 
corresponds to the incorrect value in last_row, because only then the necessity of change in 
the memory line becomes apparent. Only then the wrong memory location will be read. This 
situation is unlikely in simulation, but the approach described here finds such errors and en-
sures on top of that, that the verification of all possible error scenarios is reliably taken care 
of. 
3.4.2 Determinedness  
To exclude the verification gaps above, it is sufficient to determine whether the conjunction of 
properties is satisfied by exactly one output trace for each input trace trace of the circuit. This 
completeness criterion is used e.g., in [Claessen 2006]. This test determines whether the veri-
fication engineer decided for a fixed output value at every point in time. If this is not the case, 
the verification must be improved. 
This completeness criterion requests a bit much, because sometimes the designers do not want 
to uniquely specify some signals. E.g., many protocol specifications define when address and 
data signals shall be "valid", i.e. when the sending module must make the information availa-
ble on the bus. Only then the receiving module should read them from the bus. Outside of 
these times, these signals may assume any value, and the concrete value is often a conse-
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quence of optimization criteria such as power or area consumption. The verification should 
better not check these values, because they might change during a design project, and this 
change should not modify the circuit function.  
Conversely, it should also be ensured that the verification makes no assumptions about the 
input signals at times at which, e.g., a protocol specifies that the signals are invalid. The cir-
cuit must operate in the same way for all invalid signal values and therefore such signal val-
ues should again not be evaluated in the verification of the circuit. 
In practice, it is therefore obviously necessary to allow a certain blur of the input and output 
traces of a circuit. Two input traces may be different, but should be treated equally by the cir-
cuit. For the same input trace the circuit may produce different output traces, but they may 
only differ in a way that is not recognized by the neighbouring circuits. 
This blur is expressed by determination conditions. If the determination conditions specify 
which two input traces are to be regarded as equal, they are called determination assumptions. 
If the determination conditions define which two output traces are the same, they are called 
determination commitments. When the contents of visible registers are regarded as equal, is 
determined by local determination conditions. 
In general, determination assumptions and commitments can be formed by conditional deter-
mination functions. The conditions mask situations where specific values of the traces are not 
relevant. The functions extract from the circuit traces all information relevant for the circuit 
operation, similar to the transaction extractors of section 3.1.2. 
The basic syntactic building block for determination assumptions and requirements is the con-
struct  
if g then determined(e) end if; 
with   as a condition and   as a function that extracts the information. The construct 
determined(e); 
is a short form of  
if true then determined(e) end if;  
The conjunction of determination assumptions and commitments is given by  
determined(e);  
determined(f); 
Besides the determination assumptions and requirementscommitments there are also local 
determination conditions that specify intermediate proof goals of the completeness checker. 
They express that an operation property uniquely describes the value of a visible register at 
the end of the operation. Unlike determination assumptions and commitments these local de-
termination conditions are therefore not examined at every time point, but only at selected, 
usually only one time point relative to the time point   of the operation property. The syntax 
is 
at t: if g then determined(e) end if; 
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The following shall exemplify the terminology around determination at the SDRAM inter-
face: The operation automaton must check the signal         against a unique value at every 
point in time. This is necessary to avoid that the SDRAM receives unintended commands. In 
addition, the signal       should always be uniquely determined, as is usual in many practi-
cally relevant protocol specifications, although this is not mandatory for the proper function 
of the protocol. This is achieved by determination commitments 
determined(sd_ctrl); 
determined(ready); 
These commitments request that the operation properties always check these signals against a 
uniquely defined value.  
The output signal         need only be checked against a unique value when the SDRAM 
needs the address, and that is the case when it receives the commands activate, read or write. 
Accordingly, the signal          need only be valid if a write command is issued. The sig-
nal       must only be determined when a read access is finished.  
The corresponding determination commitments are  
if rw = 1 and ready = 1 then determined(rdata) end if; 
if sd_ctrl = write then determined(sd_wdata) end if;  
if sd_ctrl = read or sd_ctrl = write or sd_ctrl = activate  
then determined(sd_addr) end if;  
The determination assumptions of the SDRAM interface require continuous determinedness 
of the signal        . The output signals    and         of the processor need only be 
determined when a request is present. Write data on the signal      may only be as-
sumed to be determined if it is a write request. The SDRAM provides its read data only if 
it has previously received a read command within a sufficient time interval. This provides 
the determination assumptions 
determined (request); 
if request = 1 then determined(rw) end if; 
if request = 1 then determined(address) end if; 
if request = 1 and rw = 0 then determined(wdata) end if; 
if prev(sd_ctrl, 2) = read then determined (sd_rdata) end if;  
The local determination condition for the property read_new_row from section 3.2.5 
at t+9: determined(last_row) 
checks that this property uniquely determines the visible register         . 
3.4.3 Completeness Checker 
A central component of this work is a completeness checker [Bormann / Busch 2005], for 
which a patent is pending. The completeness checker analyzes an operation automaton and 
uncovers verification gaps or confirms the absence of verification gaps. The use corresponds 
to a property checker. Like a Property Checker that receives assume and prove parts from the 
user and checks them against a circuit, the completeness checker receives determination as-
sumptions and determination commitments, and checks them against an operation automaton. 
The completeness checker examines whether the operation properties only accept output trac-
40 
 
es that match the determination commitments if the input traces satisfy the determination as-
sumptions. 
The investigation is often limited to those input traces that can be generated by the environ-
ment of the circuit. The environment is described by constraints, or it is part of the verifica-
tion. In the latter case, the environment assumptions are described by assertions, usually about 
neighouring parts of the circuit. In the sequel, the term local constraint shall be used as a col-
lective term for the environment assumptions that are relevant for a completeness check of a 
set of operation properties. 
Technically, the completeness checker firstly ensures that for each input trace a sequence of 
operations can be found, which covers the input trace. This sequence is called a chain. In fur-
ther process steps, the completeness checker ensures that the output signals are uniquely de-
termined by the properties modulo the determination commitments. 
The completeness checker is especially implemented for the examination of an operation au-
tomaton or a set of operation properties. It is built on top of a property checker. This allows 
completeness checking on circuits of industrially relevant size. A detailed description of the 
completeness checker can be found in section 5 along with a detailed assessment of the prior 
art. 
In practice, the completeness checker outputs counterexamples that point the user to verifica-
tion gaps. In many cases, two sequences are shown that meet the determination assumptions 
but violate determination commitments. In other cases, the counter example consists of only 
one trace. Such a counter example shows that the operations or operation properties take the 
circuit into a conceptual state from where the chain of operations does not continue. This is 
demonstrated by specifying an input trace that satisfies all constraints of the verification, but 
violates the input conditions of all operations that start in this conceptual state. The complete-
ness checker generates fairly detailed debug information, because it performs various specific 
tests on the operations or operation properties. 
The counter examples point to verification gaps. This helps the user to complete the verifica-
tion. In many cases, the verification gaps arise from specification gaps. Their closure im-
proves the specification, such that even the quality of the specification benefits from the com-
pleteness check. 
If the completeness checker can prove the determination commitments under the determina-
tion assumptions, the set of properties is called complete. This completeness criterion solves 
the problem to determine the quality of a set of properties that has repeatedly been mentioned 
by users and in the literature [Mitra 2008]. 
In the context of complete verification the completeness checker provides a logical criterion 
for the termination of a circuit verification. That criterion has never been applied previously in 
the industrial circuit verification. The satisfaction of this termination criterion can be docu-
mented in detail and is always traceable. This provides a much more founded quality proof for 
the circuit as currently possible with simulation-based methods. 
3.4.4 Verification of Complex Assertions by the Completeness Checker  
As already mentioned in section 2.8, assertions play an important role also in complete verifi-
cation. They are used to capture dedicated verification goals as to justify local constraints or 
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to summarize other important intermediate verification goals. As said earlier, the proof of 
assertions can become too complex for ABFV tools. In section 3.3.5 it was mentioned that the 
direct proof of assertions by IPC requires the provision of reachability conditions, and this can 
sometimes be prohibitively expensive. 
One way out requires the presence of a complete set of proven operation properties. These 
relate to every input trace one or at most only few traces of internal and output signals. If the 
assertion is valid on all these traces, then the assertion is also true on the circuit. 
This insight is the basis for an extension of the completeness checker. The basic idea is to 
treat the assertion as an additional output signal, and to prove about it that it always indicates 
that the assertion is true. Accordingly, the complete set of operation properties of a circuit 
provides an adapted induction scheme for verifying the assertion [Sheeran / Singh / Stalmarck 
2000]. 
With such an analyzer for complex assertions, the complex reachability analysis involved in 
the proof of an assertion is replaced by the reachability analysis required for the proof of the 
operation properties and their completeness. In accordance with the considerations of section 
3.3 this is much easier. 
3.5 Compositional Complete Verification  
The compositional complete verification [Beyer / Bormann 2008] is based on several sets of 
properties, that each completely verify a part of a larger circuit. This gives raise to the ques-
tion whether these properties altogether completely verify the large circuit.  
The answer seems trivial only at first glance. A second look reveals that the trivial answer 
usually involves circular reasoning. This can be seen as follows: When a verification shows 
that a module satisfies an assertion   under the constraint   and another satisfies assertion 
  under the constraint   it must not generally be concluded that the overall circuit satisfies 
the assertions   and  . Counter examples are presented in section 6.4.3. 
To study related effects, integration conditions play an important role. They are descriptions 
of the interfaces of the property sets and will be introduced in section 3.5.1. Integration condi-
tions exist both for those property sets that the completeness checker proved to be complete, 
as well as for sets of properties that have been formed according to the rules of compositional 
complete verification. Accordingly, this section develops a hierarchical process for the com-
plete verification of circuits of any size. 
To combine complete property sets of partial circuits to one complete set of the whole circuit, 
the properties need to be proven on suitable models, and the integration conditions of the par-
tial circuits and the whole circuit need to satisfy a number of preconditions. Some of these 
preconditions are specific for the single integration condition, and some of them relate to the 
interaction of all integration conditions.  
Since each circuit is usually part of a larger system, the preconditions of the individual inte-
gration conditions should be fulfilled even if no compositional verification is to be performed. 
Hence, corresponding tests offer themselves as plausibility tests for each complete verifica-
tion and provide an attractive alternative to the examination of constraints wrt. contradicitions 
that is usual for ABFV. An overview of the plausibility tests is provided in section 3.5.3 and 
details are given in section 6.2.  
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The requirements about the interaction of the integration conditions of compositional com-
plete verification have two important applications. In IP-based design of a system-on-chip 
(SoC) they lead to the verification of the communication between the IP blocks. This is de-
scribed in section 3.5.5. 
The complete verification of modules, such as the IP blocks themselves must often deal with 
multiple concurrent operation automata, which are implemented by various circuit compo-
nents. These circuit parts are called clusters and are descrubed in section 3.5.6. The verifica-
tion of a circuit with multiple clusters is presented in section 3.5.7. 
Compositional complete verification is treated in detail in Chapter 6. The associated mathe-
matical theory is set out in the Annex. 
3.5.1 Integration Conditions  
A complete verification is performed under constraints and determination assumptions. They 
include the conditions about the input behavior of a circuit under which the individual proper-
ties are proven and the conditions, which are used in the completeness check. Constraints and 
determination assumptions together provide information under which assumptions about the 
interface protocols the complete verification of the circuit was performed. Accordingly, this 
information is called integration assumption. 
About the output signals of a circuit, assertions and determination commitments are proven. 
Therefore this information describes the protocol that behavior of the output signals of the 
circuit adheres to. Accordingly, this information is called integration commitment. 
Integration assumptions and commitments are combined into integration conditions. They are 
formal descriptions of the protocol supported by the output signals of the circuit. A special 
feature of this approach is that integration conditions adequately express when a communica-
tion partner reads data and addresses from its input signals, or when it sends such information 
to the output signals. This sets the stage for testing that each communication partner in a SOC 
reads data and addresses only when they are sent by the other communication partner. This 
feature is fundamental for testing the communication between IP blocks and is not included in 
any other method for formal verification of communication between IP blocks. 
3.5.2 Example  
The integration conditions of the SDRAM interface from section 3.2.1 are the result if the 
constraints and the determination assumptions used during its complete verification and have 
the form 
 
integration_condition of sdram_if is 
 
assume: 
reset = '0';  
 
 -- constraints of the processor_protocol 
if request = '1' and ready = '0' then  
next(request) = '1' and 
  next(address) = address and 
  next(rw) = rw and 
  if rw = '0' then next(wdata) = wdata; 
end if; 
 
 -- Determination assumptions of the SDRAM IF 
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determined (request); 
if request = 1 then determined(rw) end if; 
if request = 1 then determined(address) end if; 
if request = 1 and rw = 0 then determined(wdata) end if; 
if prev(sd_ctrl, 2) = read then determined (sd_rdata) end if;  
 
guarantee: 
 -- A potential assertion about pulses of the ready signal 
 if prev(ready) = '1' then ready = '0'; end if;  
  
 -- Determination commitments about the SDRAM IF 
if rw = 1 and ready = 1 then determined(rdata) end if; 
if sd_ctrl = write then determined(sd_wdata) end if;  
if sd_ctrl = read or sd_ctrl = write or sd_ctrl = activate  
then determined(sd_addr) end if;  
 
 end integration_condition;  
The integration assumption indicates the protocol that the SDRAM interface supports. This is 
expressed by the constraints of section 3.2.5 and the determination assumptions of section 
3.4.2. In essence, the processor protocol requires that the processor request is maintained until 
the peripheral indicates that it served the request. The determination assumption states when 
the input signals are evaluated by the SDRAM interface. 
As an example, the integration commitment is extended by an assertion that the SDRAM in-
terface produces pulses on the ready signal, i.e. the ready signal is never active over two con-
secutive clock cycles. Such an assertion confirmes that a certain feature of the processor pro-
tocol is not used here, that allows immediate (combinatorial) responses to a request. Such an 
assertion could become important if, for example, a processor version is used, that can not 
deal with such immediate reactions. 
Other assertions could be related to the protocol towards the SDRAM itself and e.g., assure 
the correct sequence of commands on sd_ctrl or compliance with time constraints between 
control commands.  
3.5.3 Plausibility Tests  
Integration assumptions should describe only those input traces that the circuit can actually 
receive, e.g., if it is part of a larger system. This is straightforward if the integration assump-
tion contains no output and internal signals of the circuit under test. 
However, in many cases the environment reacts on the behavior of the output signals of the 
circuit. That means, that the environment produces input signals to the circuit with a restricted 
behavior, and the restrictions are different depending on the circuit outputs. In this case, the 
integration conditions contain output and internal signals. Then the integration assumption is 
called reactive.  
From the syntax, reactive integration assumptions may postulate behavior that can not be cre-
ated by any surrounding system. For example, a reactive integration assumption may not only 
restrict the input signals of the circuit, but they can simultaneously ban certain values on the 
output signals, although there is no equivalent to do so in the physics of a digital circuit. In 
addition, the integration assumptions may postulate a behavior of the surrounding system that 
it could only show if it would not be causal, i.e. if it had clairvoyant abilities. Thirdly, the in-
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tegration assumption could require a combinatorial path in the surrounding system that com-
plements a combinatorial path in the circuit to form a combinatorial loop. 
One of the conditions for compositional verification is that the integration assumption must 
not be pathological in any of the above scenarios. For a related criterion a formalization has 
been found that is intuitive also for users without formal education: There must be at least one 
equivalent circuit that implements the integration assumption and can be combined with the 
circuit under test, without producing combinatorial loops. Details are described in section 6.2. 
The criterion therefore consists of two parts. On one hand, it requires that there is at least one 
such equivalent circuit. If it exists, the integration assumption is called implementable. The 
requirement of implementability of the integration assumption ensures firstly that it will ac-
cept all values of the output and internal signals of the tested circuit. Secondly it ensured that 
the integration assumption implies no clairvoyance, i.e. no dependency between current val-
ues of the input signals and values of output or internal signals at future clock cycles. 
The second criterion requires that no combinatorial loops may be created if this equivalent 
circuit is connected to the to circuit under test. This criterion is called structural compatibility. 
Structural compatibility can be understood as a refinement of the requirement for causality. 
This refinement is about combinatorial dependencies between signals. As long as there are no 
combinatorial loops in a circuit, there is an order in which the operations of the circuit take 
place within a clock cycle. This provides a causality relation, and the requirement of structural 
compatibility ensures that the integration assumption fits to it.  
In section 6.2 tests are presented which implement sufficient pre conditions to ensure that an 
integration assumption is implementable and structurally compatible with the circuit under 
test. These tests are regularly used as plausibility criteria that prevent a devaluation of a com-
plete verification by inadequate integration assumptions. 
Thus, the plausibility tests take a role that is played in ABFV by vacuity tests, that shall detect 
flaws in constraints, be it with or without the model of the circuit. In comparison, the vacuity 
tests of ABFV are fuzzier than the plausibility tests of complete verification because they only 
raise an alarm when a constraint prohibits all output values, and they are blind to non-causal 
dependencies between output and input signals of the tested circuit. In turn, the plausibility 
tests of complete verification already warn against a reactive constraint that accidentally re-
stricts some output behavior.  
3.5.4 Examples of Rejected Integration Assumptions  
To demonstrate the value of the tests on implementability and structural compatibility, inte-
gration assumptions are presented below, which are rejected by them:  
 
integration_condition of example1 is 
assume: 
 if next(outsig) then determined(insig) end if; 
guarantee: … 
end integration_condition;  
would be rejected because the determination assumption is not causal.  
The integration assumption  
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integration_condition of example2 is 
assume: 
 determined(insig); 
 insig = outsig+1; 
guarantee: … 
end integratin_condition;  
would be rejected if insig and outsig are bit vectors with equal width. Then the integration 
assumption prohibits namely that outsig ever becomes "1111 ... 1111". This is because ITL 
performs the addition in a numerically correct way which cannot be presented by insig due to 
the restricted bit width. 
For the circuit of Figure 10, the integration condition 
integration_condition of example3 is 
assume: 
 determined(in1); 
 determined(in2); 
 in2 = sum; 
guarantee: … 
end integration_condition; 
will be rejected because the integration assumption is not structurally compatible with the 
model under examination. This is because any circuit that is equivalent with the integration 
assumption will introduce the combinatorial dependency that is indicated in Figure 10 by the 
dashed line, and this causes a combinatorial loop. It is useful to uncover this problem, because 
under the constraint in the integration assumption the unusual assertion 
assertion unusual := out_sig = '0'; end assertion; 
can be proven, which can be seen as follows: Since                , we get for       
the relationship             , which contradicts the constraint. Hence there must be 
     , which proves the assertion. But the proof of this assertion appears absurd, because 
there is no circuit environment that is connected only with the signals sum and in2, and influ-
ences the signals in1 or out_sig. 
3.5.5 IP Based SoC Design  
A strategy for the rapid development of integrated circuits is the IP based design of a system-
on-chip (SoC). Here circuit blocks are pre-designed, verified and made available in an IP li-
brary, potentially independently of final plans for the development of a specific ASIC. Such 
half adder
carry
sum
out_sig
in1
in2
 
Figure 10: Structurally pathological case 
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circuit blocks are, for example, processors, arbiters, memory controllers or bus systems. For 
such modules, the term IP block (IP = intellectual property) is used, which points out that the 
final product of their development is not a silicon circuit but only their production documents. 
IP blocks are realized on silicon as part of a SoC, which is created sometime later by another 
developer team from the production documents of multiple different IP blocks. This SoC de-
velopment team is often referred to as the integrators. 
As a basic set of production documents the IP developers will offer RTL, synthesis scripts and 
so on. They add value to their IP with further information, including integration information 
about the supported behavior of the input signals, or general descriptions about the behavior 
of the output signals. Frequently the integration information names the protocols that are sup-
ported by the module, and they may also indicate that the circuit does not support certain spe-
cialties of the protocol either on the input or the output side. The integration information of IP 
blocks thus contains information similar to the contents of the integration conditions of com-
plete verification. 
In IP-based SoC design, verification of the IP block itself is usually executed by the IP devel-
oper. Besides correct function this module verification must also show the correctness of the 
integration information. Today, this is done primarily by means of simulation and is therefore 
somewhat uncertain. 
The integrators use the IP information to make a preselection of candidate IP blocks. After the 
interconnection of the IP blocks (by suitable RTL code) simulation is used to confirm the 
proper interaction with neighboring modules. Moreover, this simulation ensures that the inter-
action between the IP blocks actually has the function that is requested by the specification. 
The integration conditions are results of complete verification as described above. They are 
precise and formally proven descriptions of the supported protocols that can be put automati-
cally and formally into relation with each other before much effort is spent on the develop-
ment of the SoC. This way, a formal verification of the communication in the SoC is possible, 
which is distributed like in simulation on the IP and SoC designers: The IP developers ensure 
on one side by execution of a complete verification that the integration conditions are correct. 
They also make sure that the integration assumptions are implementable and structurally 
compatible with their circuits. 
The SoC designers on the other side ensure that the integration assumptions of the overall 
circuit are implementable and structurally compatible with the overall circuit. They also en-
sure the structural compatibility of integration assumptions of sub-blocks with the overall 
circuit. And of course they have to determine whether the integration conditions fit together. 
To that end firstly the integration assumptions of all blocks must be satisfied, taking into ac-
count the interconnection, the integration commitments of the neighboring blocks and the 
integration assumptions of the overall circuit. Secondly, the integration commitments of the 
overall circuit must by satisfied by the integration commitments of the sub-blocks and the 
integration assumption of the overall circuit. The mathematical formulation of these require-
ments is discussed in section 6.3.2. 
If the SDRAM interface with its integration conditions from section 3.5.2 provides a proces-
sor with instructions (and not with data), the processor may have the following integration 
commitments: 
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integration_condition of processor is 
assume:  
… 
guarantee: 
 p_rw = '1' and 
 if p_request = '1' and p_ready = '0' then  
next(p_request) = '1' and 
  next(p_address) = p_address 
 end if; 
 
if p_request = '1' then determined(p_address) end if;  
… 
end integration_condition;  
The prefix p_ of the signal names should highlight that the outputs of the processor are initial-
ly  not related to the input signals of the SDRAM interface. The processor signals must there-
fore be suitably substituted before an integration test can be performed. After this substitution 
the test can be executed. It seems an interesting facette that the determination assumption 
about the signal    of the SDRAM interface is justified by the assertion about      and not 
by a determination commitment.   
3.5.6 Clusters  
A complete verification of a larger circuit is usually split into multiple parts that are complete-
ly verified separately. This is always the case when the full circuit does not only execute one 
sequence of operations but there are multiple parts of the circuit that execute operations con-
currently. In this case, the circuit must be verified by a number of operation automata.  
The circuit parts that are verified by one operation automaton are called clusters. Two circuit 
elements usually belong to different clusters, if they process events from two independent 
sources. 
Many circuits, e.g., the IP blocks from the previous section 3.5.5, consist of multiple clusters. 
Processor peripherals often consist of a configuration block which consists of the configura-
tion registers and a slave interface to write or read these configuration registers. This block is 
often verified as a separate cluster, while the actual function of the peripheral is verified in 
one or more other clusters. 
When complete verification is to be applied to processors, the entire pipeline is kept in one 
cluster. But if there is a more demanding prefetch unit, it usually does not work in the rhythm 
of the pipeline, but takes a life of its own. For example, the prefetch unit may be controlled by 
the allocation of the instruction bus. Accordingly, there are fifos between the prefetch unit and 
the decode stage of the processor pipeline, with which the different rhythms decoupled. In this 
case, the prefetch unit and the processor pipeline will be verified from the decode stage in 
different clusters. 
Another reason to split a complete verification in different parts can be complexity limits of 
formal assertion checkers. But IPC can successfully treat relatively large clusters, such as a 
complete processor pipeline, so that the division of the circuit in clusters usually follows func-
tional requirements rather than complexity problems.  
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3.5.7 Complete Verification of Circuits with Multiple Clusters  
A circuit with multiple clusters is completely verified by executing complete verification of 
the clusters. It is obvious that this complete verification can be executed with the rules that 
were just introduced for the verification of a SoC that consists of multiple IP blocks. To this 
end, an own circuit model would be built for each cluster, and all relations between cluster 
inputs must be provided by explicit integration assumptions, which need to be justified by 
explicit integration commitments of the neighbour circuits.  
 
But some effort related to explicit integration assumptions can be avoided, if the full circuit 
with its multiple clusters is known in advance. In this case neighbouring clusters can some-
times be used as implicit constraints. E.g., one cluster might have an output signal that is a 
delayed version of another output signal. If these two outputs are inputs to a second cluster, 
the relationship can be made explicit in an integration assumption of the second cluster. But 
this explicit integration assumption is not necessary if the model of the second cluster also 
contains the first cluster and how it derives one output from the other.  
 
This approach is however limited. If the larger model contains dependencies from a cluster 
output to cluster inputs, i.e. through the environment of the cluster, then these dependencies 
may influence the formal verification. An example is given in section 6.4.3. It shows that de-
pendencies from cluster outputs to cluster inputs must be removed during the model genera-
tion. This is done with the “signal cutting” operation that can optionally be executed during 
the model generation. With this signal cutting operation, an internal signal is turned into a 
primary output and a primary input. The primary output provides the value of the signal, the 
primary input is connected to all parts of the circuit that consume the signal.  
The trick is to carefully select those cluster inputs that must be cut to become primary inputs 
of the verification. Two requirements determine the cluster inputs that must become primary 
inputs. One requirement is that cyclic dependencies between clusters are to be removed. The 
second requirement is that reactive constraints must not introduce such cyclic dependencies.  
To determine the cluster inputs that must become primary inputs, a cluster graph is created. 
Nodes of this graph are the clusters, and if this cluster drives a signal that is used by another 
cluster, the cluster graph contains an edge from the cluster that produces the signal to the clus-
ter that consumes it.  
This cluster graph needs to be analyzed to determine a hopefully small set of edges, such that 
the cluster graph becomes cycle free, if the edges of the set are removed from the cluster 
graph. Every removed edge from one cluster to another corresponds to a number of signals 
from the first to the second cluster. All these signals need to be cut.  
Complete verification is then executed separately for each cluster, but on the model with the 
cuts. Many cluster inputs will remain internal signals that are generated by other clusters. The 
complete verification of each cluster creates an integration assumption for that cluster. If an  
integration assumption contains a reactive constraint, all cluster inputs in this constraint need 
to become primary inputs by further signal cutting. This gives the model on which the compo-
sitional complete verification is executed with the approach described above.  
The special feature of this approach is to use a model in which some signals being cut be-
tween clusters, but others may remain intact. The cuts are necessary to ensure that the com-
plete verification of the entire circuit can actually be decomposed into a complete verification 
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of the clusters. The advantage of this approach is that the verification can be performed on a 
model in which many input signals remain internal signals such that some integration con-
straints need not be made explicit. This saves effort.  
This shall be exemplified by comparison with the example in section 3.5.2.  It shall be as-
sumed that the SDRAM interface is included in the processor and is developed and verified 
with it. Processor and SDRAM interface then form two clusters and their cluster graph is cy-
clic. It is advisable to eliminate the edge from the processor to the SDRAM interface to make 
the cluster graph cycle free. Then the verification of the processor and SDRAM interface is 
carried out on a common model in which the signals ready and rdata remain internal signals 
that connect the SDRAM interface to the processor. The verification is executed cluster by 
cluster, but it uses the same common model with a few cut signals. Thereby, the integration 
condition about the pulses of the ready signal is not required, which was necessary in section 
3.5.2 was necessary to ensure proper processor function. 
3.6 Complete Verification in Industrial Application  
Operation automata and properties, IPC and the completeness checker form an advantageous 
symbiosis in this approach. The symbiosis has proven itself over nearly 10 years in industrial 
practice and has been made available in the product OneSpin 360 MV [OneSpin undated]. 
Since the completeness checker is used on operation properties, it produces resource friendly 
proof goals, such that it can handle properties about large circuits. IPC is particularly suitable 
for operation properties, in particular also because this requires only relatively simple reacha-
bility conditions. If such conditions are needed, the approach allows user input, by which a 
higher understanding of the circuit can be incorporated into the verification. If the user pro-
vides reachability conditions, the completeness checker ensures that they are not incorporated 
into the verification without proof. All in all, the symbiosis allows the independent formal 
investigation of modules, which forms an alternative to simulation-based module verification. 
The features of the formal approach are summarized in the sequel: 
3.6.1 Highest Quality of Implementation  
The approach described in this thesis has already been used in many verification projects. It 
achieved highest circuit quality with a significantly simpler procedure than with theorem 
provers and with a much higher productivity. In this regard, the complete verification is the 
first of its kind because in contrast to simulation, a properly configured complete verification 
does not allow that errors escape [Büttner 2007]: Simulation overlooks errors in unstimulated 
situations, but also stimulated errors are only discovered by the simulation when the simula-
tion stimulus propagates the misbehavior to the interface of a checker, which moreover needs 
to be sensitive for the misbehavior. To mitigate the vulnerabilities of simulation-based verifi-
cation some approaches are offered [Grosse / Hampton 2005, Certess undated] which are 
based on fault injection and mutation analysis [Offutt / Untch 2000]. 
Complete verification does not only mitigate such vulnerabilities, but it prevents them reliably 
and automatically. Errors escape complete verification only, if the specification was formal-
ized in the same wrong way that was already used during the circuit development, or if the 
constraints on the primary inputs were formulated too restrictivly. This problem is shared by 
all verification procedures, as long as they start from informal specifications. For complete 
verification this case is quite unlikely because of the systematic alignment between informal 
specification, formalization and implementation. 
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Specifications that are formalized by properties are available for complete verification firstly 
in the form of reusable assertions about protocols, and secondly e.g., as formalized architec-
ture descriptions for processors [Bormann / Beyer / Skalberg 2006], that were also the starting 
point for the development of fast simulators. If a verification starts out from such a formalized 
specification, the problem of falsely accepted errors is no longer relevant. 
3.6.2 Quality of Specifications  
If the specification is carefully translated into operation properties, the completeness checker 
also identifies specification gaps, and thus helps to complete the specification.  
The approach is anyhow quite tolerant wrt. the quality of the specification, which is an ad-
vantage for industrial use. In various example applications little written information about the 
circuit was available apart from the module name. Even then it is still possible to work effec-
tively provided that an authority like a system architect can make binding statements about 
the expected behavior. If there is no such authority, the verification reduces to plausibility 
tests e.g., about the synchronization of the circuit with its environment. Even these plausibility 
tests are still quite powerful verification tools because of the intuitive representation of opera-
tions of the circuit. 
The final circuit description by operations states precisely and on a transaction level, how the 
specification was interpreted.  
3.6.3 Constraining  
Complete verification is designed so that each hint provided by the user must be proven. Con-
straints are therefore only required on the primary inputs of the full circuit that is to be com-
pletely verified. Here, they must also be known for simulation-based approaches. The applica-
tion of complete verification allows that the designer focusses on one operation after another, 
and hereby always takes care of a few constraints and their exact formulation at a time. This 
already simplifies the correct constraining for complete verification compared to other formal 
procedures. On top of that, complete verification provides more critical plausibility checks 
about the constraints than other formal procedures. When integrating IP blocks to SoCs, com-
positional complete verification ensures that the constraints of the different IP blocks are in-
deed justified by the neighboring blocks. 
3.6.4 Verification Process  
Complete verification is an independent, highly automated verification process which is suit-
ed to provide far better quality than simulation-based methods. Complete verification is there-
fore an alternative to simulation, once the actual verification phase begins. In previous design 
steps, simulation appears indispensable to give designers a feeling for the circuit and its be-
havior. 
Unlike ABFV the effort for complete verification therefore does not add to the effort for 
simulation-based verification, but complete verification can take over the full task and hence 
the full effort budget of the simulation based module verification.  
Verification planning [Bormann et al. 2007] for complete verification is executed like project 
planning. The goal is to produce a net plan for the verification tasks that are related to the 
clusters. The completeness checker ensures full coverage of the specification during the exe-
cution of the verification. The net plan is the basis for progress reporting in the verification 
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project. In contrast, verification planning for simulation requires much forethought [Bergeron 
et al 2005], many reviews and therefore more effort. 
When carrying out complete verification, the verification engineer focuses on individual op-
erations and their interaction, and thus on a level of abstraction similar to the transaction-
based verification by simulation. This avoids the difference of abstraction levels which exists 
between ABFV and simulation based verification. The operations are taken from the specifi-
cation, the degrees of freedom provided by specification are filled in occording to the the im-
plementation decisions. In addition it is taken from the implementation, how the operations 
interact with one another. 
The examination of the circuit description is thus an integral part of complete verification. 
The process pursues the approach that an engineer applies anyhow, if he or she starts familiar-
ization with a circuit and its description. The first part to be examined is the central control 
unit of the circuit and from there an understanding is built, how this control unit influences the 
data path. This understanding is reviewed, when the operation properties are developed step 
by step, when intermediate versions of the operation properties are verified, and when the 
completeness of the properties is checked. 
Experience has shown that much less interaction is needed with the designers as in simula-
tion-based verification projects or during application of ABFV [Mitra 2008]. Nevertheless 
errors localizations are usually very precise up to functionally tested proposals for corrections. 
Applications of the approach over multiple years [Bormann / Spalinger 2001, Bormann 2003, 
Winkelmann et al. 2004, Thomas et al. 2004, Bormann / Blank / Winkelmann 2005, Bormann 
et al. 2007, Loitz et al. 2008] shows that the risk to accept errors is quite low, and that it is 
likely that all errors in the circuit description are found, which are course many more errors 
than by simulation-based verification. 
3.6.5 Termination Criterion  
One of the most striking features of complete verification is the existence of a termination 
criterion that is based on the proof that all functionality of the circuit is verified by at least one 
operation property. This is different from all other verification approaches which deploy more 
vague termination criteria which are satisfied before all functionality is verified. Hence all 
these approaches run the risk that errors escape because they were never stimulated or ob-
served. Moreover, the operation based verification methodology provides a recipe how to 
achieve this termination criterion with a structured effort. The common termination criteria 
provide less insight about what to do to satisfy it.  
 
The termination criterion of complete verification is reached, if the following requirements 
are fulfilled:  
 All opertion properties are successfully checked against the RTL of the circuit. 
 The completenss checker proves that the properties verify all circuit functionality.  
 The complete verification of all clusters can be combined to a complete verification of 
the whole circuits.  
 All predefined assertions are checked.  
This is automatically checked in OneSpin 360 MV. Therefore it is the first verification tool 
with a non-heuristic termination criterion. If this termination criterion is satisfied, the proper-
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ties and in particular the associated timing diagrams form a readable and proven design doc-
umentation. 
Whether the verification really assures correctness, depends on whether the properties actual-
ly represent the specification, and whether the constraints actually model the environmental 
conditions under which the circuit should operate. The former can be ensured by reviews, the 
latter can be demonstrated by simulation or formal when the circuit is embedded in a larger 
system. 
3.6.6 Productivity 
Experienced verification engineers, who are willing and able to understand details of RTL 
descriptions, achieve this termination criterion and the related high circuit quality significant-
ly faster than with simulation-based verification [Bormann 2003, Bormann / Blank / 
Winkelmann 2005], which even provides less quality. In many application examples experi-
enced verification engineers completely verified on average 2,000 to 4,000 lines of RTL code 
per person month, the record is at 8000 lines per person month. Moreover, the computing 
power for the verification is much smaller than in simulation. 
The approach abstains from complex custom abstractions, and thus avoids one of the reasons 
for upredictable efforts, that R. Mitra [Mitra 2008] complains about. The approach becomes 
slower when the RTL code is conceptually unclear, unstructured, or generally difficult to un-
derstand, i.e. badly described in the sense of Software Engineering. Such bad RTL code is 
sometimes created right from the first version, when the circuit concept was not well thought 
through and the circuit was subsequently improved incrementally due to feedback from e.g., 
simulation based verification. But more frequently, even worse RTL code arises in particular 
in the context of reuse, when if a circuit is repeatedly modified by several designers who did 
not fully familiarize with its concept before they started to modify the code. Complete verifi-
cation can be particularly useful for such a circuit, because it allows rediscovering the con-
cept, to detect unnecessarily complex or large code, and to ensure a verification of the corner 
cases that usually arise from such a development history.   
3.6.7 Integration with Simulation  
When completely verified modules are embedded in a larger system, that is to be verified by 
simulation, the verification plan need not state coverage goals for this module. It only needs to 
be checked sufficiently deeply that the system complies with the constraints of the complete 
verification. This provides a pragmatic approach for a cross-technology verification planning 
and coverage evaluation. 
System-wide verification objectives usually require that the quality of simulation is monitored 
by coverage. The completely verified modules offer a simple way to define functional cover-
age on the basis of the operations of the modules: The coverage conditions are met whenever 
the corresponding operations are carried out. For this it is sufficient to turn the assumptions of 
the corresponding operation properties into functional coverage points. This avoids that the 
operations themselves are intensively investigated by the system simulation, which would be 
a redundant effort after a complete verification. 
3.6.8 White-box Verification  
Practitioners regard it a weak point of complete verification that it depends on the concrete 
implementation of the circuit. In fact, changes of the circuit RTL usually need to be accompa-
nied by changes in the properties, because otherwise the test of some operation property fails. 
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This adjustment often requires further changes of the property set, to make the property set 
complete again. The change effort is usually low for successive versions during a design 
phase. It increases when circuit parts are discarded and reimplemented following an entirely 
different concept. 
A different picture emerges in relation to circuit IP, i.e. reusable modules that are maintained 
over years and many revisions by various designers. In such a context there is often little time 
to propertly adapt simulation based verification. This leads to the phenomenon of ageing of 
the simulation-based verification, which has the consequence that the verification checks less 
and less critical situations of the modified functionality, and hence overlooks more and more 
errors. If this leads to escapes, i.e. error that are only detected during the product test, or even 
from in the field, the carelessness of the module verification is excused with the outdated veri-
fication technology, although this verification technology was well capable to secure a rea-
sonable quality of the first version of the module. 
Complete verification prevents the ageing of the verification. However, proper integration of 
complete verification should modify the development and maintenance processes of the cir-
cuit. Goal should be to closely interleave the RTL development and the related modification 
of the operation properties. Ideally, the RTL changes are planned on the higher abstraction 
level of the operation properties. This means that the operation properties are changed first, 
and then the RTL is suitably adapted. An advantage of such changed development and 
maintenance processes is the availability of a proven design documentation prior to every 
revision of the circuit RTL. This helps a (potentially new) developer to a quick familiarization 
with the concept behind the RTL. Experiments suggest that this does not only lead to highest 
quality of the IP after the changes, but it also reduces the amount of changes, and leads to 
conceptually clearer circuit description than what can be achieved with the state of the art 
approaches.  
3.6.9 Does Complete Verification Help Against the Verification Gap?  
Does complete verification meet the dream to reduce the verification gap with formal verifica-
tion? The leaps in quality and verification productivity that were observed in many successful 
verification projects seem to suggest it. But it is a disruptive approach, which requires a com-
pletely different education of the verification engineers, which cannot use existing verification 
code, for which there is almost no verification IP, and which requires changes in the design, 
maintenance and verification processes. 
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4 Basics  
4.1 Synchronous Circuits  
All efforts on synthesis-based design are targeting digital circuits that are implemented by 
FPGAs or ASICs. Without loss of generality, this thesis focuses on synchronous circuits with 
one clock. Such circuits consist of combinatorial gates and flip-flops. The combinatorial gates 
shall be connected without forming combinatorial loops, such that they do not implement 
storing behavior.  This work only considers circuits with flip-flops that are triggered by a ris-
ing clock edge. 
Pecularities of the timing behavior of input signals shall be excluded. Therefore, it is always 
assumed that the circuit is (or can be) embedded into a larger circuit that satisfies these as-
sumptions.  
As usual in synchronous design, it is assumed that the latency of combinatorial paths from the 
output of a flip-flop to the input of another flip-flop is small enough, so that the input to the 
second flip-flop has a stable value, whenever a rising clock edge occurs. This assumption jus-
tifies both the zero-delay-descriptions that are usual for synthesis based design as well as its 
mapping to a Mealy automaton.  
4.1.1 Automata 
This Mealy machine represents the values of the signals of the circuit just before each rising 
clock edge [Bormann et al. 1995]. It is characterized by 
 A set   of input variables and a set of values     that these variables can assume. 
These variables should be the input signals of the circuit. 
 A set   of state variables and a set of state values     these variables can assume. 
These variables describe the values of the flip-flops in the circuit. 
 A set   that contains the set of internal signals  and the set of output signals  . All 
elements of   are output signals from an automata theoretic point of view. The 
sets of values are denoted    ,     and    . It is       and     
         .1 
 A state transition function                 ,  
 A function                     to compute the values of the outputs  
 A function                     to calculate the values of the internal signals 
 A condition  :        about reset sequences2. These reset sequences are input 
traces of length  , that take the circuit into its reset state. It must be ensured that the 
circuit always executes one of the reset sequences before it processes normal inputs. 
This condition replaces the conditions about initial states that are usually introduced 
for automata.  
The circuit firstly executes a reset sequence                         which starts in an arbi-
trary state of the circuit, whereby the circuit produces a sequence                         
of states, which starts at an arbitrary state           and ends in a reset state   . Starting 
from    a sequence              of input values is processed by the machine. This leads to 
                                                 
1
 Flip-flops are indeed represented twice, as part of the set of states   and additionally as a part of the set of in-
ternal signals  . 
2
   represents the set              of Boolean values. 
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values              of the flip-flop signals. The input stimulus 
                                   therefore leads to sequences 
                                   and                                 of values 
of internal and output signals, which are calculated according to  
 
       s  i   
and 
        s  i                   s  i   
 
where     .   is called the state transition function of the automaton and      the output 
function.  
4.1.2 Traces  
A sequence        of values of a set of signals is called a Trace   of these signals. Typically, 
the index   counts the cycles of a clock. The individual      is called the  -th element of the 
trace. Traces can be finite or infinite. If a set    of signals is given, the set of all traces of   is 
denoted     . To form     , the signals shall be treated as free variables, i.e.      
should also contain those traces that would not be created by a circuit that implements the 
signals in  .  
A finite initial segment                         of a trace is called the trace prefix.   is 
called the largest index of the prefix. Two traces can have a common prefix. The separation 
index          shall be the largest index of the largest common prefix of   and  . If 
    then           . 
Two traces   and   can form a joined trace        that consists of the pairs               of 
elements of the two traces. There shall be no distinction between a pair of traces and the 
trace of pairs of their elements.  
According to section 4.1.1 an automaton  can be identified with a predicate  about 
traces.           is satisfied if and only if the automaton  can map an input trace   to the 
output trace , the trace of the state variables   and the trace of internal signals . This 
mapping is not unique, because firstly it reflects the reset behavior, and secondly is shall not 
be assumed that the reset state is unique. The trace of the state variables often plays no inde-
pendent role, because this information is already contained in the trace of internal signals  . 
Therefore, the automaton is usually regarded as a predicate        . A trace         that 
satisfies the predicate         is called a trace of the machine M. The Traces start with 
the index  –    to account for the reset sequence. 
4.2 Assertions, Constraints and Properties  
4.2.1 Roles of Assertions, Constraints and Properties  
For the traces     and   of an automaton, conditions          can be defined that contain 
restrictions or expectations about the behavior of the automaton. These conditions are often 
built from formalizations             that are stated relative to an arbitrary but fixed time 
point  . They should hold for all    , i.e. 
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The conditions    may be assertions, constraints or operation properties. Constraints describe 
behavior that is not to be questioned, either because it shall be assumed that the environment 
of the circuit under test behaves accordingly, or because a verification should be limited to the 
situation described in the constraint. Constraints are used for the proof of assertions, of prop-
erties, or for the completeness check and they limit the proof accordingly. Constraints are 
global, i.e. they are valid for the entire verification. 
Assertions contain either verification goals (see section 2.8), reachability conditions (section 
3.3.3) or local constraints (section 3.4.3). Assertions and operation properties formalize proof 
goals as described in section 3. 
4.2.2 Dependencies  
In the sequel the term object shall be used to summarize assertions, constraints, operation 
properties, and completeness. A verification is executed by proving all objects except the con-
straints. Many of these proofs are executed under the assumption that other objects are valid. 
Practical experience (and common practice in maths) shows, that it is often helpful to post-
pone the actual proof of an object, e.g. because the concentration on one part of a circuit is 
helpful for the exact formalization and the proof of several objects. 
 
The concept of dependencies helps to postpone the proof of certain objects in favour of a 
more suitable order in which they are worked at. To that end, the user annotates each object 
with the objects that are to be postulated during its proof. E.g., operation properties and many 
assertions are proven with IPC under the postulate of other assertions or constraints. Com-
pleteness and complex assertions are proven with the completeness checker, again postulating 
assertions, constraints and operation properties (see section 4.3.7). Except for potentially in-
creased complexity of the algorithmic proof, the annotation of dependencies that are actually 
not needed for the proof does not harm.  
 
To avoid circular reasoning, the graph of dependencies must be cycle free. If this is the case, 
the objects can be proven in any order that the user thinks best.  
 
4.2.3 Reactive Constraints and Assertions  
Constraints describe the behavior of the input signals of a circuit by providing a condition 
about the input trace that is satisfied if the input trace can occur during the operation of the 
circuit, and dissatisfied otherwise. Only simple constraints can be described by conditions, 
which depend only on the input signals of the circuit. In most cases, the circuit is part of a 
larger system with feedback from the output signals of the circuit to the input signals. These 
effects of the circuit environment are also formalized with constraints, but these constraints 
depend on output or internal signals. Such constraints are called reactive. 
In compositional verification also reactive local constraints can occur, which are assertions 
from a global point of view. Analogously to the above, such assertions are called reactive as-
sertions. 
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4.2.4 Safety and Liveness Conditions  
A safety condition describes that an undesired situation never occurs. A liveness condition is 
met if a desired situation will eventually occur in the future.  
A condition is a safety condition iff it can be refuted (i.e. proven to be wrong) on a finite pre-
fix of a trace. Hence if a safety condition      is refuted on a trace  , then there is an index 
  such that       is violated on any trace    that has a common prefix of length  with  . 
Typical safety conditions require that some Boolean condition about a choice of signals is 
always true, or that a second event always occurs after a first event occurs within a limited 
number of clock cycles. 
Liveness conditions require the investigation of entire traces. A typical liveness condition 
requires that a start event is eventually followed by a reaction, without specification of a max-
imum waiting time. The algorithmic proof of liveness assertions is usually very expensive. 
Complete verification therefore avoids such assertions. This is possible because circuit verifi-
cation uses liveness conditions in two situations for which there are alternative solutions: 
The first situation is that the waiting time between the start event and the reaction is deter-
mined only by the circuit. In this case, the methodology of section 3.2.3 requires an exact de-
termination of the waiting time which will be encoded in the corresponding operation proper-
ty. By this, the operation property becomes a safety property and can therefore be verified 
with IPC. 
In the second case, the circuit response occurs only after a second external event which must 
arrive after the start event. A counter example for this property consists of the start event and 
the second event, which arrives after a finite number of clock cycles. For the reasons de-
scribed above, the circuit response is expected after a number of clock cycles that is again 
given by the circuit description. Hence, the counter example is again finite, which demon-
strates that the property is a safety property. See section 4.2.5 for a discussion of how this 
behavior is captured in an operation property. 
These considerations show that complete verification uses only safety properties and safety 
assertions. Liveness assertions may only occur as externally provided proof goals. They will 
be shown on the basis of operation properties and other safety assertions in a separate verifi-
cation step. 
4.2.5 Treatment of Endless Waiting Times  
IPC, the proof technology that underlies complete verification (cf. section 3.3) cannot deal 
with endless waiting times between a start and an external event in the sense of the previous 
section 4.2.4. It is only possible to formalize finite waiting times, where the upper limit should 
be chosen small to keep complexity low. This limitation relates to the property check well as 
to the completeness check. 
The user can however perform complete verification in full generality. To that end waiting 
periods must be divided into three phases which are described by separate properties: In the 
first phase the circuit enters the waiting period and reaches a waiting state. The second phase 
proves that the circuit remains in the waiting state if the external event is absent.The third 
phase assumes that the circuit is in the waiting state and the external event arrives, and proves 
that the circuit leaves the waiting state and continues to operate as expected. With this ap-
proach, all waiting states become conceptual states.  
58 
 
 
The application of this procedure is sometimes quite demanding, because an operation is split 
into three operations at a quite unnatural time point. For this time point the arguments from 
section 3.3.5 about the simplicity of reachability conditions between operations are invalid. 
Hence it can be quite expensive to identify the reachability conditions in the wait states. Fur-
ther, the split makes it more difficult to understand an operation. 
The alternative approach is to restrict the waiting time to a maximum that can be handled by 
the IPC-prover. This approach leaves a verification gap, because it does not reason about 
longer waiting periods. However, it is often obvious from the circuit behavior that this verifi-
cation gap is irrelevant. The advantage of this alternative approach is the more comprehensive 
description of the operations and the related better understandability of the circuit behavior.  
In the following description the theory is developed so that it is also applicable to operations 
with infinite delays.  
4.3 Property Language ITL  
A formal functional verification is the more accepted, the better the behavior to be proven can 
be expressed in the language that is accepted by the Property Checker. The goal in developing 
a property language should therefore be that a user can concentrate his/her energy on the iden-
tification of the behavior to be proven. As little effort as possible should be spent to actually 
formalize the proof goal. Deviations between intended and actually formalized behavior 
should be as rare as possible, and they should quickly become obvious during debugging. 
Furthermore, the property language must be able to represent the cause-effect relationships of 
the signals of the interfaces of a circuit that are involved in the processing of a transaction. To 
satisfy these demands, the property language ITL was developed [Siegel et al. 1999], based on 
experiences that have been made with a previous version [Bormann 1995]. 
ITL was backed up with the already introduced graphical representation (cf. Figure 7) [Bor-
mann 2001, Paucke 2003], which closely follows timing diagrams and hence is much more 
intuitive than other graphical formalisms for describing circuit behavior [Schlör 2001, Peukert 
et al. 2001]. In addition, a method was developed to translate ITL properties into synthesiza-
ble simulation monitors [Bormann 2003, Beuer 2005]. 
4.3.1 Treatment of Time 
A first example property has already been described in section 3.2.5. It shows that a main 
characteristic of the language is the explicit treatment of time, which is measured in clock 
cycles. All operation properties are formalized relative to an arbitrary but fixed point in time 
that is represented by the keyword "t". Finite offsets of t are expressed by     or      
where   is an integer.  
Variable offsets are e.g. required to describe how the circuit waits for a synchronization event 
from the communication partner during the execution of a transaction. They are represented 
by time variables that are defined relative to  . To describe what happens if a synchroniza-
tion event does never arrive, the time variables can take the value infinity, which is repre-
sented by "$". 
Time variables that can be infinite are called infinite time variables. Otherwise they are called 
finite time variables. 
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4.3.2 Timed Conditions  
The properties are determined by conditions of the form  
at <time point>: <Boolean condition>; 
during [<time point1>, <time point2>]: <Boolean condition>; 
within [<finite time pt1>, <finite time pt2>]: <Boolean condition>; 
The first condition requires that the Boolean condition is true at the given time point, the se-
cond condition requires that it applies to all time points in the interval, and the third, that it 
becomes true at least once in the given interval. The intervals always contain their boundaries. 
If the left interval boundary is larger than the right, the interval is empty. Then the "during" 
condition is trivially satisfied and the "within" condition is trivially violated. 
The time points have the form        or       , where      can be   or a time varia-
ble. In within-conditions infinite time variables are not allowed. When the time specification 
after "at" contains a time variable and this time variable is set to infinity, the whole timed 
condition is trivially satisfied. If both limits of a during interval are infinite, the corresponding 
condition is trivially satisfied. If only the right boundary is infinite, the Boolean condition 
must be met for all time points starting from the left interval boundary. 
The Boolean conditions have a syntax that is similar to either Verilog or VHDL. Depending 
on the underlying RTL language, ITL is also called VLI (VeriLog Interval Language) or VHI 
(VHDL Interval Language). The Boolean conditions are evaluated at the times indicated in 
each case. The return values of arithmetic bit vector operations are always wide enough to 
represent the exact result. Functions prev and next allow evaluation of expressions at other 
time points than the one indicated. 
4.3.3 Basic implication  
The basic structure of an ITL property is given by various text blocks. Two of them are par-
ticularly important: One block starts with the keyword "assume" and describes preconditions 
of the property. The other block with the keyword "prove" describes the proof goal of the 
property. 
The assume part describes the situation that is to be checked with the property, and the proof 
part describes the expected behavior in this situation.  
4.3.4 Assume and Proof Part of a Property  
Assume and prove part of a property are formed by a number of timed conditions as in the 
preceding section 4.3.2. If these conditions are separated by a semicolon, they are combined 
by a conjunction. 
Disjunction is expressed by the construct  
 either 
  Condition 
 or 
  Condition 
 or  
  ... 
 end either; 
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Assume and proof part of a property are functions on the traces           of the automa-
ton that represents the circuit.  The return values of the functions are 0 (false) or 1 
(true). Besides the trace,   and all time variables       are arguments of this function. The 
assume predicate                   indicates whether the assume part is satisfied on the 
Trace   for a given choice of time variables. Similarly, the proof goal predicate 
                  tells whether the proof part is satisfied.  
4.3.5 Time Variables  
Time variables are defined in a separate block that is introduced with the keywords "for 
timepoints". A time variable is introduced by the expression 
 
T j = B j + n j .. m j awaits w j;  
   is either   or an already introduced time variable.    is an integer and   either an integer 
or  , i.e., infinity.    is a waiting condition about input, output, or internal signals of the cir-
cuit. If    has a finite value,    is assigned the first value in the interval                
where    becomes true. If     is never satisfied in the interval,    becomes       if   is 
finite, and     , if    . Also     , if    is already infinite.  
Because of their dependency on the the wait conditions, the    can therefore be considered 
functions         that return the value of the time variable for a given   and trace  . If these 
functions are substituted into the assume and proof predicate, 
                                   and                                   are creat-
ed.  
4.3.6 Freeze Variables  
To describe data transport through the circuit, values can be frozen in a separate variable. 
They are then available throughout the property. Freeze variables are defined in a separate 
block that begins with the keyword "freeze". Syntax of the definitions is 
 
Fj = expressionj @ timepointj ; 
Semantically, freeze variables behave as if they were substituted everywhere by the right side 
of the assignment.  
If a freeze variable is defined relative to an infinite time variable  , it may be used only in 
expressions that become irrelevant if the time variable   assumes the value infinite. Such 
expressions are “at” constructs relative to   or relative to a time variables that depends on 
 , or during constructs, in which the left interval boundary has this shape.  
4.3.7 Dependencies  
Assertions and properties have an optional dependencies block, where dependencies accord-
ing to section 4.2.2 are specified by listing the names of the dependencies. 
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A dependency is a predicate        with the definition of an assertion or a constraint. All 
dependencies must be satisfied on every trace of the underlying model at any time   . IPC 
assumes the dependencies on the examination window of the property or the assertion. 
All dependencies are summarized to the condition about traces 
              
   
                  
4.3.8 Assertions and Constraints  
The syntax of assertions and constraints according to section 4.2 is 
constraint <name> :=  
<Boolean condition>;  
end constraint; 
  
assertion <name> :=  
<Boolean condition>;  
dependencies: <list of assertion- and constraint names>;  
end assertion;  
with the Boolean conditions of section 4.3.2. These Boolean conditions may use         
and         to refer to signal values at the previous or next time point and they shall apply 
to all time poins after the reset sequence. Because of the reasons provided in section 4.2.4 ITL 
allows only the formalization of Safety assertions and Constraints. 
4.3.9 Properties  
The syntax of a property is:  
property <name>; 
dependencies: <list of assertions and constraints>; 
for timepoints: <time variable declaration>; 
freeze: <freeze variable declaration>; 
assume: 
             <assume part>;            
 prove: 
              <prove part>;            
end property;  
All blocks are optional except for the proof part. Their syntax and semantics were described 
in previous sections.  
A property expresses the relationship  
                                   
It holds on a trace         of an automaton, if it holds at any given time    . A property 
holds, if it holds on all traces of the automaton that also satisfy the dependencies. This is 
summarized by the formula  
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where    summarizes all dependencies. 
Since all dependencies are consequences of the constraints and the automaton, the proof of a 
property implies that all traces         of the automaton satisfy the property if they satisfy 
the constraints: 
                                      
   
 
   
 
4.3.10 Example  
As an example, a property about the execution of a read operation by a processor shall be pre-
sented. The processor is implemented by a pipeline with the stages dec (decode), ex1  
(execute 1), ex2 and wb (write back). The respective stage can be stalled with the signals 
         ,          ,           and         . If stalled, a stage does not pass any data to 
the next state. Accordingly the property contains time variables t_ex1, t_ex2 and t_wb which 
denote the time points when a stall is released and the instruction moves from the respective 
stage to the next.  
The stall signals must satisfy some requirements to ensure that the pipeline works as expected. 
These requirements shall be summarized in the constraint stall_relation. 
The ITL description of the property will be presented next and discussed in the following par-
agraph:  
property read_no_violation is 
dependencies: no_reset, stall_relation;  
 
 for timepoints: t_ex1 = t     + 1 .. $ awaits ex1_stall = '0', 
                 t_ex2 = t_ex1 + 1 .. $ awaits ex2_stall = '0', 
                 t_wb  = t_ex2 + 1 .. $ awaits wb_stall = '0'; 
 
 freeze: instr_dec = instr @ t, 
              read_val_ex2 = read_val @ t_ex2; 
 
 assume: 
 at    t:          opcode(ip_instr) == READ_INSTRUCTION; 
 at    t:          dec_valid = '1'; 
 at    t:          dec_stall = '0'; 
 
      at t_ex2:    violation = '0'; 
 
      prove: 
 during [t+1, t_ex1]:  adr_out == address(instr_dec); 
      during [t_ex2+1, t_wb]: result_wb == read_val_ex2; 
      end property; 
At the start of the property a read instruction shall wait in the dec stage which is not stalled.  
This gives the three conditions in the assume part for time  . Also at the time   the encoding 
63 
 
of the instruction is expected on the signal instr and hence frozen in the freeze variable 
instr_dec, which allows access to the encoding whenever needed in the property. The read 
address is output in the ex1 stage. It is assumed that the data memory reacted when the EX2 
stage can continue to operate. The reaction of the memory is either a message about violated 
access rights provided by the signal          , or the read data itself. In the case of this 
property, the access rights are satisfied. Therefore, the data arrives at time t_ex2 and gets 
stored in the Freeze variable read_val_ex2. This freeze variable will be used to verify the data 
transport by comparison with the signal result_wb  when the instruction is in the wb stage. It 
is shown that the output of the wb-stage provides the read data, for example, to the register 
file. 
4.3.11 Graphical Representation  
An important subset of ITL properties, namely properties without either- or within-statements 
can be represented graphically by color-coded timing diagrams [Bormann 2001, Paucke 
2003]. This representation is very helpful especially for protocol-dominated circuits. An ex-
ample of the graphical representation is given in Figure 11 which visualized the property of 
section 4.3.10. The intuitivity of this representation is a big advantage over other graphical 
formalisms [Schlör 2003, Peukert et al. 2001]. 
The color code in the generalized timing diagrams is  
 blue for the assume part  
 red for the proof part  
 green for the waiting conditions of the time variables and  
 black for the time points at which other conditions access the signal value. When ac-
cessed through freeze variables, their names are shown. If otherwise accessed, e.g., by 
     or     , no name is entered. 
 The time range in which a time variable can vary is indicated for each signal by a broader 
column and by an arrow in the first line of the timing diagram. The arrow is intended to indi-
cate that the width of this cell is actually variable. In extreme cases, the column can get the 
result_wb
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Figure 11: Graphical representation of the property read_no_violation 
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width 0 and thus vanish, when the wait condition is satisfied immediately. The maximum 
width of the cell is given by the upper bound for the wait time that is indicated above the ar-
row. When a signal reacts to a synchronization signal with some delay, the respective broader 
cell shifts corresponding to the delay. Figure 12 shows an example. 
 
4.3.12 Discussion  
ITL is a proprietary language with features that make it particularly suitable for complete ver-
ification. Particularly important features are the Boolean implication and the explicit time. 
The specialty of Boolean implication is that assume part and proof part may overlap in time. 
This is important because it is required to reason about the protocol compliant execution of a 
full transaction, that usually involves several assumptions and requirements about the inter-
face signals that interleave in time.  
But Boolean implication requires a language feature that allows easily addressing the same 
point in time in the assume and the proof part. The explicit time expressions of ITL realize 
this, even when the common point is variable and determined by a time variable that is de-
rived from a synchronization event. 
A third important feature of ITL is its graphical representation. It eases formalization, under-
standing, and review of properties, in particular about protocol dominated circuits.   
These three features are the reasons, why ITL still exists besides the two standardized proper-
ty languages, PSL [PSL 2004], and the part of SystemVerilog [SystemVerilog 2005] to de-
scribe assertions, called SVA. Normal use of PSL and SVA abolishes above features: Se-
quence implication is used instead of Boolean Implication. In sequence implication the ante-
cedent (comparable to the assume part of ITL) and the sukzedent (proof part) do not overlap 
in time so that the interplay of assumptions about input signals and requirements about output 
signals cannot be formalized in one property, although this interplay is typical for the execu-
tion of full protocol transactions. 
Instead of explicit time expressions, SVA and PSL provide an opportunity to identify se-
quences of conditions that must hold on a trace successively. These sequences are formed by 
regular expressions. This allows expressing protocol related behavior only if the bus is inter-
adr_delayed
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dec_valid
t
dec_stall
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Figure 12: Delayed reaction on a synchronization event 
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nal, i.e. all modules that are connected to the bus are part of the circuit under formal verifica-
tion. This is often the case in simulation, but not in formal verification, because such subsys-
tems are usually too large for the formal tools. Formal verification examines the protocol 
compliance of a module at its primary interfaces. Then the examination of full transactions 
requires checking of more cause-effect-relations that are too complex for the sequence impli-
cation of SVA or PSL. In this situation SVA and PSL split the full transaction into smaller 
parts which can be expressed with sequence implication. The splitting impacts the conciseness 
of the properties, but accommodates complexity limitations of the formal tools. All in all, with 
SVA and PSL two property languages have been standardized, that are not well suited for a 
transaction based examination, although transaction based examination is key for simulation 
based verification.  
When using less prominent parts of the language, some features described above can also be 
used, at least in SVA. This is made possible through the library Tidal [Bormann 2007], but the 
support by other formal tools is still to be explored.  
In addition to the above strong points, ITL (and Tidal alike) have also some advantages in 
terms of usability. Most striking is probably the clear division of cause, effect and temporal 
structure in the assume-, prove-, and for-time point-blocks of the property code. In SVA and 
PSL the timing structure is mixed with the description of cause and effect. Since the timing 
structure is usually determined by external events, the succedents become difficult. Overall, 
SVA and PSL appear richer in snares, such that users have to invest more effort in clarifying 
the question of whether the intended property is actually correctly formalized in SVA or PSL. 
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5 Completeness and its Examination  
The completeness checker is important for the automation of complete verification. It is pre-
sented below and compared to other approaches for determining the quality of a verification. 
5.1 Methods for Determining the Quality of a Simulation-Based Ver-
ification  
Integral part of verification projects are predictions about the already secured level of quality 
of the circuit under test. These predictions are already made long before the planned termina-
tion [Carter / Hemmady 2007] of the project. This quality prediction is based on statements as 
to how intensely the verification has examined the individual parts of the circuit, and how 
great the danger is that the circuit still contains an error. 
5.1.1 Coverage  
The quality of simulation based verification is mostly determined by the input coverage of 
simulations, which is often simply referred to as coverage. The Input Coverage makes a 
statement about the extent to which input traces of the simulation have examined the circuit in 
every possible situation. The result is condensed to a figure that is called the coverage meas-
ure. 
Methods for measuring input coverage were first developed for software verification [Hirsch 
1967, Belzer 1990], and then introduced in the nineties to hardware verification. Several of 
these methods now belong to the basic features of a verification environment. There are dif-
ferent approaches for determining the input coverage [Stuart / Dempster 2000]. Common to 
all is that they define a set of coverage conditions and a coverage target that indicates for each 
coverage condition, how often it should be met. The coverage measure is then a (possibly 
weighted) average ratio between the coverage targets and how often the related coverage con-
ditions were actually met. 
The various methods for determining input coverage differ with respect to the definition of 
the coverage conditions and coverage goals. A large group of methods is based on the RTL 
code. These methods are called code coverage or structural coverage. The simplest method, 
the Line or Statement Coverage, defines for each line of code the coverage condition that this 
line is executed and the coverage target that every line is executed at least once. 
For branch coverage the conditions of the control statements (e.g., if and case) are examined. 
For each value that the control condition can assume, there is a coverage condition that is sat-
isfied when the control condition has taken that value. The coverage target is in turn that each 
coverage condition is met once. Derivative methods (condition coverage, expression coverage 
focused expression coverage) do not examine the control condition as a whole, but their 
subexpressions. In path coverage, paths through the control graph of the RTL are determined 
in advance and the coverage conditions require that such a path is executed. 
Other coverage metrics depend on the signals of the circuit. For toggle coverage the coverage 
conditions describe changes in signals and coverage goal is that for each signal a change in its 
value is observed. Triggering coverage analyzes which signal changes trigger the execution of 
a process. 
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Structural coverage provides effective guidance to best allocate the limited capabilities of 
simulation. But all coverage metrics described above are satisfied long before the circuit was 
really examined under all situations. Coverage is for example weak, when it comes to a func-
tion that is implemented by parallel processes that need to be examined with every possible 
time offset. 
Code coverage is therefore complemented by functional coverage. The individual coverage 
conditions and coverage targets are explicitly specified by a verification engineer. This allows 
putting some focus on situations that the verification engineer regards critical and which are 
not addressed by the structural coverage. Obviously, the strength of the functional coverage 
depends on the definition of the coverage conditions. If a coverage condition has been left out, 
verification will not make an effort to trigger the respective situation.  
5.1.2 Coverage Distributes the Attention of Simulation  
A verification aims at 100% input coverage. The verification project leaders are used to the 
fact that over the time spent on the verification project, the coverage measure changes accord-
ing to a saturation curve. Towards the end of a verification project, a coverage measure of 
98% therefore might be dramatically low. Target are often values in the range of 99.9%. At 
100% input coverage verification teams are usually happy, despite the shortcomings of the 
approach. For example, the search for errors due to parallel execution of processes is not 
structured by the above-mentioned coverage metrics. 
Even from relatively small circuits onwards, simulation is in principle not able to consider 
each stimulus. Therefore, the coverage conditions partition the entire verification task into 
sort of a grid. Each element of this grid comprises a plurality of circuit executions that all sat-
isfy the same coverage condition. To meet the coverage condition, it does not matter which of 
the circuit executions actually occurred.  
For the circuit executions within one grid element it is implicitly assumed that the circuit 
would work similar and that therefore an error of the circuit could be detected in any of these 
executions. Which differences between the executions are considered irrelevant, is determined 
by the selection of the coverage conditions. A first division is made by the choice of method 
for code coverage, as adjusted by the individual production conditions of functional coverage. 
The verification quality is higher the finer the grid is, i.e. the more detailed the coverage con-
ditions are. Nevertheless, it is not useful to choose a particularly fine grid, because this would 
require satisfying a large number of coverage conditions, which in turn requires a large num-
ber of simulations, and thus a very high run time. Therefore the choice of coverage conditions 
and coverage goals must find a good balance between verification quality and the simulation 
effort.   
When users of formal verification want to emphasize the advantages of their method against 
coverage driven simulations, they build a mental model. They postulate a coverage measure in 
which every input trace of a sufficient length
3
 is mapped to a coverage condition that is satis-
fied if the circuit receives this input trace.  When this coverage measure indicates 100% the 
verification examined all input traces, as is typical for formal verification. But for realistic 
circuits this coverage measure would never even reach even small values because there are 
simply so many coverage conditions that it is impossible to meet them all during a simulation. 
                                                 
3
 The length can for example be the diameter of the circuit according to [Biere et al. 1999]. 
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But of course no one would seriously consider this mental model as an input coverage method 
for simulation, but just choose a coarser grid. This shows that coverage has also the purpose 
to appropriately distribute the limited capabilities of simulation over the whole circuit, and to 
concentrate it on particularly interesting spots. Coverage is not able to increase the capabili-
ties of simulation, but it only allows a better use of its limited power. 
5.1.3 Output Coverage  
But the quality of verification is determined not only by input coverage, but also by the ques-
tion of whether enough verdict generators have been incorporated into the simulation, be they 
assertions, monitors, checkers, or other mechanisms for detecting errors. Input Coverage in-
fluences only the probability that an error in the code is actually triggered. Whether the result-
ant misbehavior is really recognized, depends on the verdict generators. How accurately they  
examine the circuit behavior, is not captured by the Input Coverage. In extreme cases, a simu-
lation could provide best values for the Input Coverage, although it does not contain a single 
verdict generator, such that the verification reports no error at all. Obviously, the verdict gen-
erators have significant contribution to the quality of verification. 
In this thesis the term Output Coverage is used to describe the quality of all verdict genera-
tors. Input and Output Coverage provide orthogonal contributions to the quality of the verifi-
cation. The combination of these actually independent values to a unified coverage measure 
statement is work in progress [Bailey 2007]. 
The output coverage is usually determined at the beginning of a verification project, i.e. dur-
ing the setup of the verification plan, and specifically during the determination of the verifica-
tion goals. During this phase, the verification engineers work informally: The specification is 
analyzed and divided into individual verification tasks. This step is critical, because if some 
verification goals are not identified, they will not be checked lateron, and related misbehavior 
is not recognized. 
Because this process is informal, there is no fundamental tool support. Some tools help to 
document the relationship between specification and verification plan by cross-referencing. 
These tools identify parts of the specification which are not yet covered by an entry in the 
verification plan. But such tools cannot tell whether the ignored paragraphs really requested 
an entry in the verification plan, because they do not comprehend the text of the specification. 
Important quality assurance measures during the creation of the verification plan are therefore 
reviews by the engineers who are responsible for specification and circuit design. 
In many design teams these reviews are the main measures to ensure decent output coverage. 
Automated tools for testing the output coverage of simulation-based verification [Certess un-
dated, Grosse / Hampton 2005] are deployed by only few design teams. These tools can only 
be used when the testbench is largely completed including all their tests and checkers. The 
investigations are based on Mutation Analysis [Offutt / Untch 2000], that is, they inject errors 
into the circuit and investigate whether these errors are found by the simulation. If the injected 
errors are not found, deficits are often related to insufficient output coverage. If the verifica-
tion project then still has time to improve the simulation, verification quality can be increased 
due to this feedback. 
5.2 Output Coverage in Formal Verification  
Formal verification does not have the problem of inadequate input coverage, except maybe 
for some semi-formal verification approaches, which will not be discussed further. A true 
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proof acts as if the property or assertion in question is examined with all possible input traces. 
But this powerful examination method verifies often only quite simple statements. It seems 
that the assertions of ABFV fail to identify a lot of misbehavior because they only examine a 
very narrow range of functionality. This might lead to the impression that the advantage of 
optimal input coverage of formal verification is consumed by the disadvantage of inadequate 
output coverage. To oppose this, several approaches deal with the determination of the output 
coverage of formal verification. Some of these approaches are discussed below. 
5.2.1 Fault Injection Method  
The approach in [Hoskote et al. 1999, Hojati 2003] uses Mutation Analysis similar to the re-
spective simulation based approach described above. Errors are injected into the circuit and it 
is checked whether then at least one of the properties is refuted by a property checker. If each 
injected error leads to a refutation, the quality of the property set is regarded sufficiently high. 
Otherwise, the ratio of injected errors is determined, that are detected by formal proof of the 
property set. 
This method is heuristic. There is no guarantee that other errors than the injected ones are 
identified. The method requires both the properties and the circuit description. 
5.2.2 Completeness of a Specification in Relation to a Given Circuit 
The approach in [Katz et al. 1999] is based on a relation   between so-called Kripke struc-
tures which is called simulation preorder. In the context of this thesis the Kripke structures are 
the same as automata. For two circuits and their automata  and   we have     iff   has 
all input signals of , and if   has any additional inputs, then their traces can always be 
chosen such that   is sequentially equivalent to . If     and     holds,  and   are 
sequentially equivalent, i.e. they have the same input and output behavior . 
From a temporal logic formula   considered in [Katz et al. 1999], an automaton      can be 
generated which is called Tableau of   , and which may be indeterministic. The Tableau  
     satisfies the property  , and has such a rich behavior that each circuit M that satisfies   
can be embedded in the Tableau in the sense of      . 
If    is the specification of a circuit  then  is usually the conjunction of  partial specifi-
cations. In the context of this thesis the partial specifications are be operation properties 
or assertions. Usual property checking examines if M satisfies the specification  . If this 
is the case, there is       by definition. To determine the output coverage of , it is 
attempted to show  
       
For this attempt the states and transitions of      and  are matched one with the oth-
er. If M contains states or transitions without a mapping partner in     , then  does 
not describe some part of the behavior of , and hence  is not a complete specification.  
  is called a complete specification of  in the sense of [Katz et al. 1999], iff        
can indeed be proven. In this case,      and  are sequentiall equivalent. Obviously a se-
cond circuit   is sequentially equivalent to  if   is also a complete specification of    
[Katz et al. 1999] does not discuss, if the proof of         is still needed. But without re-
lated considerations it can only be stated that   is a complete specification for a given circuit 
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 . [Katz et al. 1999] makes no considerations whether   is complete independently of an 
implementation.  
In comparison, the completeness concept of this thesis is independent of a concrete circuit, 
and only a characteristic of a set of properties. Besides that there are also application-oriented 
objections against [Katz et al. 1999]: To diagnose specification gaps, the tableau machines are 
to be compared sequentially with     , hence counter examples can only be understood if 
the user understands Tableaus and knows how they are related to the original property  . 
Even if the BDD-based equivalence comparison algorithm of [Katz et al. 1999] would be re-
placed by more powerful algorithms of today, the tableau generation still appears to be an 
expensive step that limits the complexity of the circuits that can be examined with this ap-
proach.  
5.2.3 Completeness Criterion  
In this thesis output coverage is determined by checking completeness of the set of properties. 
The completeness criterion was introduced informally in section 3.4.2 and 3.4.3: A set of op-
eration properties is called complete iff for every input trace that satisfies its determination 
assumptions, an output trace can be found that satisfies all properties and the related determi-
nation commitments. This completeness check must restrict itself to the examination of the 
properties with the signal names becoming free variables, and it must not use the concrete 
circuit. 
As discussed in section 3.4.2 there is no loss of generality if the determination assumption  
if g then determined(e) end if; 
is considered, where   is a condition and   an ITL expression that extracts at every time point 
  the information contained in the input traces. Condition   and extraction function   will 
depend on input signals, but may also depend on output and internal signals. If two triples 
        und            of traces are given, the determination assumption is calculated by 
                                                                                
where ~ denotes negation. For brevity  
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Figure 13: Completeness checking 
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shall be introduced as local determination assumption.  
The determination commitment                   and its local counterpart 
                     shall be defined analogously.  
The completeness checker examines the situation that any two circuits  and   are given, 
which both meet all operation properties. These two circuits shall receive input traces   
und    and produce output traces   and    as well as traces   und    of internal signals. The 
traces shall satisfy the dependencies         ,             and the determination as-
sumption                  . The completeness checker examines whether the output 
traces meet the the determination commitments                   in this situation. If 
this holds for all possible input stimuli   und    the property set is complete.  und   
then have the same input / output behavior at least modulo the determination assumptions 
and commitments. The situation is shown in Figure 13. 
Thus, ultimately the following condition is derived for the completenss of a set the   of prop-
erties:  
5-1 
          
       
          
       
    
          
          
         
 
Here the following denotational conventions are used:                      ,    
                  ,           ,              ,              and                 . 
5.2.4 Alternative Formalizations of the Completeness Criterion  
If determination assumptions simply require the equality of   and   , and the determination 
commitmentds demand      the completeness becomes  
 
5-2 
                      
    
    
                           
    
    
      
         
          
         
 
This corresponds to the formalization in [Claessen 2006], which has been developed inde-
pendently. The completeness criterion from section 5.2.3 is somewhat more general, because 
of its determination assumptions and determination commitments. This work goes beyond 
[Claessen 2006] because it provides a more efficient divide-and- conquer implementation of 
the completeness checker that is specialized for operation properties and produces counterex-
ample that enable a more detailed analysis. 
A further modification of the criterion 5-2 is to replace one of the conjuncts in the LHS by the 
model itself, which is anyway to be checked against the properties. Thus, it is easy to trans-
form 5-2 into the equivalent formalization 
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5-3 
                                              
    
    
      
         
          
         
 
An implementation of a completeness checker in accordance with this reformalization is at-
tempted in [Große et al. 2008]. 
5.3 The Algorithm  
The completeness checker receives a number of inputs which are described in section 5.3.1. 
Main entry is the set of operation properties, based on which the completeness checker per-
forms a series of tests. There are several classes of tests that are characterized by a formula 
each. The formulas are instantiated according to the user inputs and then proved with a prop-
erty checker. They are not be verified on the actual circuit, but on a model that contains two 
instances of type correct free variables for each signal of the circuit, according to the circuits 
representations  and   of the completeness criterion 5-1 in section 5.2.3. Section 5.3.8 
provides the proof that the interaction of the tests actually implements the completeness crite-
rion. 
How the formulas are to be instantiated, will will be shown at the example that is known from 
section 3.2.1. The completeness checker input will be derived from section 3.4.2. 
5.3.1 Inputs  
The completeness checker needs the operation automaton with the operation properties. 
Therefore, an important input to the completeness checker is the set of properties   together 
with a successor relation . The successor relation determines which properties may follow 
each other in the operation automaton. According to section 4.3 every property provides the 
time variables   
          , the assume part             and the proof part            . 
On top of that, according to section 3.2.3 every property   provides the reference time point 
    
          , which is assumed to be of the form    , where   is either   or one of the 
time variables    
          . 
The reset property   is a special element of  about the reset behavior according to sec-
tion 4.1.1. The assume part of   is the condition                             that de-
scribes the reset sequence, such that            describes the reset behavior of the cir-
cuit.  
The determination commitments are formalized in accordance with the            state-
ments by local determination commitments                      . 
For each property and for each determination commitment the user has to provide the 
determination time interval in which the determination commitment should be satisfied. 
The determination time interval is specified by its first time point    
  and its last time 
point    
 .    
  is of the form     and    
  is of the form     where   is the start time 
point of the property and   is either   or a time variable   
          . Correspondingly the 
determination time interval is a function     
              
            of   and the traces of 
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the input, output and internal signals. The determination commitments of the reset property 
are requested for all time points   , i.e. after the reset sequence.  
To formalize intermediate results about the determination of the visible registers from section 
3.2.2, the user can annotate local determination commitments                         to eve-
ry property. They consist of one or multiple conditions in the form provided by section 3.4.2, 
which are required at single points in time relative to   or relative to a time variable   
 . The 
following definition shall simplify the notation: 
5-4 
                                                          
      
            
          
 
Assertions and constraints among the Dependencies of the completeness proof form the con-
dition         .  
Some of the user inputs are redundant. The successor relation , the reference time points 
    
 , the determination time intervals     
              
            and actually even the 
local determination commitments                         can in principle be automatically 
extracted from the properties. In fact, first research on completeness checkers [Busch 2005] 
dealt with such automatic extraction and developed related determination tests and case split 
tests. But these activities did not deal with visible registers and did not recognize successor 
tests. Thus they failed to prove completeness in the intuitive definition of section 3.4.3. Fur-
thermore, the algorithms were so complex that only fairly small circuits could be examined. 
From today's perspective, the provision of the redundant user information is not a big effort, 
since the information captures the intentions of the verification engineer. In turn, the user in-
put has the advantage that it allows reduction of the proof complexity, and that it allows more 
telling diagnoses if the completeness checker detects a verification gap.  
5.3.2 Example  
The algorithm shall be illustrated at the example from section 3.2.1 with the transaction au-
tomaton according to Figure 6. The property read_new_row of section 3.2.5 is written as 
 
property read_new_row is  
dependencies: no_reset, processor_protocol;  
   
assume:  
at  t:   state = row_act;  
at  t:   request = '1';  
at  t:   rw = '1';  
at  t:   address /= last_row;  
   
prove:  
at  t+9:   state = row_act;  
at  t+9:   last_row = prev(row(address));  
during [t+1, t+7]:  ready = '0';  
at  t+8:   ready = '1';  
at  t+9:   ready = '0';  
at  t+8:   rdata = prev(sd_rdata);  
do_read(t, sd_ctrl, sd_addr, address);  
 
end property;  
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after the introduction of the macro do_read with the definition 
macro do_read(tt: timepoint; sd_ctrl: bit; 
sd_addr, address: bit_vector): temporal := 
at  t+1:   sd_ctrl = prech;  
at  t+2:   sd_ctrl = nop;  
at  t+3:   sd_ctrl = activate;  
at  t+3:   sd_addr = row(address);  
at  t+4:   sd_ctrl = nop;  
at  t+5:   sd_ctrl = read;  
at  t+5:   sd_addr = col(address);  
at  t+6:   sd_ctrl = stop;  
during [t+7, t+9]:  sd_ctrl = nop; 
end macro; 
The reference time point        of this property is    . A local determination commitment 
at t+9: determined(last_row); 
comes with the property. 
A further property shall be about write requests:  
property write_old_row is 
dependencies: no_reset, processor_protocol;  
 
assume: 
at t:  state = row_act; 
at t:  request = '1'; 
at t:  rw = '0'; 
at t:  address = last_row; 
 
prove: 
at t+2: state = row_act; 
at t+2: last_row = prev(last_row, 2);  
at t+1: ready = '1'; 
at t+2: ready = '0'; 
at t+1: sd_ctrl = write; 
at t+1: sd_addr = col(address); 
at t+1: sd_wdata = wdata; 
at t+2: sd_ctrl = stop; 
 
end property;  
The register last_row shall not be modified during this operation. Therefore it needs to be 
proven that its value at the end of the operation is the same as at the start. This is done with 
the second line of the prove part.  
The property has the reference time point              and the local determination 
commitment   
at t+2: determined(last_row); 
The properties can be proven under the dependencies  
constraint no_reset :=  
reset = '0';  
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end constraint; 
 
constraint processor_protocol := 
 if request = '1' and ready = '0' then  
next(request) = '1' and 
  next(address) = address and 
  next(rw) = rw and 
  if rw = '0' then next(wdata) = wdata; 
 end if; 
end constraint;  
The two operations may follow each other in arbitrary order. The successor relation is there-
fore                           ,                            , 
                          and                             .  
Section 3.4.2 already stated the determination commitments  
determined(sd_ctrl); 
determined(ready); 
if rw = '1' and ready = '1' then determined (rdata) end if; 
if sd_ctrl = write then determined (sd_wdata) end if;  
if sd_ctrl = read or sd_ctrl = write or sd_ctrl = activate  
then determined(sd_addr) end if;   
and the determination assumptions  
determined (request); 
if request = '1' then determined(rw) end if; 
if request = '1' then determined(address) end if; 
if request = '1' and rw = '0' then determined(wdata) end if; 
if prev(sd_ctrl, 2) = read then determined (sd_rdata) end if;  
The determination time intervals for the read and write property are                 
       and                       , respectively.  
The completeness check needs only the dependency                   . 
5.3.3 Chains of Operation Properties  
The basic idea of the completeness checker is to build chains of operation properties  
 
5-5 
             
   
 
where     ,          
  
, and then to prove that all behavior of the circuit is uniquely de-
scribed by at least one chain, up to the determination commitments.    is the reset property   
and describes the circuit behavior after reset. The chains terminate as soon as a      becomes 
infinite, or the chains themselves are infinite.   
A first sub-goal of the completeness checker is to prove that for each input stimulus that is 
permitted by the assertions and constraints among the dependencies of the completeness 
check, a property chain can be found such that the input trace satisfies all the assume parts. To 
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this end the completeness checker generates and executes the case split tests that will be de-
scribed more closely in section 5.3.4.  
It shall then be verified that this chain determines the output trace  . To that end each proper-
ty    is required to fulfill each determination commitment in the respective determination time 
interval. This is checked by the determination test, which also ensures that the determination 
time intervals of successive properties either seamlessly adjoin one another, or that the deter-
mination commitments even hold in the gaps between them. The determination test is pre-
sented in section 5.3.6. 
In addition, it must be ensured that any predecessor property      proves enough about the 
internal signals to ensure that the applicability of the successor property is determined, i.e. 
uniquely ensured. This is done by the successor test in section 5.3.5. 
5.3.4 Case Split test  
The case split ensures the existence of property chains for every input trace. Each single tests 
examines the situation that the            was satisfied on a trace   for an arbitrarily chosen 
point in time  . Then the case split test examines if the assumption part of at least one of the 
possible successors properties of   will be met by  . To simplify the notation of the general 
case split test,   will be used instead of          and           : 
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The test is performed on a trivial model in which free variables are used for the signals of the  
sets      .  
The current implementation of the test is limited to properties with finite time variables as 
described in section 4.3.1. 
If the case split test applies to all properties, including the reset property, induction shows, 
that there is a chain      of operation properties for each input trace   such that each assume 
part in Formula 5-5 is satisfied by the input trace. 
The typical verification gap that is revealed by the case split test is a behavior of the inputs 
that is not covered by any successor property of  . The diagnosis of such an error will pro-
vide a snippet of the input trace that satisfies assume and prove part of   as well as all de-
pendencies. It will list the appropriately time shifted assume parts of all successor properties 
and demonstrate that none of them is satisfied by the snippet of the input trace. Usually the 
diagnosis either points to a missing property that describes the expected circuit behavior or to 
a missing dependency that rules out the input trace.  
The completeness checker generates the corresponding proof tasks from the text of the origi-
nal properties. For the example of section 5.3.2 this gives  
property case_split; 
dependencies: processor_protocol;  
for timepoints: TRef_W = t + 2; 
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assume: 
-- assume part of write_old_row 
at t:  state = row_act; 
at t:  request = '1'; 
at t:  rw = '0'; 
at t:  address = last_row; 
-- prove part of write_old_row 
at t+2: state = row_act; 
at t+2: last_row = prev(last_row, 2);  
at t+1: ready = '1'; 
at t+2: ready = '0'; 
at t+1: sd_ctrl = write; 
at t+1: sd_addr = col(address); 
at t+1: sd_wdata = wdata; 
at t+2: sd_ctrl = stop; 
 
prove:  
either 
 -- assume part of write_old_row, time shifted by TRef_W 
 at TRef_W:  state = row_act; 
at TRef_W:  request = '1'; 
at TRef_W:  rw = '0'; 
at TRef_W:  address = last_row; 
or 
 -- assume part read_new_row, time shifted by TRef_W 
at TRef_W:  state = row_act;  
at TRef_W:  request = '1';  
at TRef_W:  rw = '1'; 
at TRef_W:  address /= last_row;  
or 
 … (time shifted assume parts of other successor properties) 
end either; 
end property; 
 
5.3.5 Successor Test  
The successor test determines whether the predecessor property   determines the applicability 
of the successor property  . This means that the input trace and the visible registers of   
uniquely decide about the applicability of  . The extent to which   determines its visible 
registers is given by the local determination commitment     . The applicability of   
depends on the question whether its suitably time shifted assume part 
       
                  holds. Since this test is about determination, it is executed on 
two sets of traces         and            which are assumed to be similar modulo appro-
priate determination conditions. It is assumed that assume and proof part of   and the 
appropriately shifted assume part of  hold on        , and that assume and proof part 
of   hold on           . The successor test then aims at a proof that the assume part of   
also holds on           . 
 
To simplify notation, the following abbreviations will be used: Determination assump-
tion                     ,  dependency           and              , assume 
part            
                  and            
                    , time variables 
  
    
      
                  and     
    
      
                       , further 
                            and                                   . The successor 
test then takes the form 
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The test is again performed on a trivial model with free variables for the signals of the sets 
          and  .  
A situation that violates the successor test is described in Figure 14: The predecessor opera-
tion   has a conceptual end state           , which is both partly covered by the start states 
of the successor properties    and   . The end state of   is only partly covered, because the 
assume parts of    and    introduce a counter     to determine whose turn it is. This value 
should be determined by  . If it is not, two different circuits could be implemented that dif-
ferently implement     during the operation of  , such that the two circuits produce funda-
mentally different output traces for the same input trace, which contradicts completeness. On-
ly one implementation of     can be the desired one. It is a verification gap not to check this 
implementation. The successor test ensures that the verification engineer decides for one im-
plementation and verifies it by the operation properties.   
The counter example is related to one pair of predecessor and successor property   and  . 
The counter example shows two sets of traces         and            such that the traces are 
equal modulo determination assumptions for all times, modulo the determination commit-
ments during the determination time intervals of   and modulo the local determination com-
mitments of  . The counter example demonstrates that both sets of traces satisfy the assume 
and prove part of  , the dependencies, and the local determination condition      . 
Furtheron, the counter example demonstrates that         satisfies the assume part of  , but 
           does not.  
 
The analysis of the counter example may uncover a missing local determination condition, 
e.g. about     in the example above. Once the determination condition is added, the determi-
nation test of section 5.3.6 will insist on a proper proof about the value of the visible register. 
The counter example may also highlight a mismatch between the end state condition of   and 
the start state condition of  .  
P
Q1
Q2
end state condition
state = idle
start state condition
state = idle and cnt > 0
start state condition
state = idle and cnt = 0
 
Figure 14: Counter example to the successor test 
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The successor test for the predecessor property                and the successor property 
              from the example in section 5.3.2 is generated as follows, where the objects 
of   and indicated by the _c ssuffix. 
property successor_test; 
dependencies: processor_protocol, processor_protocol_c;  
for timetpoints: TRef_W = t+2; 
 
assume: 
-- determination assumptions 
during [t, TRef_W+9]: request = request_c;  
during [t, TRef_W+9]: (request = 0 and request_c = 0) or rw = rw_c;  
during [t, TRef_W+9]:  (request = 0 and request_c = 0)  
or address = address_c;  
during [t, TRef_W+9]: ( 
(request = 0 or rw = 1) and 
(request_c = 0 and rw_c = 1) 
) or wdata = wdata_c;  
during [t, TRef_W+9]: ( 
prev(sd_ctrl, 2) /= read and 
prev(sd_ctrl_c, 2) /= read 
    ) or sd_rdata = sd_rdata_c;  
 
-- determination commitments of write_old_row 
during [t+1, t+2]: sd_ctrl = sd_ctrl_c;  
during [t+1, t+2]: ready = ready_c;  
during [t+1, t+2]: ( 
(rw = 0 or ready = 0) and  
(rw_c = 0 and ready_c = 0) 
) or rdata = rdata_c;  
during [t+1, t+2]: (sd_ctrl /= write and sd_ctrl_c /= write) or 
sd_wdata = sd_wdata_c;  
during [t+1, t+2]: ( 
sd_ctrl /= read and 
sd_ctrl /= write and 
sd_ctrl /= activate and 
sd_ctrl_c /= read and 
sd_ctrl_c /= write and 
sd_ctrl_c /= activate 
) or sd_addr = sd_addr_c;  
 
-- lokale determination commitments of write_old_row 
at t+2: last_row = last_row_c; 
 
-- assume part of write_old_row for first set of traces 
at t:  state = row_act; 
at t:  request = '1'; 
at t:  rw = '0'; 
at t:  address = last_row; 
-- prove part of write_old_row for first set of traces 
at t+2: state = row_act; 
at t+2: last_row = prev(last_row, 2);  
at t+1: ready = '1'; 
at t+2: ready = '0'; 
at t+1: sd_ctrl = write; 
at t+1: sd_addr = col(address); 
at t+1: sd_wdata = wdata; 
at t+2: sd_ctrl = stop; 
 
-- assume part of write_old_row for second set of traces 
at t:  state_c = row_act; 
80 
 
at t:  request_c = '1'; 
at t:  rw_c = '0'; 
at t:  address_c = last_row_c; 
-- prove part of write_old_row for second set of traces 
at t+2: state_c = row_act; 
at t+2: last_row_c = prev(last_row_c, 2);  
at t+1: ready_c = '1'; 
at t+2: ready_c = '0'; 
at t+1: sd_ctrl_c = write; 
at t+1: sd_addr_c = col(address); 
at t+1: sd_wdata_c = wdata; 
at t+2: sd_ctrl_c = stop; 
 
-- time shifted assume part of read_new_row for 1st set of traces 
at TRef_W:  state = row_act;  
at TRef_W:  request = '1';  
at TRef_W:  rw = '1'; 
at TRef_W:  address /= last_row;  
 
prove: 
-- time shifted assume part of read_new_row for 2nd set of traces 
at TRef_W:  state_c = row_act;  
at TRef_W:  request_c = '1';  
at TRef_W:  rw_c = '1'; 
at TRef_W:  address_c /= last_row_c;  
end property;  
5.3.6 Determination Test 
The determination test considers a situation similar to that of the successor test from section 
5.3.5, but with addition that it successfully passed the successor test. The determination test 
proves that   determines all output and visible registers at all required points in time. With 
the denotational simplifications from the previous sections and the abbreviations     
  
    
          ,            
                
        ,             
            
       
                
      
          ,    
      
      
        ,   
     
      
         
und    
     
      
            the determination test has the following shape:  
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The first part of the RHS of the implication ensures that the property   meets its determina-
tion commitments. The second examines gaps between the determination time intervals of   
and   and requires the the determination commitments hold there as well. 
The test is performed on the trivial model that was already used for the successor test of sec-
tion 5.3.5. The dependencies   and    and can provide additional information about the be-
havior of signals which may help to demonstrate the determination. For example, this might 
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fill in gaps in the description of an output signal. Such gaps may e.g. appear between opera-
tion properties about processor pipelines whose individual stages can be stalled (see e.g. 
[Bormann / Beyer / Skalberg 2006]). 
The counter example for a determination test presents two set of traces         and (          
that satisfy the dependencies, the assume and prove parts of predecessor property   and suc-
cessor property , as well as the determination assumptions about the inputs, the determina-
tion commitments about the outputs during the determination time intervals associated with   
and the local determination commitments of  . The counter example will then show how   
allows the traces to be so different that they violate the determination commitments.  
The usual verification gap that is uncovered by a determination test are insufficient descrip-
tions of output behavior or visible states, mismatches between the time points where    de-
termines a visible state and Q uses it, or determination time intervals that are not seamlessly 
adjacent.  
A determination test for the properties write_old_row and read_new_row from the example of 
section 5.3.2 is relatively long. Therefore some parts are removed, that are identical to the 
successor test of section 5.3.5. 
property determination_test; 
dependencies: processor_protocol, processor_protocol_c;  
for timetpoints: TRef_W = t+2; 
 
assume: 
-- determination conditions 
... (see section 5.3.5) 
-- determination commitments of write_old_row 
... (see section 5.3.5) 
-- local determination commitments of write_old_row 
at t+2:  last_row = last_row_c; 
 
-- assume part of write_old_row for the 1st set of traces 
... (see section 5.3.5) 
-- prove part of write_old_row the 1st set of traces 
... (see section 5.3.5) 
 
-- assume part of write_old_row for the 2nd set of traces 
... (see section 5.3.5) 
-- prove part of write_old_row the 2nd set of traces 
... (see section 5.3.5) 
 
-- time shifted assume part of read_new_row for 1st set of traces 
at TRef_W:  state = row_act;  
at TRef_W:  request = '1';  
at TRef_W:  rw = '1'; 
at TRef_W:  address /= last_row;  
-- time shifted prove part of read_new_row for 1st set of traces 
at TRef_W+9: state = row_act;  
at TRef_W +9: last_row = prev(row(address));  
during [TRef_W +1, TRef_W +7]:  ready = '0';  
at TRef_W +8: ready = '1';  
at TRef_W +9: ready = '0';  
at TRef_W +8: rdata = prev(sd_rdata);  
do_read(TRef_W, sd_ctrl, sd_addr, address);  
 
-- time shifted assume part of read_new_row for 2nd set of traces 
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at TRef_W:  state_c = row_act;  
at TRef_W:  request_c = '1';  
at TRef_W:  rw_c = '1'; 
at TRef_W:  address_c /= last_row_c;  
-- time shifted prove part of read_new_row for 2nd set of traces 
at TRef_W+9: state_c = row_act;  
at TRef_W +9: last_row_c = prev(row(address_c));  
during [TRef_W +1, TRef_W +7]:  ready_c = '0';  
at TRef_W +8: ready_c = '1';  
at TRef_W +9: ready_c = '0';  
at TRef_W +8: rdata_c = prev(sd_rdata_c);  
do_read(TRef_W, sd_ctrl_c, sd_addr_c, address_c);  
 
prove: 
-- determination commitments  
during [t+3, tRef_W+9]: sd_ctrl = sd_ctrl_c;  
during [t+3, tRef_W+9]: ready = ready_c;  
during [t+3, tRef_W+9]: ( 
(rw = 0 or ready = 0) and  
(rw_c = 0 and ready_c = 0) 
) or rdata = rdata_c;  
during [t+3, tRef_W+9]: (sd_ctrl /= write and sd_ctrl_c /= write) or 
sd_wdata = sd_wdata_c;  
during [t+3, tRef_W+9]: ( 
sd_ctrl /= read and 
sd_ctrl /= write and 
sd_ctrl /= activate and 
sd_ctrl_c /= read and 
sd_ctrl_c /= write and 
sd_ctrl_c /= activate 
) or sd_addr = sd_addr_c; 
 
-- local determination commitments 
at TRef_W+9:  last_row = last_row_c;  
end property;  
5.3.7 Tests about the Reset Property  
The property chains (cf. section 5.3.3) need to start with the reset property  . This property 
has no predecessor property. Therefore, the tests need to be slightly modified. 
To demonstrate that the application of the reset property is determined, a variation of the suc-
cessor test is used.  
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Besides the already introduced denotational simplifications, the formula  uses the abbrevia-
tions               ,                   ,   
    
           and    
    
            ). 
Finally, it must be shown that the reset property determines its output. This is done with 
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using the abbreviations                              und                      
              . 
Both tests are again performed on free variables for the signals of           and  . 
5.3.8 Proof  
It shall be demonstrated that the completeness condition 5-1 is met, if the case split, succes-
sor, determination, and reset tests hold on a set of operation properties   which are assumed 
to hold on two different automata   and  . 
Two input traces   und    shall be given. They both contain reset sequences 
                                and                                     and extend afterwards 
such that the synchronous circuits  and   generate traces        und    of internal and 
output signals that satisfy         and            . For these traces the determination as-
sumption                    shall be met. It is to be proven that the determination commit-
ment                    is also met.  
The proof uses induction. The induction hypothesis is that there is a finite chain 
                of properties and a finite sequence of time points                 with 
    ,          
  
 such that internal and output traces are found that satisfy 
             
 
    and                
 
   , the determination condition 
      
      
 
    
                   
the local determination commitment            and     
        
  .  
Induction base: For the      the reset property is to be considered applied for    . Its 
assume part is satisfied for   and   . Because of the first test 5-9 about the reset property, po-
tential time variables of the reset properties are equal for both copies of the traces. Hence the 
reference time points     
  und      
  are equal which proves the respective part of the induc-
tion hypothesis. Since the assume part of the reset property is satisfied for both copies of the 
traces,  and   behave for     according to the reset property. Hence formula 5-10 is ap-
plicable and proves        . The rest of the induction hypothesis follows from formula 5-4 
and the conditions about the right boundary of the determination time intervals of the reset 
property.  
Step from   to    : Let the induction hypothesis be valid for  . This means in particular 
that               und  
             hold.  The case split test 5-6 therefore ensures for 
      the existence of a property      the acceptance part of wich is satisfied for 
      
            . This defines      according to the induction hypothesis for    . From 
the successor test 5-7 follows that                      is also satisfied. Hence  und   be-
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have for         according to the property     . The successor test 5-7 additionally shows 
that potential time variables of      assume the same values on both copies of the traces, i.e., 
    
           
    . Moreover, the determination test can be applied to    and      for         
and provides because of formula 5-4   
             
                            
     
 
      
 
        
  
Together with the induction hypothesis for   this proves the induction hypothesis for    . 
Thus the validity of the induction hypothesis is shown for all  , for which    remains finite. 
Either the    remain finite for all natural numbers  , or there is a number  , for which     
   
becomes infinite. In the first case    
   increases beyond all limits, because it is calculated 
relative to   . And    grows beyond all limits because       
  is required for all properties 
   . In the second case is    
     for all   for which there are determination com-
mitments   . This finally proves  
      
    
                  
which is the definition of                    according to section 5.3.1. This completes the 
proof. 
5.4 Discussion  
The prominent role of the completeness checker to prove the completeness and hence the ter-
mination of a complete verification was presented in section 3.4.3 in detail and will not be 
repeated here. Instead, some peculiarities of the implementation of the completeness checker 
shall be pointed out. 
5.4.1 Case Split Tests and Reactive Constraints  
Figure 15 shows a slightly modified version of the property from Figure 7, that contains addi-
tional assumptions about         and    for time     to    , that an engineer could 
easily include in the property. These additional assumptions are actually redundant, since they 
are consequence of other parts of the property and of two protocol constraints 
 
if ready = '0' and request = '1' then next(request = '1') end if; 
if ready = '0' and request = '1' then rw = next(rw) end if; 
and of the fact that all operations deactivate the ready signal in              . 
If all other properties were changed correspondingly, the case split test would provide a coun-
terexample that asks in principle for properties about the case that the signals         und    
from the processor do not behave according to the protocol. This question is at first aston-
ishing, because the respective protocol constraints are among the dependencies of the 
completeness check.  But the astonishing behavior of the completeness checker is a re-
sult of formula 5-6 of the case split tests, because there the proof parts    of the successor 
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properties are not taken into account. Hence the completeness checker does not know about 
        and hence it cannot use the reactive constraints. 
In the verification practice the verification engineer should use reactive protocol constraints 
during the proof of the properties and remove those parts of the assumption from the property 
that are redundant to the protocol constraints. Therefore, the property of Figure 7 is better 
suited for the case split test. 
5.4.2 Completeness Proof on Operation Automata  
The completeness proof for operation automata is almost the same as for operation properties, 
although the operations of the operation automaton do not contain the important states. But 
their role is taken up by the successor relation  and the reference time point     
 . By this, 
the completeness checker can be applied to check the plausibility of an operation automaton, 
for which there is no implementation of the conceptual states yet. This plausibility check does 
not elaborate on the question of implementability of the operation automaton, but it is useful 
as an initial step of a development methodology where the properties are developed first and 
then the RTL.  
5.4.3 Important states  
The completeness checker identifies the conceptual states independently and automatically. 
The tests are defined such that the user need not highlight has with a specific syntax. In fact, 
in practice, sometimes quite unusual conceptual conditions have occurred. The conceptual 
states can include input or output signals, they can depend on output behavior even over a 
longer period, and they can even contain time variables. All this is not immediately compati-
ble with the concept of a state and would constitute an additional difficulty in using complete 
verification. With the chosen approach the user need not care which part of the property is 
required to connect with the successor property, which part is responsible to check the output 
behavior, and if some parts of the property serve both purposes.  
In relationship to important states it was already mentioned that the completeness checker 
does not really need them. It only checks in the successor test whether the conceptual states of 
sd_wdata
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Figure 15: Modified SDRAM IF property (additional assumptions about request and rw) 
86 
 
successive properties fit together among themselves and in relation to the reference time 
points and the successor relation. But this compatibility is needed to check user provided 
reachability information (cf. section 3.3.4).   
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6 Compositional Complete Verification  
Compositional complete verification [Beyer / Bormann 2008] is described in this chapter with 
two facets. The assembly of complete verifications will be presented at the example of the 
development of a system on chip (SoC) from IP blocks in section 6.1, and results in an effi-
cient method to verify the communication of IP blocks of a SoC in section 6.3. 
Section 6.4 is about the decomposition of complete verification into suitable clusters that is 
usually necessary for the verification of larger modules, such as many IP blocks. Different 
from the assembly, the entire RTL code is here available at least in a first preliminary version 
and it is to be completely verified. The approach is to decompose the circuit into parts which 
are called clusters (cf. section 3.5.6 ), and then to completely verify the clusters under obser-
vation of some restrictions that ensure the composition of the complete verification of the 
clusters to a complete verification of the entire block. 
Of course a development and verification flow starts from IP blocks that are completely veri-
fied with the methods from section 6.4. Once the IP blocks are assembled in SoCs the com-
plete verification follows section 6.3. Thus, the discussion in this thesis reverses the natural 
order of the design and verification process. Anyhow, the theory of the decomposition of a 
complete verification task is derived from the theory of the assembly of complete verifica-
tions, and this justifies reversed presentation in this thesis. At first reading of section 6.3 alls 
IP blocks can be viewed as consisting of only one cluster that is completely verified with the 
methods from the previous chapters.  
Compositional complete verification is based on so-called integration conditions. The ques-
tion, if subcircuits of a SoC communicate properly with one another, can be examined ex-
haustively by checking the integration conditions with an IPC-prover. Integration conditions 
exist for each complete verification, regardless of whether it was carried out on a single clus-
ter, or whether it already comprises multiple clusters. Therefore, this chapter also paves the 
way for a hierarchical application of complete verification of SoC of arbitrary size. 
The theory of compositional complete verification is a suitable adaptation of the theories 
about models of digital systems and the associated Assume-Guarantee reasoning, which clari-
fies questions about the integration of components that were modeled according to these theo-
ries. The relevant mathematics is presented in the Appendix (section 8). 
6.1 Compositional Complete Verification for IP-based SoC Design  
6.1.1 Verification Tasks of IP-based SoC Design  
The first step of a SoC design is the partitioning of the overall function into subtasks. These 
tasks are often taken over by IP blocks, i.e. pre-developed and pre-verified circuits. The SoC 
designer needs to select them, usually from a larger number of different IP blocks with similar 
functionality. Criteria for this selection are of course functional aspects, but also an assess-
ment of the RTL quality, the usefulness of the documentation, royalties, chip area, power con-
sumption, etc. 
The functional aspects include the actual function, processing latencies, throughput and about 
the protocols at the interfaces. The question of the protocols is crucial to ensure the communi-
cation in the SoC design – interface partners should use the same protocol to avoid the cost 
and performance impact of bus bridges. Protocols have been standardized to reduce variability 
and potential mismatches between communication partners.  
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But standardization is inflexible. With standardized protocols it is much harder for the SoC 
designers to find a good trade-off between performance requirements of the communication 
and cost in terms of silicon area and power consumption. Today's SoC design practice there-
fore uses a compromise: Some features of the protocols are marked optional, sometimes ex-
plicitly, sometimes only as the consequence of common design practice.  
These options must be taken into account during the selection of IP blocks. Otherwise, if one 
partner implements a feature that is never requested by the other partner, unnecessary power 
or silicon area is consumed. Alternatively, if one communication partner requests a feature 
that is not supported by the other partner, the communication might break. This error may 
only affect the two communication partners, which is bad enough. But it may also impact the 
whole bus system. Communication errors are often major functional failures of SoCs that can 
not easily be circumvented. 
Such incompatibilities of IP blocks that pretend to support the same standard protocol must be 
ruled out during the selection. At the time of the selection the RTL code of the actual IP block 
is usually not available to the SoC designer, either because the SoC developer did not have 
time to deal with the code, or because business negotiations are not in a state are that allow 
the transfer of the highly sensitive RTL code. The SoC designers then rely on the documenta-
tion of the IP blocks and and compare it with respect to the interface behavior of those blocks 
that should communicate with one another. This alignment is prone to errors. The documenta-
tion may be incomplete, it does not necessarily represent the IP block correctly and it might 
be misunderstood by SoC designers. 
Today, if such incompatibilities escape the attention of the SoC developer, the project is al-
ready lucky if they are discovered in the system simulation of the largely developed SoC. But 
even this is not certain, because an RTL based system simulation of the whole SoC runs so 
slowly that only few scenarios can be simulated. Thus, such communication errors are some-
times noticed only in the product test after the production of the first silicon sample, when the 
fix requires a respin. 
But up to the point in time where the system simulation can be performed, much effort has 
been invested into the new SoC, and all of this effort has been carried out on the basis of the 
initial selection of the IP blocks. It is most likely that a sizeable amount of this effort went 
into the development of the communication infrastructure of the SoC. Frequently, the soft-
ware development begins in parallel with the hardware development. Changes to the original 
selection of the IP blocks lead to additional effort to adapt the communication infrastructure 
and to adapt the already developed software. They should therefore be kept rare and small. 
So it is very helpful for the SoC design to get reliable information about the compatibility of 
potential communication partners already during the selection of the IP blocks.  
6.1.2 Formal Verification of the Communication of the IP Blocks of a SoC  
The technique presented here allows using at an early stage reliable information about the 
compatibility of the interface behavior of IP blocks. Results about the compatibility of these 
blocks can be obtained in minutes. The related approach is a natural consequence of the ques-
tion when the complete verification of separate subcircuits is a complete verification of the 
overall circuit. 
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Prerequisite is a kind of interface description of the complete verification of the IP block - 
similar to [Broy / Rumpe 2007]. This interface description consists of an integration assump-
tion with constraints about behavior and determinedness of input signals, and from an integra-
tion commitment with assertions about the behavior and the determinedness of the output sig-
nals. Integration assumptions and integration commitments are collectively referred to as in-
tegration conditions. If the IP block is completely verified, the integration conditions are 
available. However, it is also worthwhile for an IP provider to set up the integration condi-
tions even without a formal verification. This does not rule out discrepancies between the 
RTL code and the integration conditions, but allows for the compatibility test described in this 
chapter. 
Based on these integration conditions some formal tests can efficiently detect if IP blocks are 
compatible with respect to their communication behavior. It could be imagined that these in-
tegration conditions are made freely available for each IP block. By this the proposed test can 
be performed without making RTL code to a yet undecided buyer of IP. 
6.1.3 Protocol Descriptions by Integration Conditions  
An example of an integration condition has been described in section 3.5.2. Basic syntax of an 
integration condition is  
integration_condition of <module_name> is 
assume: 
 <determination assumptions and constraints>; 
guarantee: 
 <determination commitments and assertions>; 
end integration_condition; 
At least in the context of formal verification, integration conditions allow for the first time a 
description of the main raison d'être of protocols at all, namely to ensure that one module is 
ready to receive some data, when another module really sends it. 
ABFV has no way to express this, and is therefore limited to behavioral aspects of the control 
and data signals. ABFV can express and check comfortably that a data signal is to remain 
unchanged in a certain situation.  But whether this data signal then transmits a valid value, i.e. 
a value that should be evaluated by the receiver, can not be expressed by means of ABFV. 
Complete verification can reason about valid data values with the keyword "determined" of 
the integration conditions. 
The limitations of ABFV become particularly striking at the rdata signal of the SDRAM inter-
face. This signal is not subject to any behavior restriction that could be expressed in an asser-
tion. The signal itself may behave arbitrarily, only that it sometimes transmits read data. This 
is is indicated by            . It But since there is no restriction in the behavior of 
rdata, ABFV descriptions of the processor interface will not mention rdata at all despite 
its prominent role in the protocol. In contrast, Integration conditions will contain the de-
termination commitment 
if ready_o = '1' then determined(rdata) end if; 
which makes the completeness check require a proof goal about rdata whenever 
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In simulation-based verification the transaction extractors from section 3.1.2 identify when a 
signal carries a valid value, because this becomes a parameter of the respective transaction. 
These extracted parameters are compared with the values calculated by a reference model. 
This is how simulation verifies that the modules indeed consistently forward data and ad-
dresses.   
6.1.4 A Simple Compositional Completeness Proof  
To provide a feeling for the intended reasoning of compositionsl complete verification, it is 
assumed that two blocks   and   are connected in series.   shall be completely verified 
by the property set   . The complete verification was executed under the integration as-
sumption     and it proved the integration commitment    . The same applies for  .  
To completely verify the overall circuit, it obviously must be ensured that     is satisfied 
whenever     holds. If this is the case, the circuit is completely verified by the property 
set       . The Integration assumption of the full circuit is     and the integration com-
mitment is       
To prove that the whole circuit is proven by       the criterion from section 5.2.3 must be 
shown. Hence, any two circuits  and   shall be compared, that both satisfy      . Under 
the integration assumption     the property set    proves the integration commitment      
and thus identifies the circuit parts   and    as being completely verified by   .   and 
    show equal input/output behavior to the extent described by     and    . Since     is sat-
isfied,     holds also.    identifies circuit parts   and    which satisfy under the integra-
tion assumption     the integration commitment    . Hence     is satisfied. This shows that 
  and   from Figure 16 are completely described by       for the integration assumption  
    and the integration commitment    .  
6.1.5 Problem with cyclic dependency of IP blocks  
However, the above-mentioned arguments can only be applied as long as there are no circular 
dependencies between the IP blocks. The scenario from Figure 17 shall demonstrate, that 
above reasoning leads to absurd results, if two circuits depend cyclically one on the other. The 
scenario is an anonymized, simplified and focused version of a customer problem [Beyer 
2008].  
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Figure 16: Cluster graph without cycles 
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The circuit under verification consisted of a bus system   and a peripheral  . The only 
interesting part in   is a multiplexor that is connected with   as shown in Figure 17. 
The protocol requires a synchronization signal     that is distributed to all peripherals. 
The peripheral that is currently requested from the bus must control the synchronization signal 
by the multiplexor select       and the local synchronization output      . If 
         , the peripheral   does not control the synchronization signal. This role is 
then taken up by another peripheral which is not part of this example. Its role is mod-
eled here with a free primary input       of  . 
For   a complete verification was carried out with the following integration conditions 
(irrelevant parts were left out) 
integration_condition of bus_system is 
 
assume: 
 determined(own_o); 
 if own_o = '1' then determined(rdy_o) end if; 
 if own_o = '0' then determined(rdy_f) end if;  
 
guarantee: 
if own_o = '1' then rdy_i = rdy_o end if; 
 determined(rdy_i); 
 
end integration_condition; 
The peripheral has been completely verified under the integration conditions 
integration_condition of peripheral is 
 
assume: 
if own_o = '1' then rdy_i = rdy_o end if; 
 determined(rdy_i); 
own_o rdy_ordy_ireq_i,
addr,
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wdata
M1
M2
rdy
rdy_f
 
Figure 17: Problematic Completeness Check 
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guarantee: 
determined(own_o); 
 if own_o = '1' then determined(rdy_o) end if; 
 
end integration_condition; 
At first glimpse this looked as if the full system would be completely verified under the inte-
gration condition 
  
integration_condition of system is 
 
assume: 
 if own_o = '0' then determined(rdy_f) end if; 
 
guarantee: 
determined(own_o); 
 if own_o = '1' then determined(rdy_o) end if;  
 
end integration_condition; 
 
But the completeness of the property set about the peripheral could be proven, although any 
proof goal about       was forgotten. Hence it was obvious that the properties did not verify 
      and misbehavior of rdy_o would not have been detected. This surprising behavior of 
the completeness checker is a result of the determination assumption about the signal       
and the constraint  
if own_o = '1' then rdy_i = rdy_o end if; 
These appear in the determination test 5-8 where the constraint is part of the dependencies   
and   . Whenever a property expects              the determination commitment does not 
have any requests for the signal      . If a property expects             the constraint be-
comes applicable and ensures                and                               . The unconditional de-
termination assumption about       means                     and all this gives                      
which proves the determination commitment.  
The error arose because the integration conditions of the overall circuit could only be derived 
using a circular argument about the integration conditions of the sub-modules. The circular 
reasoning was as follows: The completeness check about   proved the determination com-
mitment about       under the assumption that       is determined. The completeness check 
about   proved the determination of       under the assumption of a conditional determina-
tion of      .   
This chapter will describe the conditions under which complete property sets of cyclically 
interconnected IP blocks may be combined into one complete property set about the full cir-
cuit.  
6.2 Plausibility Tests About Integration Assumptions  
The absurd results from the previous section require measures to rule out cyclic reasoning. To 
this end, conditions were developed that include requirements about the structure of the inte-
gration assumptions. These requirements are a natural consequence of the wish that circuits 
should exist that behave as given by the integration assumption. Such circuits will be referred 
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to as implementations of the integration assumption. Moreover, at least one implementation of 
the integration assumption must not even produce combinatorial loops when combined with 
the circuit under verification. The examples from section 3.5.3 show that the existence of such 
circuits is not trivial.  
 
An integration assumption will be called implementable, iff there is at least one implementa-
tion of it. It will be called structurally compatible with the circuit, if at least one implementa-
tion of it avoids a combinatorial loop through the circuit and that implementation. 
Implementability and structural compatibility are fundamental prerequisites for integration 
assumptions to be realistic. The criteria are detailled out in sections 6.2.2 and 6.2.4 on the 
based of a formalization of integration conditions in section 6.2.1. 
Section 6.1.5 demonstrates that it is not always easy to tell whether integration assumptions 
are indeed realistic images of possible circuit environments. It will be shown in the course of 
the following discussion that the integration assumption of the peripheral there is not imple-
mentable and hence violates one of the fundamental prerequisite of an integration assumption. 
The prerequisites are not only important when complete verifications are to be merged. They 
are already very helpful for the verification of a single cluster. Here they may serve as a plau-
sibility criterion that saves users from wasting effort on complete verifications with unsuitable 
constraints or determination assumptions. These plausibility criteria are much sharper than the 
vacuity tests that are often used in ABFV to warn users about inappropriate constraints or 
antecedents. A comparison between the two approaches is provided in section 6.2.5.  
6.2.1 Formalization of Integration Conditions  
Although the syntax of the integration conditions seems to refer only to one set of variables of 
the model, the formalization of the integration conditions must bear in mind that these condi-
tions characterize complete verification. The completeness checking involved relates to the 
comparison of two arbitrary circuits that meet the relevant properties. Therefore, the integra-
tion assumptions need to restrict two traces   and    of input signals and the integration 
commitments should provide guarantees about two traces   und   .  
Having said this, the integration assumptions are defined in the notation of chapter 5 by 
                                                           
Here   should include all constraints that have been used in the complete verification of a 
module, i.e. the constraints of the dependencies   of the completeness check and the con-
straints under which the individual properties were verified against the RTL code.  
Correspondingly, integration commitments are formalized by  
                                                           
formalized, with   being the conjunction of assertions about the output signals. 
Integration assumptions may be reactive, but reactive formulae are particularly error prone 
and therefore benefit from the plausibility tests.  
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With the exception of the integration conditions all objects used in a completeness check    
occur in pairs. A further denotational simplification shall help here, where double letters refer 
to the pair. Hence,          ,          ,          ,                      
            , With a slight generalization,  will be replaced by 
                        
       
                
       
  
 
Keeping in mind the proof of the assertion   and the formula 5-1, the completenss check thus 
be rewritten to 
 
6-1 
                                       
6.2.2 Implementable Integration Assumptions  
Given traces    and    of internal and output signals, an implementable integration assump-
tion    should only allow input traces    that could be produced by a circuit in the environ-
ment of the circuit under verification. To demonstrate the implementabiliy of an integration 
assumption an equivalent circuit     needs to be found.     receives as inputs the traces  , 
  ,   und    of the internal and output signals of the arbitrary circuits  and    of the com-
pleteness check. On top of this,     may have any number of additional input signals, which 
are collected in the input trace  . The outputs of     provide the input traces   and    to  and 
  .    , its interface and its connection to  and   as well as its relation to    is shown in 
Figure 18. 
 
If there are flip flops in    is is assumed that they are reset to an appropriate value at 
time 0. If    is considered as a separate circuit, the traces   and    become free varia-
bles. To be an implementation of    ,     must satisfy two requirements on these free varia-
bles: Firstly, every trace trace    that     produces a for a given        , must satisfy 
            . Secondly, for every trace    that satisfies              there must be a 
trace   that makes     produce    when         are fed into it. Potential candidates for 
equivalent circuits    can be obtained from [Schickel et al. 2006, Schickel et al. 2007]. 
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Figure 18: Implementable Integration Assumptions 
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One of the consequences of the definition is that non-reactive integration assumptions are 
always implementable.  
Furthermore, an implementable integration assumption must not restrict the traces    and 
  . In other words, for every trace of internal and output signals there is always at least 
one input trace. This justifies the view that the integration assumption is in fact only a condi-
tion about the input signals, but potentially parameterized by the output and internal signals. 
Every element of this input trace may only depend on past and current values of   ,    and 
  and must not depend on future values 
A whole integration assumption need not be implementable, even if it is a conjunction of im-
plementable parts. For example, it is easy to find a circuit that implements  
if own_o = '1' then rdy_i = rdy_o end if; 
It is equally simple to find a circuit with one input that implements 
determined(rdy_i); 
But the implementation assumption from section 6.1.5 
integration_condition of peripheral is 
 
assume: 
if own_o = '1' then rdy_i = rdy_o end if; 
 determined(rdy_i); 
 
guarantee: 
 … 
 
end integration_condition; 
is not implementable, although it contains only of the two lines above. This can be seen as 
follows: The implementation assumption stands for the condition 
                                                                                        
In case of                     it restricts the output trace to                     in contradic-
tion to the fact that implementable integration assumptions must not restrict the output sig-
nals. Consequently, it would already be the requirement of implementability of the integration 
assumption that would have uncovered the problem of section 6.1.5. 
6.2.3 Criteria for the Implementability of Integration Assumptions  
This section introduces criteria for the implementability of integration assumptions. For clari-
ty, the trace    of internal signals will no longer be written in the sequel. It can be consid-
ered as part of the trace   .  
To test the implementability of an integration assumption it must be proven that for every 
input trace    there is a trace    of output and internal signals that satisfies          . 
Such an existence proof can only be executed by SAT-provers under additional requirements 
about the structure of   . The formalization of integration assumptions in ITL has been cho-
sen to adhere to these requirements. The trick is that all integration assumptions are of a form 
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that allows their transformation into a condition                             that maps past val-
ues of the input, output and internal traces and the current values of internal and output signals 
to the current value of the input trace.     is related to the original integration assumption via 
6-2 
                                      
   
 
 
       shall denote the list of values      ,        ,        , ...,      .  
 
   belongs to an implementable integration condition, if the elements of    can be determined 
one after the other, i.e. without a dead end situation where an unsuitable choice of some       
makes it impossible to find an       for some    . Therefore it needs to be tested  
whether for every point in time   there is a value    that satisfies                         . But 
even this test can become quite complex. Further optimization is therefore to split     into 
subconditions     that are responsible for the values of only few input variables, the trace of 
which will be denoted with    . For every   the subcondition     may only depend on input 
variables that were determined by a      with a smaller index. Hence, with 
                       and          
   
     
       
       
          
     it can be written 
 
6-3 
                                    
   
          
   
                   
 
   
 
Based on this decomposition, a first implementability criterion can be provided: To that end a 
constant  shall be defined that provides the highest delay at which signals are evaluated in 
  . With the syntax from section 6.1.3,  provides the maximum depth with which prev op-
erators are interleaved. The criterion shall be examined for all        . It consists of a base 
case for          :  
6-4 
                                    
   
   
         
   
          
   
                   
   
   
 
                   
   
                   
   
 
and a case for    : 
6-5 
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To prove these formulae with SAT, the existential operator needs to be dissolved into a dis-
junction over all possible values of    . This is possible if the signals of     consist only of a 
few bits. For wider variables an alternative implementability criterion is given below. 
To examine condition 6-5 with a formal tool, the variables shall be created relative to  , i.e., 
there should be sets of variables for      ,      ,        ,         , and so forth until          
and         . Earlier elements of    and    will not be evaluated in formula 6-5. The appen-
dix (i.e. section 8) contains a proof that this criterion about integration assumptions guarantees 
the existence of an equivalent circuit    . 
In practice, many integration assumptions have a structure that allows an even simpler test 
about the implementability of an integration assumption, which is still applicable if the disso-
lution of                   
   
                       from the formulae 6-4 or 6-5 into a disjunction 
becomes too large.  
This simplified examination is appicable to those     that consist of a conjunction of con-
straints of the form 
if             
   
                  then   
   
            
   
                  else      
     end if; 
and determination assumptions of the form 
if             
   
                  then determined   
   
  end if; 
In this formula   stands for the trace of the input signals as before,   denotes the trace of out-
put and internal signals.   ,    and    are conditions,    an expression with the result type of 
  , such that the condition of the then-branch of the constraint can always be satisfied. The 
parameter lists indicate the variables that may occur in the respective expressions and condi-
tions. 
For the following considerations the indices and parameter lists of  ,   and   will be omitted. 
  ,   and    denote application to    und   . Then, the implementability test consists of a base 
case for          :  
6-6 
                                    
   
   
         
   
          
   
                   
   
   
 
                         
and a case for    :  
6-7 
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These tests can be executed with SAT algorithms, without the growth of the formulae by the 
unfolding of the existential operators in 6-5. 
These tests can be checked with SAT algorithms and the formulae do not swell as before 
through the unfolding of the existential quantifier. The remarks made above about the selec-
tion of the variables also apply to formula 6-7. Again, a theorem about this implementability 
condition is proven in the Appendix. 
As an example, the second criterion shall be applied to the original integration assumption of 
the peripheral of the example in section 6.1.5. This was 
integration_condition of peripheral is 
 
assume: 
if own_o = '1' then rdy_i = rdy_o end if; 
 determined(rdy_i); 
 
guarantee: 
 … 
 
end integration_condition; 
It is rdy_i which is determined by the integration assumption, furtheron    ,    , 
            and        . The examination of      is trivial, but (         
     is instantiated by  
                                           
And this condition cannot be proven on free variables. This indicates that the original integra-
tion condition from section 6.1.5 is not implementable. Hence the complete verification of the 
peripheral must not be merged with other complete verifications. . 
With the improved integration assumption  
integration_condition of peripheral is 
 
assume: 
if own_o = '1' then rdy_i = rdy_o end if; 
 if own_o = '0' then determined(rdy_i) end if; 
 
guarantee: 
 … 
 
end integration_condition; 
the main part of the tests 6-6 and 6-7 becomes 
                                                                  
This test is satisfied, because the left side of the implication is always violated. Therefore, this 
improved determination assumption should be used for the verification of the example of sec-
tion 6.1.5. 
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6.2.4 Structural Compatibility  
The second requirement about the integration assumptions requires structural compatibility 
with the circuit. To test the structural compatibility a list    of true combinatorial dependen-
cies between an input signal and an internal or output signal is computed. To this end, a syn-
tactic analysis of the RTL code identifies candidates     of a combinatorial dependency 
between an input signal   and an internal or output signal  . Some of these candidates may 
only be syntactic dependencies. To identify true combinatorial dependencies the property 
 
property check_dependency is 
assume: 
at t:  <    > for all input signals except i; 
prove: 
 at t:      ; 
end property;  
is checked on two copies of the model of the circuit under verification. If the property fails, 
the syntactic dependency     is a real one and becomes part of   .  
The combinatorial dependencies of the equivalent circuit    of the integration assumption    
are only determined by a syntactical argument. By this approach the graph     of combinato-
rial dependencies of the integration assumption may become a bit larger than necessary. By 
this the criterion may become somewhat pessimistic, but it is assumed that the integration 
assumption could be rewritten if a syntactic dependency disturbs the criterion although it is 
not real. 
The approach is as follows: If the ITL of        
   
          
   
                    references an 
output or internal signal   at time  ,  a combinatorial dependency     is included in     for 
every signal   in    
   
. Further combinatorial dependencies      will be included for all inputs 
  that are described by          
   
. By this,     may contain longer paths.  
The combinatorial dependencies in     reflect the situation of the equivalent circuit, the 
creation of which is provided in the Annex to demonstrate the implementability of   . If     
is extended by the combinatorial dependencies from   , the situation of the combined circuit 
is reflected. To conclude structural compatibility,          needs to be cycle free.  
It is sufficient to restrict the examination of   onto the variables of only one model of the 
circuit under verification. This is a consequence of symmetry, because if     is a combina-
torial dependency of     or    then      is also a combinatorial dependency and vice ver-
sa. Mixed dependencies of the form     or      are the result of a determination condi-
tion which then also leads to    , such that cycles of   that extend over both sets of varia-
bles will always appear together with cycles in only one set of variables.  
6.2.5 Plausibility Criteria about Constraints and Determination Assump-
tions in ABFV and Complete Verification  
This chapter presents implementability and structural compatibility as the two requirements 
that ensure that an integration condition is sensible. The implementability of the integration 
condition is independent of the circuit, whereas the structural compatibility can only be de-
termined if the respective circuit is known.  
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Plausibility conditions about the constraints of a verification are also important in ABFV. 
There, the plausibility conditions are intended as a guide against unsuitable constraints that 
may devalue the verification. By actually small errors in the constraints the assertions are 
proven for less inputs than intended by the user. A verification under erroneously restrictive 
constraints becomes simpler: The assertions can be proven more easily, and usually the user 
weighs himself in false happiness. This is because the devaluation of the verification does not 
easily become apparent because constraints are the only objects of a verification that are not 
being questioned by the formal tools. To counter this problem, reviews about the constraints 
are executed. In addition plausibility tests have been developed to check the constraints. The-
se plausibility tests detect self-contradictory constraints. The test consists of the proof of an 
implication of the form 
                    
If this can be proven, the constraints are contradictory in themselves and therefore unsuitable. 
If the proof leads to counterexamples, the constraints are accepted. For the plausibility tests, 
the constraints are initially regarded as free variables. In this case the contradictions that are 
discovered arise solely from the interplay of the constraints themselves. In a second pass of 
the plausibility test it is executed on the circuit under verification. This might detect incom-
patibilities between the constraints and the circuit. 
If a plausibility test fails, users want diagnostic support. But it is difficult to generate it for the 
conventional ABFV plausibility test, because the problem arises often from the interaction of 
multiple conditions which are harmless if examined separately. 
However, the hunt for contradictions in the constraints is only a rough test, that highlights 
only the most egregious cases of bad constraints. This test is already satisfied when the con-
straints and the circuit allow even a single input trace. Even if a reactive constraint inadvert-
ently restricts the output behavior of a circuit, it is usually not identified by this rough test. 
Compared to that, the implementability and structural compatibility tests presented here are 
much more critical plausibility tests. Their application to integration assumptions is due to the 
focus of this work. But they can be easily adapted to the needs of ABFV. What needs to be 
done is to check the implementability of the constraints, and they need to be structurally com-
patible with an instance of the circuit. 
This allows at least identifying all situations, in which there is at least one trace of output and 
internal signals, for which the constraint does not allow any input trace. Such a trace of output 
and internal signals can advantageously be returned as a counter example. Consequently, all 
constraints that satisfy the proposed tests are already free of contradictions. Hence the pro-
posed tests reject all constraints that would also be rejected by the usual plausibility tests. 
But it gets even better, because the test for structural compatibility ensures that for every point 
in time there is an input value that satisfies the constraint. Hence it is secured, that constraints 
that pass the proposed tests are free of contradictions, even if the circuit is accounted for. The 
examination of combinatorial paths is sufficient to reject any constraint that would be rejected 
in combination with the circuit.  
All in all, the presented tests are attractive alternatives to todays plausibility tests about con-
straints. They allow a more detailed examination, and besides that they also allow more de-
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tailed diagnosis, because on one side problematic lines of ITL code can be highlighted on the 
other side an output trace can be calculated, in which the problem arises. If the even more 
detailed tests from the second part of section 6.2.3 are performed, even more accurate diagno-
sis is possible. 
6.3 Assembling Complete Verifications  
6.3.1 Compositional Complete Verification and Assume-Guarantee  
Reasoning 
The interconnection of circuit components is treated in many approaches to model digitial 
functionality, such as ASMs [Börger / Stärk 2003], TLT [Cuellar / Huber 1995], TLA 
[Lamport 1994], or UML [Broy / Rumpe 2007]. Related activities are subsumed by the key-
word Assume-Guarantee Reasoning [Abadi / Lamport 1995]. They also have implications for 
reactive constraints derived from the environment of the model [Broy 1994]. 
Assume-Guarantee Reasoning usually uses Moore automata, i.e. automata without direct de-
pendency between outputs and inputs. To justify, that the combination of properly functioning 
Moore automata   and   functions correctly, a proof by contradiction is executed. It is 
assumed that the combination eventually does something wrong. Then there must be a first 
time at which the malfunction occurs in one of the two components. However, the malfunc-
tion can only occur if previously the other component does not behave properly. This is in 
contradiction to the choice of the earliest time when the malfunction had been observed. So 
the the composition of   and   works correctly.  
In contrast, complete verification considers operation automata, for which it is almost a main 
feature that the output signals can be controlled by the inputs. The operation and transaction 
automata are therefore no Moore automata, such that the usual argument of Assume-
Guarantee-Reasoning is not directly applicable. Nevertheless, the theory presented below 
does not impose restrictions on the form of the operation and transaction automata, because 
the problem could be pushed back to the verification of the underlying circuits. But the usual 
automaton representation of synchronous digital circuits is also no Moore automaton, because 
that would prohibit combinatorial dependencies between input and output signals. But taking 
advantage of the requirement that the circuits must not contain combinatorial loops, a refined 
time model  based on causality could be defined, to which the usual Assume-Guarantee rea-
soning can be applied. The results can be transferred to the operation automata in turn, be-
cause they were proven against the RTL description. 
All in all, there are differences to the aforementioned modeling process, because here circuits 
are to be verified. This requires firstly the modelling of the function. Secondly, there are inte-
gration conditions which [Broy/Rumpe 2007] classifies as interface conditions, which provide 
information about the verification code of the single module.  
Another peculiarity of the theory presented here is that it can be applied if a verification task 
is to be divided into the verification of multiple clusters which are connected to each other 
cyclically. It is not required that the model has to be decomposed into the individual clusters, 
as suggested by e.g. [Abadi / Lamport 1995]. Instead it has some practical advantage if the 
model contains multiple clusters, and only a few individual signals have to be cut, i.e., re-
placed by primary inputs and outputs. This cutting shall establish a cycle free dependency 
graph of the clusters. The clusters may remain connected  in something like the opposite di-
rection. This can considerably simplify the verification, as illustrated by section 3.5.7. 
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6.3.2 Preconditions for the Assembly of Complete Verification  
The starting point of the investigation is shown in Figure 19, a circuit  consisting of blocks 
  , each block being fully verified separately with local integration commitments     
and local integration assumptions    .  
  shall have an own global integration commitment   , as well as an own implementable  
global integration assumption   .  and    shall be structurally compatible in accord-
ance with section 6.2.4 . 
 This chapter shall provide information on the conditions that ensure that  is completely 
verified by the union of the complete property sets about the   , with the global integra-
tion assumption    and the global integration commitment   .  
The input signals of the    are divided into primary input signals of the overall circuit that 
form the trace   and signals that are connected to output signals of other blocks. This connec-
tion structure is given by point-to-point signals that are collected in the trace  . Only a selec-
tion of them actually leads to the block  . If a block is driving several inputs, usually be-
cause it is connected to multiple other blocks,   contains multiple signals and the block has 
multiple copies of the output signal that an integration commitment requires to be equal.  
The output signals of the   are divided analogously into primary output signals that 
form the trace  , and signals that drive the input of an other module. These connecting sig-
nals are assembled in the trace  . As long as the circuit is cut along the line shown in Figure 
19, each   is examined separately, and the signals in the connection structure form a trace    
of output signals and a trace    of input signals. The behavior of   in separation is given by a 
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Figure 19: Assembling complete verifications 
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trace predicate      
         . Since the full circuit is assumed to be free of combinatorial 
cycles, the predicate of the full circuit is 
                         
 
 
where   is the trace of all internal signals of all  .  
In the manner described above the signals in the property sets    of the   shall already be 
renamed such that they reflect the connection structure. The   shall be completely verified 
according to the integration assumptions     and the integration commitments     . To ensure 
that the full circuit is completely verified by      with the integration assumption 
                and the integration commitment                 the following pre-
conditions must be met:  
Precondition 1 requires that the overall graph of all combinatorial dependencies of the overall 
circuit, the global and local integration conditions              shall be cycle free.   
Precondition 2 requires that the global integration assumption                 shall be 
implementable and restricts only    (the restricted trace shall be highlighted by bold 
face). In addition, the integration assumptions          
             shall be imple-
mentable and shall restrict only    und    .  
Precondition 3 requires that the global integration assumption                , if evalu-
ated on free variables, may only allow those traces    that are also admitted by the local inte-
gration assumptions    , i.e.  
                           
            
    
 
Precondition 4 requires that, if evaluated on free variables, the local integration assumptions 
are justified by local integration commitments and the global integration assumption, i.e.,  
                                            
            
 
                     
  
 
 
Here,    denotes a trace of copies of the variables of    .  
Precondition 5 requires that the global integration commitment must be a result of the local 
integration commitments and the global integration assumption, i.e. that  
                                    
 
                 
holds on free variables.  
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If the preconditions 1 to 5 are satisfied, the union      of the property sets of the partial cir-
cuits completely verifies the whole circuit . The appendix provides the proof.  
6.3.3 Examination of the Preconditions  
Section 6.2 describes in detail, how the preconditions 1 and 2 are checked. The preconditions 
4 and 5 are obvious applications of a SAT prover.  
It remains to be clarified, how the existence statement of precondition 3 is to be checked. In 
practice, the individual interfaces of a block are usually independent, and the signals of    
form such an interface. It is therefore likely, that every     can be decomposed into a 
number of conjuncts, one of which is    
   about the signals of    that is independent of 
   , i.e. 
         
                
                    
                      
In this case the check of precondition 3 can be reduced to the implication  
                    
                
 
 
that can easily be handled by a SAT prover.  
6.3.4 Role of the Communication Structure  
When selecting IP blocks for a SoC it is usually not known exactly, how the blocks are to be 
interconnected. Accordingly it is checked only for selected connections, whether the blocks 
involved can communicate. The selection of the blocks that are examined depends on the in-
tended communication. Point-to-point connections need only two blocks, but if blocks are to 
communicate via a bus system, then all blocks of the bus system need to be interconnected. If 
the bus system is to be designed to match the performance requirements of the blocks later on, 
it may first be replaced with a simpler structure, just to ensure protocol compliance. For ex-
ample, a bus matrix with several connection layers need not be developed before the protocol 
compliance of the IP blocks is checked. Nor is it necessary to introduce flip flops for interme-
diate synchronization of physically long buses.  
It is advantageous if the bus infrastructure is an IP block itself. In this case, this IP block is 
just one of the   like any other IP block. In this case the connection structure of section 
6.3.2 becomes particularly simple, because it only needs to represent how each IP is 
connected to the bus.  
6.4 Decomposition of a Complete Verification Task 
6.4.1 Disassembling a Verification Task into Clusters  
This section is about the complete verification of a circuit that was designed and developed as 
a  whole. This could for example be one of the blocks, which are combined into an SoC with 
the procedures previously presented.  
As discussed in section 3.5.6, such circuits can usually not be described by a single operation 
automaton. Instead, the circuits must be considered in parts called clusters, for which opera-
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tion automata are created. The overall function of such circuits is described by multiple chains 
of operation properties. The chains run concurrently one besides the other, and they are con-
nected to each other via signals. Accordingly, the individual clusters have input and output 
signals that are internal signals in the context of the overall circuit. 
If a formal verification engineer shall work on a larger RTL, s/he may decide how much of 
the RTL shall be processed with the frontend of the assertion checker, which converts it into 
an automaton. The choice may range between two extremes: The user may choose to convert 
the whole RTL at once. But then, a verification in multiple clusters may lead to inconsisten-
cies that will be discussed in section 6.4.3. These inconsistencies can be avoided if the clus-
ters are examined in isolation. This is simple, if a cluster coincides with some module of the 
circuit. In this case the user may indicate to the formal model generation that it shall create the 
model for that module. This turns the module inputs and outputs into primary signals. If the 
cluster does not coincide with the module boundaries of the circuit, a larger circuit will be 
specified for the formal model generation, and then the input and output signals of the cluster 
will be “cut”. This is an operation of the formal frontend, which turns the driver of the cut 
signal into a primary output and creates a primary input that feeds all loads of the cut signal. 
By this, the model may contain superfluous parts besides the cluster, but these parts will not 
influence the behavior of the cluster because there is no connection between the superfluous 
parts and the cluster.  
Examining the clusters in isolation has the disadvantage, that all restrictions about the behav-
ior of input signals of the cluster must be made explicit in a constraint. This is possible, but 
sometimes creates more effort than necessary. A potential optimization is discussed in the 
next section 6.4.2.  
6.4.2 Advantages of Models with Multiple Clusters  
Usually it is not necessary to completely isolate a cluster. An example of this is given in Fig-
ure 20. In this example, the proof of the operation properties of both clusters can be carried 
out on the full model of the circuit that contains both clusters, without cutting any sig-
nals between the clusters. It only needs to be ensured that        . Then the reason-
ing from section 6.1.4 can be used to prove that the property sets of   und   provide a 
complete verification of the full circuit.  
If the clusters are not completely separated in the model, there are input and output signals of 
a cluster, that are internal signals of the circuit under verification. Such input and output sig-
nals are referred to as internal, as opposed to the primary input and output signals. If the focus 
is on the interface of a cluster, with no distinction between primary and internal signals, the 
term local inputs and outputs of the cluster will be used. In Figure 20, the signals      are 
internal inputs of the cluster   and internal outputs of  . The local inputs and output 
of   are      and     . 
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Figure 20: Internal signals being input signals to a cluster 
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Conditions shall be called local constraints if they take the role of a constraint during the 
complete verification of an incompletely separated cluster. For the verification of the full cir-
cuit, local constraints are justified by assertions of the neighbouring clusters and global con-
straints of the full verification.  
It is advantageous not to completely separate the clusters of a complete verification, because 
that saves verification effort. The cluster   in Figure 20, for example, ensures that   ob-
tains only those traces that   can actually produce. Since the verification is carried out 
with IPC, these traces include those from unreachable states of   but even this still means 
a limitation of the behavior of     . This limitation makes the verification of   easier, 
although it need not be mentioned explicitly in     and    .  
If   and   were examined separately,      would become a primary input of the model 
that contains  . The protocol of this internal interface is often not standardized, so that the 
identification of the protocol conditions can become a time-consuming task. These conditions 
should not be too weak, because then the proofs of the operation properties    become im-
possible, but they should also not be too strong, because then they cannot be proven on  . 
To find the right balance can already be difficult if the two circuits are free of errors. But it 
gets worse, if e.g.,   has an error that only occurs if a certain feature of the protocol is used. 
A user will be tempted to insert and remove a condition about the protocol feature, depending 
on wether s/he proves   and  . If   and   remain connected, many conditions of the 
protocol need not be fomalized explicitly, and this saves effort.  
6.4.3 Necessity of Primary Input and Output Signals  
Unfortunately, the reasons for the completeness of the verification of the circuit from Figure 
20 cannot easily be transferred to circuits with a cyclic connection of the clusters. An example 
of the verification gaps that may occur is shown in Figure 21. There are two clusters, which 
both consist mainly of a flip-flop with enable. When the enable signal has the value '1', the 
flip-flops store from the value of the data input signal, otherwise, they keep the number that is 
already stored. 
enable_i
sig_o
a
bCluster M1
Cluster M2
Resetwert = '0'
Resetwert = '1'
 
Figure 21: Cyclic Cluster Dependency 
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Cluster   can be completely verified with the Integration Condition 
 
integration_condition of M1 is 
 
assume: 
determined(a); 
determined(enable_i); 
prev(reset) or prev(a) /= a;  
 
guarantee: 
 determined(b); 
 prev(reset) or prev(b) /= b;  
 determined(sig_o); 
 sig_o = '1'; 
 
end integration_condition; 
The corresponding operation property is 
property m1_op is 
dependencies: constraints_from_integration_assumption, no_reset; 
assume: 
 at t:    b = '1'; 
prove: 
 at t+1:   b = '0'; 
 at t+2:   b = '1'; 
 during [t+1, t+2]: sig_o = '1'; 
end property; 
Surprisingly, this property can be proven on the full model. Since the constraint restricts the 
output   of the flip-flop from   it implicitly requests that the enable signal yields ‘1’, as 
soon as the reset becomes inactive. Therefore, the register values are pushed forward such that 
the change of the flip-flop values actually happens, that is claimed by the property. This 
proves the assertion of the integration commitment. 
Analogously,   can be completely verified under the integration condition 
intergration condition of M2 is 
 
assume: 
determined(b); 
determined(enable_i); 
prev(reset) or prev(b) /= b;  
 
guarantee: 
 determined(a); 
 prev(reset) or prev(a) /= a;  
 
end integration_condition; 
But from these two complete verifications is must not be concluded that the full circuit satis-
fies the integration condition 
integration_condition of M is 
 
assume: 
 determined(enable_i); 
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guarantee: 
 determined(sig_o); 
 sig_o = '1'; 
 
end integration_condition; 
Because this would obviously be wrong:       is directly connected to         , and there is 
no constraint that restricts it. Hence,       can of course become ‘0’.  
This happens, although the integration conditions of   and   satisfy almost all precondi-
tions for the assembly of complete verifications according to section 6.3.2. The only excep-
tion is that it was required that IP blocks are completely verified on separate models. In fact it 
is not possible to verify the clusters   and   on separate formal models with   and   as 
primary inputs and outputs. Consequently, the integration conditions of   and   are no 
longer correct and the global integration condition can no longer be concluded.  
6.4.4 Adaptation of the Model on the Base of the Cluster Graph  
The theory of compositional complete verification that was developed for this thesis balances 
between the desire to save effort by keeping the clusters connected as much as possible, and 
the requirements arising from the soundness of the proof procedure that requires to cut signals 
between the clusters, as demonstrated by the counter example from section 6.4.3.  The com-
promise is to allow models in which multiple clusters may be connected by internal signals, 
but where connecting signals are cut to the extent necessary to avoid cyclic dependencies be-
tween the clusters.  
The first activity to set such a verification up is the extraction of the cluster graph. In this 
graph, the clusters are nodes that are connected by directed edges. The edges lead from one 
cluster to another, if there is a local output signal of the first cluster that is a local input signal 
of the second cluster. In general, this cluster graph contains cycles. These cycles must be bro-
ken. This is done by elimination of a number of edges. These edges correspond to signals that 
need to be cut. The cutting of signals was introduced in section 6.4.1.  
By this a model with multiple connected clusters is created, that has a number of additional 
primary inputs and outputs. The complete verification of the clusters is executed on this mod-
el. If during these verifications reactive constraints become necessary about one or the other 
local cluster input, these inputs need to be cut as well, and the verification may need to be 
suitably adapted.  
Hence, if there are clusters that interact with each other linearly, their interaction need not be 
cut and this might save effort. But in practice there are also reasons to cut more than the min-
imum number of signals, e.g. to reduce the size of the model if it leads to high proof times.  
6.4.5 Preconditions about the Integration Assumptions  
Following the previous section, the original task of formal verification of some larger circuit 
  is decomposed into the subtasks to completely verify the clusters  , but on a model   
that contains multiple clusters and many, but not all, connections between the clusters. The 
effort for a verification on   are higher than the effort for the inconsistent verification on , 
but the effort increase can usually be limited if the cut signals are chosen wisely, and it re-
mains less than the additional effort that arises if separate models were used for every  . 
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Like in section 6.3.2, the integration conditions of the subtasks and the global integration con-
ditions must also meet certain preconditions to ensure that the overall circuit is completely 
verified by the set of all properties of all clusters.  
To formalize these preconditions, it must be noted that there are now three categories of local 
input signals for each cluster. The first category are the primary signals of the overall circuit. 
Their trace shall be denoted with   as usual. A second category are the primary inputs created 
by cutting internal signals. Their trace shall be denoted with   . The third category are the 
uncut internal input signals with the denotation  . Analogously there are primary output sig-
nals of the overall circuit with the trace  , new primary outputs with the trace    created by 
cutting,  and internal output signals with the trace  .  
The following preconditions are modified versions of those in section 6.3.2, primarily sup-
plemented by the treatment of the traces   of internal inputs and internal outputs of the clus-
ter: 
Precondition 1 requires that the integration assumption     of each cluster can be written as 
a conjunction of a condition    
    about the internal inputs and outputs, and a condition 
   
     about the primary signals, i.e. the primary inputs and output of the overall circuit and 
all cut signals: 
         
                    
                 
                          
The combinatorial dependencies of , of the integration assumptions    
    
 and the global 
integration assumption    must again form a cycle free graph         
   
    
. 
Precondition 2 requires that the global integration assumption                    is im-
plementable and that only the input trace    of    is restricted by   . Moreover, the inte-
gration assmptions    
                          must be implementable and must con-
strain only    and    .  
Precondition 3 requires that                    allows on free variables only those trac-
es    that are also admitted by the integration assumptions, i.e.   
                        
                         
    
 
Precondition 4 requires that the local integration commitments of the clusters and the global 
integration assumption satisfy the local integration assumptions of the clusters. Consequently,  
                                                  
               
 
                        
  
 
 
should hold on free variables. Again,    denotes a trace of copies of the variables of   . 
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Precondition 5 requires that the global integration commitment must be a consequence of the 
local integration commitments and the global integration assumption, i.e. 
                                                                
shall hold on free variables.  
If the preconditions 1 to 5 hold, the union      of the properties is complete and verifies  
under the integration conditions    and   . A detailed proof will be provided in the Appen-
dix.  
The process to examine the preconditions is analogous to what was said in section 6.3.3. 
6.4.6 Example  
At the end of this thesis the decomposition of a complete verification shall be demonstrated at 
a circuit that consists of the processor and the SDRAM interface. The scenario shall be that 
both were developed together, and the SDRAM Interface is an exclusive interface to the in-
struction memory. Moreover, it shall be assumed that no verification was executed so far. The 
protocol between SDRAM Interface and processor shall represent an ad-hoc protocol. This 
means that initially no protocol description is available, neither informally by some specifica-
tion, nor by the integration conditions from section 3.5.2 
SDRAM memory blocks are to be used that are provided by a third party. These are character-
ized by data sheets from which, by consideration of the clock frequencies, the integration 
conditions are deduced: 
integration_condition of sdram is 
assume: 
 determined(sd_ctrl); 
 if sd_ctrl = read or sd_ctrl = write or sd_ctrl = activate then 
  determined(sd_addr); 
 end if; 
if sd_ctrl = precharge or sd_ctrl = activate then  
next(sd_ctrl = nop) end if; 
 end if; 
 if sd_ctrl = write then determined(sd_wdata) end if;  
 
guarantee: 
 if prev(sd_ctrl, 2) = read then determined(sd_rdata) end if; 
end integration_condition;  
The cluster graph of the processor and the SDRAM interface contains cycles. To select the 
signals that should be cut, it is observed that the SDRAM interface requires that request and 
address signals are kept stable during a request, i.e., until activation of the ready signal. This 
requires a reactive constraint that restricts the signals request and address and therefore they 
are cut, which has the nice side effect that this already removes the cycles from the cluster 
graph. The verification is therefore performed on a model with signal cuts according to Figure 
22. This block diagram corresponds to Figure 3, but with a few differences. In particular, the 
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rw signal is treated as if it is always set to '1', because the SDRAM interface should only read 
instructions. Therefore, the write data signal is superfluous
4
. 
A further complication shall be that the processor only works correctly if the ready signal 
provides pulses and is never active for two consecutive clock cycles. If processor and 
SDRAM interface were verified separately, this condition needed to be an explicit part of the 
integration conditions.  But since the two modules are interconnected in one model, this con-
dition can be left out. The resultant integration conditions are 
integration_condition of processor is 
assume: 
 determined(ready); 
 if ready = '1' then determined(rdata); end if;  
 
 <assumption about the data interface> 
guarantee: 
 determined(request); 
 if request = '1' then determined(address); end if; 
 if prev(request) = 1 and prev(ready) = 0 then  
request = '1' and 
address = prev(address); 
 end if;  
 
 <commitment about the data interface> 
end integration_condition; 
and  
integration_condition of sdram_if is 
                                                 
4
 For simplification it shall be assumed that the program code is already in the memory. The mechanisms to load 
the binary are ignored.   
SDRAM Interface
sd_addr sd_ctrlsd_wdata sd_rdata
Processor
request address rdata ready
 
Figure 22: Verification if a circuit consisting of processor and SDRAM interface 
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assume: 
 determined(request); 
if request = '1' then determined(address); end if; 
 if prev(request) = 1 and prev(ready) = 0 then  
  request = '1' and 
address = prev(address); 
 end if; 
 
 if prev(sd_ctrl, 2) = read then determined(sd_rdata) end if; 
guarantee: 
 determined(ready); 
if ready = 1 then  
determined(rdata); 
end if; 
 
 determined(sd_ctrl); 
 if sd_ctrl = precharge or sd_ctrl = activate then  
next(sd_ctrl = nop) end if; 
 if sd_ctrl = read or sd_ctrl = activate then 
  determined(sd_addr) 
 end if; 
 sd_ctrl /= write; 
end integration_condition; 
 
The integration conditions do not differentiate between signals that are created by cutting in-
ternal inputs or outputs, because this can be sorted out automatically. 
It will now be examined whether these two integration conditions verify that the entire circuit 
is verified under the global integration condition  
integration_condition of full_circuit is 
assume: 
 if prev(sd_ctrl, 2) = read then determined(sd_rdata) end if; 
 <integration assumptions of data interface> 
guarantee: 
determined(sd_ctrl); 
 if sd_ctrl = precharge or sd_ctrl = activate then  
next(sd_ctrl = nop) end if; 
 if sd_ctrl = read or sd_ctrl = activate then 
  determined(sd_addr) 
 end if; 
 sd_ctrl /= write;  
<integration commitment about data interface> 
end integration_condition; 
To this end, the preconditions of section 6.4.5 get tested. 
Firstly, the cluster graph of Figure 22 is cycle-free. The SDRAM cluster has no local cluster 
inputs, therefore     
        . Moreover,      has no combinatorial dependencies.  
For the processor interface,    
    is given by the integration assumption with the exception of 
the provisions for the data interface. It is    
          and therefore no combinatorial de-
pendency involved. 
There are also no combinatorial dependencies in   . This satisfies precondition 1. 
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,    
    
 and    are implementable. Therefore precondition 2 is satisfied. 
By recalculating it can be seen that the preconditions 3, 4 and 5 are also met. This shows that 
the property sets of the processor and of the SDRAM interface together completely verify the 
overall circuit. 
  
114 
 
7 Epilogue  
This thesis describes a breakthrough in the functional verification of digital circuit designs. It  
first transfers the paradigm of transaction-based verification from simulation to formal verifi-
cation. One result of this transfer is a particular form of formal properties, called operation 
properties. Circuits are examined with operation properties by Interval Property Checking, a 
particularly powerful SAT-based functional verification. This allows examination of circuits, 
which are otherwise considered too complex for formal verification. Furthermore, this thesis 
describes a tool that is to be applied to sets of operation properties, and identifies all verifica-
tion gaps, keeps pace with the complexity that IPC-based formal verification can handle and 
is called the completeness checker. The methodology of the operation properties and the tech-
nology of the IPC-based property checker and the completeness checker form a beneficial 
symbiosis for functional verification of digital circuits. Based on this, a procedure is devel-
oped  to completely verify also the connection of completely verified modules, which is de-
rived from the theories about modeling of digital systems. 
The approach presented has demonstrated in many commercial application projects that it 
rightly bears the name "complete functional verification", because in these application pro-
jects no errors were found after reaching a termination criterion that is well-defined by the 
completeness checker.  
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8 Appendix: The Mathematics of Compositional Complete 
Verification  
Remark: To save effort I will not translate this section until somebody expresses dedicated 
interest and is not capable of the German language. Please get in touch with me: 
joerg.d.bormann@web.de.  
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